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Foreword
For Oxfam America and all the individuals concerned with publishing this 
book, a steady impetus has been to disseminate the knowledge that should, 
but too often does not, accompany efforts to provide development and 
disaster assistance.
This book is encyclopedic in its ideas, recommendations, and questions 
yet to be answered. It should humble every voluntary and government 
agency that presumes to give effective disaster assistance, because it 
indicates the degree of expertise, organizational ingenuity, and above all, 
sensitivity to Third-World needs and cultures that is essential for truly 
constructive disaster assistance.
Throughout its thirteen-year history, Oxfam America has been 
attempting to understand how an agency like ours, primarily dedicated to 
aiding self-reliant development, should and can respond effectively to the 
all-too-frequent disasters in areas where we work.
Disaster mitigation and preparedness should be the main objectives, 
obviously, and Fred Cuny makes clear that disasters are largely preventable, 
even when natural catastrophes are beyond human control or even 
prediction. Beyond this, a major contribution of the book is to significantly 
advance understanding of the interactions between disasters and poverty; 
between disaster recovery needs and ongoing development needs; and 
between the relief and development assistance strategies and programs of 
aid organizations.
Poor people are the most frequent victims of disasters. Cuny shows why 
the poor are especially vulnerable to natural and political catastrophes. 
Similarly, disasters may further entrench or exacerbate poverty; or, seen 
from another perspective, interrupt or reverse the progress of poor people 
in achieving self-reliant development.
vii
viii Disasters and Development
On the other hand, a disaster may open a society to development 
possibilities. Some have contended that the Managua earthquake disaster 
(1972) contributed to the downfall of the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza. 
Cuny explores several notions of how a disaster, for all its destructiveness, 
presages possibilities for development.
Aid agencies should read this book closely for its implications for relief 
and development assistance stretegies and programs. One striking theme is 
that disaster relief ought not to be seen as an isolated intervention, 
unrelated to the affected society’s prospects for long-term recovery and 
development. This implies at least two questions. Are specialized aid 
organizations, which provide relief exclusively, inherently unaware of or 
indifferent to the development processes at work in the disaster-affected 
community? It is well documented that food relief organizations inundated 
Guatemala with unneeded food aid after the earthquake in 1976. Develop­
ment-minded agencies, on the other hand, heard the Guatemalan villagers 
say that their priorities were: shovels to recover food from collapsed 
household granaries; funds to build larger granaries for the oncoming 
harvest; and protection of local grain markets against a glut of imported 
food relief.
The parallel question is whether or not development agencies will have 
the expertise and outlook that will permit them to respond effectively to 
development processes that may be interrupted, temporarily blocked, or 
even shattered by disaster. Development agencies, in their understandable 
concern that relief may breed or perpetuate dependencies, can easily move 
to the opposite extreme of ignoring disaster situations that require relief. 
Worse, they may close their minds to understanding the interactions 
between disaster recovery and development processes.
Encouraging local self-help works at the relief stage at the same time that 
it is a bridge to the rehabilitation and development stages for a completely 
shattered society. Both relief and development assistance should be 
predicated upon respect for the recuperative and self-help inclinations of 
people affected by a disaster.
Oxfam America welcomes this book’s elaboration of the reasons why 
respect for local cultures and realities, and for the potential of working 
partnerships with local people, is not only desirable but necessary for 
effective disaster assistance. It elucidates the forces within disaster situations 
and organizational dynamics that repeatedly drive aid organizations into 
costly errors of omission and commission. Aid organizations persistently 
yield to the pressures of crisis, time constraints, funding sources, and 
management imperatives in providing the wrong kind of assistance, in the 
wrong way at the wrong time. After the last Guatemalan earthquake, one 
respected international aid organization, by its own admission, launched an
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inappropriate housebuilding program for the homeless. The houses were 
culturally incompatible with local preferences, very susceptible to environ­
mental ravages, and too expensive to be maintained by poor campesinos. 
Incredibly, many houses went unoccupied. Other organizations, working 
with campesinos and their organizations, developed more appropriate house 
repair and replacement options, featuring adaptations of traditional houses, 
locally affordable and available materials, and training programs for area 
builders. Even this advanced approach produced mixed results from which 
we should learn.
Yet Cuny never goes off on flights of fancy. His book moves much 
beyond the platitudes about the blunders or heroics of aid organizations to 
clarify first principles for action and to prompt us as designers and 
administrators of disaster assistance to be more reflective and critical of 
what we are doing. Indeed, one major finding is that aid organizations tend 
not to learn from their experience because of the lack of a reflective attitude, 
memory loss due to staff turnover, and a general absence of training 
programs to encourage learning within and between aid organizations.
Working together in the housing construction education project of 
Programa Kuchuba’l, a disaster response to the Guatemalan earthquake, 
Oxfam America and Intertect decided the experience was full of possibili­
ties for learning by local and international aid agencies. What began as a 
casestudy of Programa Kuchuba’l (Chapter 10) evolved into this more 
ambitious and eclectic book.
Oxfam America learned much from the collaboration in Programa 
Kuchuba’l with Guatemala community leaders, World Neighbors and the 
British Oxfam, and Intertect, the Dallas consulting firm that Fred Cuny 
heads. We sustained and appreciated continual dialogue with Fred over 
several years, in which he was diverted from this publication project by 
consulting or operational roles in yet new disasters, as in the Caribbean, 
India, and Kampuchea. We thank especially the Wolohan Family and the 
Tinker Foundation who, seeing the promise of this book, underwrote the 
early stages of the project and waited so patiently for the results.
JOSEPH SHORT 
Executive Director 
Oxfam America
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Disasters and Development

Introduction
Disasters hurt people. They injure and kill. They cause emotional stress and 
trauma. They destroy homes and businesses, cause economic hardships, 
and spell financial ruin for many. And the people hit worst are the poor. A 
natural disaster can happen anywhere, but for a combination of reasons— 
political as well as geographic—most large-scale disasters occur in the 
region between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. This 
region encompasses most of the poorer developing nations, which we call 
the Third World.
For the survivors of a natural disaster, a second disaster may also be 
looming, for the very aid that is intended to help them recover may be 
provided in such a way that it actually impedes recovery, causes further 
economic hardship, and renders the society less able to cope with the next 
disaster.
This book is about disaster response and the way in which relief agencies 
and other organizations provide aid and assistance in the developing 
countries. The book focuses on international disaster assistance, the aid 
provided by the industrialized nations through myriad international orga­
nizations, both governmental and private, which the public calls the inter­
national relief system.
International aid is highly visible, yet it represents only a small part of the 
total recovery picture, both in terms of resources and the actions taking 
place within the affected society. The reader should remember that even in 
the most intensive international response, outside aid will probably not 
amount to more than 30-40 percent of the total expenditures for disaster 
recovery.
The international response has added importance, however, for it sets 
the tone and often defines the scope and methods used by the affected 
countries themselves in dealing with the disaster. Unfortunately, many of
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the techniques developed by the industrialized nations foi dealing with 
disasters in their own societies are inappropriate for use in the Third World. 
Many of the fundamental assumptions are wrong, and many of the actions 
are counterproductive and actually delay recovery.
For years, disasters have been treated as separate events, and relief has 
tended to ignore the implications of disasters for the social and economic 
development of a society. The most basic issues in disasters are their impact 
on the poor and the links between poverty and vulnerability to a disaster. 
(Ironically, high vulnerability is often a direct result of people’s desire for 
modernity. Those most capable of coping with disaster are those who live in 
the least sophisticated but most self-reliant societies, while those who have 
begun to seek a change in their social and economic status are least 
equipped to deal with calamity.)
Nevertheless, the fundamental themes of this book are that it is the poor 
who suffer most in disasters, that they are vulnerable in a more complete 
sense because they are poor, and that we must address the question of how 
to reduce poverty and place disaster response in the context of development 
if we hope to reduce suffering and to make a true contribution to recovery.
The international agencies have an opportunity to do this, for they have 
the interest, the technology, and valuable resources to contribute. For this 
reason, the developing countries look to the more developed nations for 
leadership. To be effective, however, we must re-examine our underlying 
assumptions about disasters and how people react, about aid and the role it 
plays in disaster recovery (and, by implication, development itself), and 
about the nature of the organizations that have been established to 
respond.
The book is divided into three parts. The first is an examination of 
natural disasters and what happens in a society affected by such an event. 
The second focuses on disaster response, especially by international agen­
cies. The impact of response on the affected society is explored, as well as 
the structure and workings of the system that has evolved to respond, and 
the actual manner in which assistance is delivered. The final part of the 
book answers in practical terms the issues raised in the previous parts. It 
explores ways in which response can be improved through proper planning 
both before and after disasters.
The primary focus is on two types of events: earthquakes and hurricanes. 
This is because they are the most traumatic. Annually they kill the most 
people, thus they draw the most attention from the agencies that respond to 
disasters. They also provide a good platform for exploring disasters because 
they affect more sectors of a society and an economy than any other types of 
disaster.
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To a lesser extent, droughts and famines are discussed. These are of 
rising concern, not only because of their contribution to world hunger, but 
also because both the scope and severity of droughts can be expected to 
increase, and the effects of a large-scale famine can have a major impact on 
food supplies and economic systems far beyond the actual borders of the 
shortage. The study of drought and famine has not received the same level 
of interest and research as the more dramatic disasters, and the focus of this 
book regrettably reflects this. But while the effects of drought, the needs of 
the victims, and the response patterns are different, it is important to 
remember that concerns about the vulnerability of the poor, the long-term 
impact of the response, and the necessity of approaching disasters from a 
development context remain the same.
Throughout the book, four disasters are mentioned frequently: the 
Managua, Nicaragua, earthquake of 1972; the Andhra Pradesh, India, 
cyclone of 1977; the Guatemalan earthquake of 1976; and the drought and 
famine of the Sahel region of Africa in the early 1970s. The Managuan 
earthquake demonstrates the impact of a disaster on a large capital city, and 
Andhra Pradesh cyclone that on a rural agricultural region. The Guate­
malan earthquake shows the impact on virtually an entire country, and the 
Sahel drought and famine illustrate what can happen to an entire region. It 
should be evident after reading the book that while the areas affected are 
different, the lessons are the same.
In our examination of disaster response, we will explore in detail the 
nature of disaster assistance and consider several important questions. Is 
the emphasis on rapid response desirable? Is response focusing on the most 
important needs? Do the relief approaches used and the goods commonly 
supplied meet the needs of the victims or those of the donors? Are we 
concentrating our response during the most appropriate phase of the 
disaster?
Our review of the relief agencies should also stimulate some questions. 
Are these organizations the most appropriate vehicles for disaster assis­
tance? If disasters are such an important part of the development equation, 
why does the system rely so heavily on untrained staff and volunteers? Why 
is it so difficult to improve the performance of the relief agencies? And, 
most important, what are appropriate roles for relief and for development 
groups?
The most common approach to providing disaster assistance is through 
formal programs. A program is the focal point where all the ideas, ideals, 
and resources are translated into action. Yet programs, the process by which 
they are formulated, and the techniques by which they are managed are 
little understood. Agencies give little training to their staff on project
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planning or management, and few programs are thoroughly evaluated. 
This book explores the usual process of program planning and some 
reasons why programs often fall short of their goals.
To provide the reader with a working example of how a program is 
developed and executed, some of the problems typically encountered, and 
a look at the consequences and long-term impact, we will examine 
Programa Kuchuba’l, conducted by OXFAM U.K., OXFAM America, and 
World Neighbors. Programa Kuchuba’l was established in the Guatemalan 
highlands following the earthquake in 1976. It was primarily a housing 
reconstruction program, although several other post-disaster projects and 
activities were conducted by the program staff. This particular program was 
chosen for several reasons. It was one of the largest and longest programs 
conducted in Guatemala. It trained people to build earthquake-resistant 
housing using local materials and technology, rather than providing 
housing outright, a unique approach at that time. The program was rather 
sophisticated, using ideas, training materials, and approaches that were not 
common at that time. Many of these were copied by other organizations in 
Guatemala, and many of the ideas and materials are finding their way into 
reconstruction programs in other parts of the world. Finally, I was con­
sultant to the project and am familiar with most of the details in its planning 
and operation, as well as many of the shortcomings that developed.
Only a few of the approaches used by Programa Kuchuba’l were, in fact, 
new. The material subsidy schemes, for example, have been used many 
times in the past. But the way in which elements of the program were 
combined showed a good deal of sophistication. Although many of the 
ideas and approaches once considered unique have found expression 
elsewhere and have been improved upon, Programa Kuchuba’l is still by 
most standards a good program. For this reason, it provides a positive 
example for examining operational programs and illustrates how, with a 
little forethought, concern for the long-term impact, and the use of an 
essentially developmental approach, disaster response can have a sub­
stantial impact on a society.
Throughout this book, housing programs are emphasized. The damage 
to and destruction of housing in cataclysmic disasters are the single highest 
cause of death and injury and result in the greatest economic loss to the 
poor in terms of property. Housing also illustrates how many of the related 
development issues come into focus when a disaster strikes. For example, 
land tenure, urbanization, and job skills are all related to housing and must 
be taken into account in both disaster response and development. And the 
housing sector is complex, providing a good viewpoint from which to 
examine agency response to various needs.
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To a large extent, this book explores disaster response without con­
sidering the political context. In reality, just as disasters and development 
cannot be separated, neither can disaster response be divorced from 
politics. Unfortunately, few governments in the Third World are democratic 
and many regimes perpetuate underdevelopment because it supports the 
needs of an oligarchy or other privileged class. Thus many of the ideas 
presented here are anathema to these groups. For them, control of disaster 
relief is another way of maintaining the status quo, and a paternalistic dole 
of relief goods from foreigners is the preferred method of aid, for it is in 
keeping with the dictatorial system.
Some disaster specialists argue that any examination of disasters in the 
context of development automatically becomes political, that reducing the 
vulnerability of the poor is a development question, and that such ques­
tions must be answered politically. I agree. But this should not deter us 
from examining disasters individually. For a society to develop, many 
obstacles must be overcome, and it is important that each be examined 
thoroughly in its own right. In this way, basic problems can be identified 
and alternatives reviewed. This is important in the field of disasters, for even 
if all players have the best of intentions, current practice complicates—not 
complements—development.
A word should be said about two terms used in this book: victims and 
intervention. The term victims has many negative connotations. It provokes 
images of helplessness, of people who must be taken care of. For this 
reason, many agencies have used substitutes such as beneficiaries or 
recipients. These do not adequately describe all the people affected, 
however, and may not accurately depict the actions taking place (as we shall 
see, not all people benefit). The term survivors could be used, but technically 
it applies only to those who have escaped a life-threatening situation. Thus, 
rather than create a new buzzword, the author has chosen to go with victims. 
Victims, however, are not helpless. They are capable of making intelligent 
choices and when special allowances are made so that victims can cope with 
personal losses, they can participate effectively in all post-disaster activities. 
It is hoped that the reader will come to understand that in disaster response, 
the term victim should be coterminous with participant.
Intervention is the most important term used in this book. It is used in the 
medical sense of acting in order to bring about a change in the course of 
events. The purpose of intervention is to improve the circumstances of the 
disaster victim. Any disaster response initiated from outside the affected 
community is a form of intervention, and the failure to treat it as such is one 
of the underlying causes of many of the problems relief agencies encounter.
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As in medicine, intervention here too can have positive results, and it is our 
intention to show that successful intervention can play an important part in 
the development process.
(The term “OXFAM” as used in this book denotes both OXFAM U.K. and 
OXFAM America.)
Disasters and Their Impact
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Disasters and Development
Until recently the connection between disasters and development was not 
recognized. Disasters were not seen as providing an opportunity to aid 
development, and development organizations often tried to avoid be­
coming involved. But some unsetding facts began to emerge. Countries on 
the road to development, experiencing a disaster, suddenly lost momen­
tum. Resources became scarce, and development programs had to compete 
with reconstruction plans for available funds.
At first it was assumed that the answer was more relief aid from the 
industrialized countries, and annually the appropriations grew. Yet material 
losses and numbers of people affected continued to increase. Perhaps the 
answer was to speed the response, to devote more resources, or to expand 
the international delivery system. But these measures and others were 
applied, few with meaningful results. Why?
The basic problem was the conceptual failure by aid organizations to link 
disasters to development. The concept of a disaster as a separate event 
requiring a rapid response of medical and material aid was not entirely 
accurate and led to efforts that were not only very ineffective, but in many 
cases counterproductive. The relief agencies tended to view disasters solely 
as emergencies. This meant that the best way to respond was by providing 
emergency medical assistance, basic goods (especially personal articles such 
as clothes and blankets), and temporary emergency shelter, usually tents. 
Emergency aid, collectively called “relief,” was distributed free, as a form of 
charity. Even if this were totally effective in meeting emergency needs, and 
could be provided at an appropriate time, such aid would still not address 
the roots of the problem: poverty and underdevelopment.
More than any other human event, a disaster traumatically brings into 
focus all the basic problems in a society. It reduces all issues to their most 
fundamental level and strips away all the ancillary issues that obscure or
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confuse the fundamental questions that must be faced. Critical decisions, 
previously unaddressed, can no longer be ignored, and choices must be 
made.
Disasters highlight the inherent weaknesses in a society and often force a 
reappraisal of goals. When it became evident in Guatemala that the 
earthquake had affected the poorer sectors (especially the Indian com­
munities) to a far greater extent than the middle- and upper-class families, 
everyone recognized the portent this held for the future of the country. For 
the first time, people who had been unconcerned about poverty or even 
unaware of the extent of poverty in Guatemala were brought face-to-face 
with the reality. Many of the middle-class youth and students who volun­
teered to help in rural communities were appalled by what they saw, and 
new organizations sprang up to work not only in reconstruction, but also 
toward more fundamental changes in the society. Existing organizations 
also received a boost from this new awareness and many were able to 
expand the scope and range of their programs to serve more people directly 
as a result of the earthquake. There can be no doubt that the increased 
awareness of poverty and greater level of participation led many Guate­
malans to become politically active. It is clear that the old order will be 
forced to change as a result.
Disaster-induced changes occur because disasters create a climate where­
in changes in society are more acceptable. While not all people, least of all 
the governments, experience a desire for change, pressures from victims 
often evolve into demands for fundamental changes—demands that may 
cover not only changes in the society, but also changes in the form of the 
environment, including land and housing.
Governments usually expand their role and range of services following 
disasters. Once a government has entered areas, it is unlikely that it will 
withdraw. Once established there, it must continue to provide a high level 
of services or face criticism from the community.
The changes that can occur are many and varied. Researchers have noted 
that changes in building styles, methods, and materials can often be traced 
to a disaster event such as an earthquake or hurricane. Shifts or migrations 
of people from one area to another can result in changes in urbanization or 
rural living trends. Land invasions following earthquakes have affected the 
makeup of peripheral settlements around large cities and have, in many 
cases, affected the pattern of land ownership and tenure, not only in the 
immediate area of the invasion but also in surrounding communities. In 
wars or droughts, when large numbers of people are forced to migrate, the 
place at which they stop in order to receive relief supplies often becomes a 
new settlement.
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The loss of economic opportunity or the need to find alternate sources of 
income have often caused small-scale migrations of skilled workers from 
rural areas into the cities. Following the Guatemalan earthquake, large 
numbers of skilled masons and carpenters left the rural areas to go to 
Guatemala City to find work in order to obtain the capital needed to repair 
or rebuild their homes. Once they became established in the city, however, 
few returned (Bates 1980).
The very face of the land may be altered by a disaster. Droughts have led 
to famines, famines to migrations; and when the people ceased to farm the 
areas they left behind, creeping deserts swallowed the arable land and made 
it untenable. But positive changes have also been recorded. Better cropping 
patterns have often followed droughts. Reforestation efforts and better use 
of contours for hillside agriculture have often followed rain-induced 
landslides. Where contour planting has been introduced, economic benefits 
have often followed.
For the society, disasters often bring changes in the structure of com­
munity leadership. New organizations may be born out of necessity to deal 
with the disaster and remain to continue the work of bringing economic 
change to the community. New leaders often emerge, sometimes to replace 
leaders felled by the disaster, but more often to replace those who have 
proved ineffective or unable to cope with the aftermath of a disaster.
We have the technology to prevent much of the destruction that now 
follows most natural hazards. But to do this requires development: stronger 
housing, better agriculture, a more diversified economy, and more 
responsive governments. To see this, one need only compare disaster 
response in an industrialized country with response in a developing 
country. An industrialized country is better able to absorb a disaster. In 
contrast to many developing countries, where the economy revolves around 
one or two major enterprises, the economies of the industrialized countries 
are more diversified, thus spreading any losses that occur.
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
In order to comprehend the magnitude of the potential for disaster, 
particularly as it relates to the Third World, it is first necessary to 
understand the nature of a disaster and to place it in a geographic context.
To restate a central point, a disaster should be defined on the basis of its 
human consequences, not on the phenomenon that caused it. An earth­
quake, for example, is simply an event in nature, and even a very strong one 
is not a disaster unless it causes injury or destroys property. Thus an 
earthquake occurring in an uninhabited area (as do scores of tremors each
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month) is only of scientific interest and is not considered a disaster. While 
natural phenomena such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and excessive rains 
can occur worldwide, their potential for widespread disaster is more a 
function of the ability of communities to cope with these events—in terms 
of their social and economic systems as well as their physical structures— 
than of the phenomena themselves.
When a natural event does affect a human settlement, the result may still 
not be a major disaster. Consider the earthquake that struck San Fernando, 
California, in 1971. The quake registered 6.4 on the Richter Scale. Yet San 
Fernando, with a population of over seven million, suffered only minor 
damage and fifty-eight deaths (Denevi 1977). Two years later, an earthquake 
of a magnitude of 6.2 struck Managua, Nicaragua, and reduced the center 
of the city to rubble, killing an estimated six thousand people. What was the 
difference between the two locations that caused such a disparity and made 
one an “earthquake,” while the other was a “disaster”? To oversimplify, the 
answer is the different level of development in the two cities.
Are disasters in the Third World on the increase? The answer is both yes 
and no. The average number of natural events occurring each year has not 
changed; there are no more hurricanes and earthquakes today than there 
were in past years. What has changed is the magnitude (deaths, damage, 
costs) of each disaster and the increased attention given to developing 
countries.
The increase in disaster potential is one result of the cycle of poverty 
common to developing countries. The roots of poverty, which are also the 
predominant roots of vulnerability, are the increased marginalization of the 
population caused by the high birthrate and the lack of resources (or the 
failure of governments to allocate resources) to meet the basic human needs 
of an expanding population. At the center of the resource issue are the 
parallel problems of land and economic opportunity. As the population 
increases, land in both rural and urban areas becomes more scarce and 
those seeking new land for farming or housing are forced to accept 
marginal lands. These offer less productivity and a smaller measure of 
physical or economic safety. Such trends result in both rapid and 
unchecked urbanization and massive deforestation of mountainous and 
jungle regions that occurs as small farmers push into less tenable areas for 
farming. In addition to the political failure of governments to develop new 
economic systems and to reallocate resources (especially land) to benefit the 
nation as a whole, there is a inappropriate attempt to use high technology to 
instantly “modernize” the society. This has two contradictory results: 
higher unemployment and rising expectations.
To understand how these tendencies affect vulnerability, let us examine 
the case of rapid urbanization. As the cities and towns expand, the land that 
is serviced by utilities and that is safe for development is in high demand for
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both housing and industry; thus the price rises. Low-income families in 
search of land for housing must settle in areas of low value. These lands may 
be the slopes of steep hillsides or ravines, or may lie along the banks of 
flood-prone rivers. Worldwide, millions of families live in squalid shanty 
towns constantly under the threat of landslides or flooding. Nor are the 
houses safe. In part, this is due to the fact that the housing styles with which 
they are familiar are often inappropriate because of the change in soils, 
unavailability of materials, or the demands of an urban environment.
Consider the case of Peru. Many of the squatter settlements in the rapidly 
expanding coastal cities have been built by families moving down from the 
mountainous regions where adobe houses are popular. Adobe housing in 
Peru is not particularly safe in any case. Along the coast, where soils are 
much sandier, the adobes are much weaker. This, added to the loose, 
uncompacted ground the houses are built on, almost guarantees that they 
will fail during a strong tremor. In some instances, people attempt to build 
with materials such as brick or concrete block, but without adequate 
engineering input, these houses are not safe either.
Recognizing poverty as the primary root of vulnerability and disaster in 
the Third World is the first step toward developing an understanding of the 
need for change in current disaster response practices. For if the magnitude of 
disasters is an outgrowth of underdevelopment and poverty, how can we expect to reduce 
the impact with food, blankets, and tents, the traditional forms of assistance?
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT
While actual vulnerability is on the increase, so too is Western awareness of 
the Third World and its problems. For the industrialized nations, Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia simply were not a part of geopolitical conscious­
ness prior to the 1960s when the colonial period (and, in the case of Latin 
America, the neocolonial period) began to draw to a close. Scores of new 
nations joined the United Nations and received media coverage. Former 
colonies suddenly became both potential markets and suppliers and (from 
the “big powers’” point of view) potential allies or enemies in the 
international competition for influence. This competition took many forms, 
most notably in aid to help the countries “develop” into societies like those 
that provided the aid. A whole new corps of foreign aid organizations was 
born; and, to provide trained staff, the colleges, universities, and private 
foundations offered training and research facilities.
A new generation of leaders emerged in the Third World. Many were 
eloquent spokesmen for a reappraisal of the world’s economic systems and 
of how to meet the needs of the developing countries. Others were forceful 
advocates of massive aid to redress the economic imbalance created by 
centuries of colonialism. They were, however, mistaken in thinking that aid
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is the only answer. As the countries and their leaders demanded more 
attention, the news services began to establish regional and even local 
bureaus. Aided by the rapid advances in communications technology, the 
media of the industrial world were soon filled with news of events in the 
Congo, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and India.
With this new awareness and the realization that these countries were 
votes to be vied for, disasters in these areas have taken on new interest. 
Governments of industrialized nations feel honor-bound to respond with a 
demonstration of concern as well as a show of resources. This is not to say 
that humanitarian concerns do not transcend the political issues, for along 
with the increased awareness of the plight of the developing countries has 
come a genuine interest in helping them with their problems. Yet political 
interests are always present and thus a factor in the increased outpouring of 
aid following disasters.
All this means that within the last twenty years, our recognition of 
disasters in the Third World has been heightened at the same time that the 
extent of the disasters has increased. If recent experience is any guide, we 
can expect this interest to remain high.
It is possible to protect against some natural hazards through engineering 
and the use of planning techniques. Stronger houses are built according to 
building standards and codes, and land use planning aims to keep 
residential areas from being situated in hazardous zones. In the developing 
countries, scarce funds allow few elaborate engineering projects, and 
widespread poverty means that most people live in weak buildings, many 
located on vulnerable sites, along flood plains or hazardous ravines.
In the emergency period immediately after a disaster, the response in 
both developed and developing countries is very much the same; it includes 
search and rescue, evacuation of the injured, and restoration of utilities. But 
in the developed countries, governmental responsibilities and the available 
infrastructure are very different. When Indiana was struck by major 
flooding in 1982, for example, the local city and county governments were 
the focal point of all emergency activities. They were supported by the state 
and later by the federal government. The larger cities, many of which had 
their own emergency preparedness offices, were able to call upon a wide 
variety of resources to meet emergency needs. After the floods subsided, 
more than 100 different governmental agencies set up offices to help the 
flood victims. Few new programs had to be established, as most of the 
assistance offered came through existing programs whose eligibility re­
quirements were simply broadened to permit the victims to apply for and 
receive priority handling.
Since few cities or provinces in the developing countries can mount the 
same level of response, the national government takes operational respon­
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sibility. But neither do the national governments have a highly diversified 
range of social and economic programs to expand for the victims. Even if 
they did, few among the poor could qualify. The magnitude of the response 
is also different, as the example of emergency shelter shows. In the United 
States, the government has stockpiled large numbers of mobile homes at 
strategic sites near areas where disasters often occur. When a disaster strikes, 
these mobile homes are towed to the disaster site to provide houses until 
people can rebuild their homes. The trailers are often surplus or out-of-date 
mobile homes. But even so, the total expenditure for each shelter alone 
averages approximately $5,500.1 In a developed society people rarely build 
their own houses, and housing reconstruction may take many months or 
even as long as one year, justifying a large outlay for emergency shelter.
In the developing countries, most emergency shelter needs are met by 
the victims themselves. The survivors quickly assemble materials from the 
rubble and build an interim shelter. Later, when they have more time and 
resources, they rebuild a permanent house using a combination of in­
digenous and locally available commercial materials. If emergency shelter is 
provided by the government or by relief agencies, it normally consists of 
tents or building materials. The average expenditure per family for emer­
gency shelter is approximately sixty-five dollars.
From this example we can see that both the combined level of assistance 
provided internally and the ability to provide that level are internally much 
greater in the richer nations. We can also see that while the need is the same 
(shelter), the response required to meet the need is very different.
In long-term reconstruction, there are also major differences. In the 
developing countries, there are few governmental programs to help poor 
families to absorb economic losses and rebuild. Thus the part foreign 
reconstruction assistance plays can be very important in disaster recovery. 
In the developed countries, most of the reconstruction burden on indivi­
dual families is handled through a “safety net” of insurance and public and 
private assistance programs.
In the less developed countries, there are few insurance programs 
available for the poor and the existing economic infrastructure can rarely 
take the burden of increased demand generated by a disaster. The disaster 
victims must work doubly hard to replace losses. In fact, for many disaster 
victims, the greatest loss is not in property but in opportunity, imposing a 
substantial handicap on a family for many years to come.
Why has disaster response in the Third World developed as it has? And 
why are relief agencies now reassessing the basic approaches? Most of the
1. Figures from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. All figures expressed in this 
book are in 1980 U.S. dollars unless otherwise specified.
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approaches and techniques used in relief operations today were developed 
to help European refugees and displaced persons after World War II. Not 
only were many people homeless, but millions had been moved far from 
their homes. Large camps were established to provide temporary assistance 
until people could be relocated or until their homes and jobs had been re­
established. Due to the transitory nature of the refugees and because of the 
disruptions in local markets, chaos in the transportation systems, and many 
basic shortages, the relief efforts relied heavily on temporary measures and 
goods supplied from outside the affected region. Food, blankets, tents, and 
clothing were all needed and were useful to the refugees. Because the relief 
agencies operated in close cooperation with military occupation authorities, 
the approaches were often regimented and relied heavily on military-style 
planning and logistics for implementation.
The relief agencies played a vital role. Generally they were designated to 
handle the people-to-people activities and emergency and short-term 
needs. Governments, in the meantime, concentrated on long-term recovery 
and reconstruction. Spurred on by the Marshall Plan, the Allied govern­
ments poured millions of dollars into the reconstruction of European 
businesses, jobs, and housing. With few exceptions, the relief agencies were 
not involved in the long-term activities.
In the late 1940s, the relief agencies operating in Europe began to expand 
their services into the trouble spots of the Third World: India, Palestine, 
and Korea required the agencies’ help in dealing with refugees. The 
agencies continued to use the techniques that they had used in Europe and 
adapt them to needs in the developing countries.
Beginning in the 1950s, the agencies began to expand into relief after 
natural disasters, especially in newly independent countries. In many cases 
the withdrawal of the colonial powers was so rapid that many of the new 
countries did not have the government agencies, nor the infrastructure or 
resources, to deal with disasters. The relief agencies helped fill this need. In 
many cases they played a role that foreign governments, especially the 
former colonial powers, could not undertake: direct operational support. 
Thus new patterns of involvement were established as well as several new 
relationships between governments and the private agencies. First, the relief 
agencies began to expand their scope of activities into longer-term recovery 
operations. Second, nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) became the focal 
point for relief activities from outside an affected country. They could move 
much more quickly than could governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations and could often go where governments could not. Most 
importandy, the relief agencies came to be seen as the operational experts,
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and many Third World governments attempted to adopt the techniques 
used by the agencies as their own pattern of response.
The problem was that the response pattern used by the relief agencies for 
natural disasters was virtually the same as that developed for use with 
refugees. There are many differences between war and refugee relief, and 
relief and recovery needs after a natural disaster. Refugees do not have 
access to normal markets or economic systems, while in a natural disaster 
the victims do, and stimulation of the market system is an important factor 
in recovery. Refugees are often situated in camps located far from their 
homes. Survivors of a natural disaster have a need to stay on site and should 
be moved only if a life-threatening situation still exists. The delivery of aid 
to refugees can be highly centralized and relies primarily on logistics. In the 
aftermath of a natural disaster, delivery systems must be decentralized to 
take the aid directly to the victims’ community. Aid for refugees emphasizes 
relief, while aid after natural disasters should emphasize recovery. Aid to 
refugees is generally considered nonrecoverable, while aid in a natural 
disaster can be provided in such a way that the resources are an investment 
not only in recovery but also in long-term development. In refugee 
operations, the emphasis is on logistics and material aid, while in natural 
disasters, a much more sophisticated operational capability is required and 
many sectors must be addressed.
Most of the agencies operating at that time were oriented toward relief 
and charity. Development concerns were emerging, but few agencies had 
yet seen a broader role for the voluntary agency. The favored relief 
approaches still relied mostly on short-term staff and volunteers. Because of 
high staff turnover, little accumulated wisdom was incorporated into the 
basic response pattern of the agencies.
As new agencies were formed to meet development needs, and new 
relationships between private and government agencies were established, a 
system of sorts began to evolve. To reduce overlap, a number of measures 
were taken to improve coordination among the agencies. The new “de­
velopment” agencies began to become involved, and the role of NGOs in a 
disaster began to expand further.
The first major test of the newly emerging system was the series of events 
that led to the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971. In November 1970, a 
strong cyclone had propelled a massive storm surge many kilometers 
inland in East Pakistan. This precipitated not only a large relief operation, 
but also a series of political events that led to a civil war in the spring of 
1971. Many of the agencies that had been providing relief to the storm- 
affected area soon found themselves trying to cope with millions of war
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refugees fleeing to India, as well as millions more displaced persons inside 
the country who were unable to flee. At the end of 1971, India entered the 
civil war and helped to establish the new country of Bangladesh. At the end 
of the war, the relief agencies were needed to help rebuild the country, 
devastated by both war and natural disaster.
Many of the people who worked in the Bangladesh relief activities had 
also worked in the Nigerian Civil War that had ended only a year earlier. 
Nigeria was an example of a logistics operation at its maximum and in 
many ways represented the zenith of the old approach. Many of the workers 
in Biafra had, however, come to question the effectiveness of this approach 
in a Third-World environment and, when they were called upon to repeat 
the same techniques in Bangladesh, realized that a new approach was 
required. Furthermore, the inadequacy of the response to meet the 
widespread needs in Bangladesh and the failure of voluntary agencies to 
perform well in many of the tasks asked of them, especially in nonmedical 
fields, led many relief workers to call for a reappraisal of the relief system.
In the early 1970s, a number of research projects were formulated by 
former relief workers in the U.S. and Europe, and an informal network of 
relief specialists began to evolve. The research examined the various 
approaches. Reports of dependencies, inappropriate aid, and counter­
productive results became frequent and raised doubts about the funda­
mental principles of relief. These challenges were slow to find acceptance 
within the relief agencies. Some agencies may have felt threatened by the 
studies; many could not believe that assistance motivated by humanitarian 
concerns could have such adverse effects. Unfortunately, the researchers 
and critics offered few alternatives and, for this reason, it was easier for the 
agencies to reject their criticism and negate their impact.
Toward the end of the 1970s, a rapprochement between critics and 
agencies began to take place. The Guatemalan earthquake initiated a period 
of change. Innovative approaches took advantage of technical advances in 
related fields (such as earthquake engineering), and the translation of 
research results into applications appropriate to developing societies 
brought disaster relief forward by many strides.
But although the development of appropriate technologies for disasters 
has improved response, there are still major problems basic to the relief 
system and the agencies. Few organizations have changed either their 
structure or their modus operandi as a result of disaster (or development) 
research. Most agencies are still focusing on emergency needs, and few fully 
understand the events that occur in a disaster and how their intervention 
affects the overall outcome of recovery.
2
Disasters: Causes and Effects
WHAT ARE DISASTERS?
Natural hazards such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and droughts, 
spring to mind when the word disaster is mentioned. Yet these events are in 
fact natural agents that transform a vulnerable human condition into a 
disaster. The hazards themselves are not disasters but rather a factor in 
causing a disaster. Two other factors are essential: the event’s effect on 
people and their environment, and human activities that increase its 
impact.
Disaster Hazards
Of the three factors, disaster hazards are the easiest to identify. Extensive 
research since World War II has increased our knowledge of the causes and 
working of each of these natural hazards and has done much to demystify 
their nature. The relevance of this information for purposes of planning 
mitigation, preparedness, and response actions cannot be overestimated. 
The figure on page 22 is a map of the world’s regions where natural hazards 
are most frequent. In many cases, countries are vulnerable to more than 
one type of hazard. Jamaica, for example, suffers from earthquakes, 
hurricanes, floods, and droughts.
In order to provide a basic understanding of the cause-and-effect 
relationships, a brief explanation of the four major natural hazards follows.
Ea r t h q u a k e s
Of all natural hazards, earthquakes seem to be the most terrifying. They can 
inflict tremendous damage within seconds and without warning at any time 
of day, on any day of the year. Ground shaking and surface faulting are
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often just the forerunners of secondary damage, such as fires, floods (caused 
by dam failure), landslides, and tsunamis (seismic seawaves).
Earthquakes are caused by the movement of massive land areas, called 
plates, on the earth’s crust. Often covering areas larger than continents, 
these plates are in a constant state of motion, acted upon by the periodic 
forces of the solar system and movement caused by the rotation of the 
earth. As the plates move relative to one another, stresses form and 
accumulate until a fracture or abrupt slippage occurs. This sudden release 
of stress is called an earthquake.
The place at which the stresses are released is known as the focus of an 
earthquake. From this point, mechanical energy is initiated in the form of 
waves that radiate in all directions through the earth. When this energy 
arrives at the earth’s surface, it forms secondary surface waves. The 
frequency and amplitude of the vibrations produced at the surface, indi­
cating the severity of the earthquake, depend on the amount of mechanical 
energy released at the focus, the distance and depth of the focus, and the 
structural properties of the rock or soil on or near the surface.
Primary effects. The onset of a large earthquake is signaled by a deep 
rumbling, followed shortly by a series of violent motions in the ground. 
Often the ground cracks, and there can be large permanent displacements 
as deep as 15 meters.
As the vibrations and waves continue to move through the earth, 
buildings on the earth’s surface are set in motion. Each building responds 
differently, depending on its construction. When the waves strike, the earth 
begins to move backward and forward along the same line. The lower part 
of a building on the earth’s surface immediately moves with the earth. The 
upper portion, however, remains at rest; thus the building is stretched out 
of shape. Gradually the upper portion tries to catch up with the bottom, but 
as it does so, the earth moves in the other direction, causing a “whiplash” 
effect, speeding up the top of the building, and creating a vibration known 
as resonance. The resonance can cause structural failure in itself, or adjacent 
buildings having different response characteristics (caused by different 
building materials) can vibrate out of phase and pound each other to pieces 
(Office of Emergency Preparedness 1972). The walls of buildings without 
adequate lateral bracing frequently fall outward, leaving the upper floors or 
roof to collapse into the inside of the structure.
Another primary effect is known as liquefaction. Loose sandy soils with a 
high moisture content separate when shaken by an earthquake. The water 
moves upward, giving the surface a consistency much like that of 
quicksand. Heavy structures resting on these soils slowly sink into the 
ground. Large portions of Port Royal, Jamaica, were damaged in this way 
during the earthquakes that struck the city in 1694 and 1907.
I
HOW AN EARTHQUAKE 
DAMAGES A HOUSE
A vulnerable house consists of 
heavy materials stacked in place 
without a continuous frame for 
reinforcement.
The house moves with the motion 
of the earth during an earthquake, 
creating new stresses in the 
structure.
~w
Built to withstand only normal 
downward gravitational forces, the 
house now is subjected to com­
plex lateral forces.
As building components fall apart, 
the roof and walls collapse, bury­
ing occupants beneath the rubble.
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Subsidence caused by liquifaction (Kingston, Jamaica).
Secondary effects. Often as destructive as the earthquake itself are the 
resulting secondary effects such as landslides, fires, tsunamis, and floods. 
Landslides are especially damaging and often account for the majority of 
lives lost. During the 1970 earthquake in Peru, the total number of deaths 
exceeded 70,000, with 50,000 injured. Of those killed, 40,000 were swept 
away by a landslide that covered the town of Yungay. Similarly, in the 
Guatemala earthquake of 1976, most deaths that occurred in Guatemala 
City were caused by the collapse of the unstabilized hillsides where 
thousands of urban squatters had settled (Office of Emergency Pre­
paredness 1972).
Of far more concern are tsunamis, the large seawaves caused by an 
earthquake abruptly moving the ocean floor. The waves move at a high 
velocity and can cross thousands of kilometers before they run up on shore. 
At sea, their low wave height gives little evidence of their existence; 
however, as they approach land, their velocity decreases and their height 
increases. In this way a 5-meter crest moving at 600 kph in the open ocean 
becomes a devastating 30-meter-high wave moving at 50 kph when it 
reaches shore (Hendley 1978).
Tsunamis are dangerous because areas far from the earthquake’s epi­
center can be struck without warning. There are instances of earthquakes in 
Chile creating tsunamis that struck in Japan. The tsunami hazard is
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A highly vulnerable hillside settlement (Lima, Peru).
especially dangerous for countries in the Pacific Basin and the island 
countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, where hundreds of remote, 
low-lying islands with poor communications cannot be given adequate 
warning.
The risk of fire immediately after an earthquake is often high because of 
broken electrical lines and gas mains. In recent years, officials in most of the 
world’s major cities have installed devices that shut these services down 
automatically if an earthquake strikes. Yet the threat still exists in many of 
the smaller cities and the squatter settlements of the larger cities where open 
fires are used for cooking.
One fact is crucial: earthquake losses are largely preventable. Approx­
imately 90 percent of the loss of life in all earthquakes is the result of 
building collapse. Until recently, this was unavoidable; but more is known 
about the nature of earthquakes and their effects now. We have engineering 
techniques to make new structures reasonably earthquake-resistant at a 
small additional cost, and we are rapidly developing techniques to make 
older buildings safer. Even structures made of materials such as adobe and 
brick in the poorest settlements of the Third World can be made relatively 
safe to substantially reduce the loss of life.
The human contribution to natural disaster goes beyond the construction 
of unsafe buildings, however. The pressures of increasing population
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density have led people to settle in areas that are difficult to develop safely, 
such as mountainous regions, active fault zones, and areas of artificial fill. 
The rapid growth of urban centers in developing countries is due largely to 
the imbalance of economic systems, and the increased vulnerability is 
directly related to the poverty that forces people to move to these vulnerable 
sites. Reducing earthquake vulnerability in these areas means dealing also 
with the socioeconomic roots of poverty, and thus is relief directly related to 
the development of that particular society.
TROPICAL CYCLONES: CAUSES AND CHARACTERISTICS
Tropical cyclones (known as hurricanes in the North Atlantic and South 
Pacific, cyclones in the Indian Ocean, and typhoons in the North and 
Western Pacific) are among the most awesome events of nature. Every year 
these violent storms, with winds of over 120 kph, bring destruction to 
coastlines and islands lying in their erratic paths. Stated simply, cyclonic 
storms are giant whirlwinds in which the air moves in a large tightening 
spiral around a relatively calm center of extreme low pressure (the “eye”), 
reaching maximum velocity in a circular band extending outward 30 to 50 
kilometers from the edge of the eye. Near the center, winds may gust to 
more than 300 kph, and the entire storm can dominate the ocean surface 
for tens of thousands of square kilometers.
Much is known about how a cyclone forms. In order to develop, a 
cyclone must have a warm sea and calm air. The warm air rises—heavy, 
humid, and full of water vapor. Its place is taken by air rushing in from the 
sides and, because of the earth’s rotation, this moving air is given a twist, so 
that the entire system begins to revolve. The warm rising air meets cooler air 
and releases its water vapor in the form of rain. It takes a tremendous 
amount of energy for the air to lift the water in the first place, and now this 
energy is released in the form of heat. This increases the rate of ascent of the 
air and a continuous cycle begins to develop. More water is released and 
thus more heat; the more water and heat released, the faster the cycle goes. 
This cycle becomes the engine that drives the beast, and gradually it goes 
faster and faster and the air mass becomes much larger.
Because the wind system is revolving, centrifugal force tends to throw the 
air outward so that the pressure in the center becomes very low, thus 
forming the eye of the storm. The pressure on the outside is very high, so 
the wind moves faster in an attempt to fill that low pressure area. The faster 
it moves, however, the more the centrifugal force throws it outward. Soon 
there are very fast circular winds and, when they reach 120 kph, the system 
becomes a cyclone or hurricane.
The system then begins to move forward like a spinning top. This brings 
it into contact with more warm sea and air, and the process becomes self-
HOW A HURRICANE FORMS
An atmospheric disturbance forces warm moist air of the 
prevailing Easterlies to rise. As the air cools, water vapor 
condenses and falls as rain; heat energy is released, and 
winds intensify.
The storm grows as air spirals inward, rises, and is ex­
hausted from the top by high level winds. Surface air 
converges at an increasing rate toward the low pressure 
at the storm center.High winds, heavy rain, and storm 
surges occur as the storm becomes a mature hurricane.
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sustaining. Once a cyclone is formed, it will continue to move and expand 
until it passes over land or over an area where the sea is cooler.
In the northern hemisphere, cyclones generally move in a northwesterly 
direction; in the southern hemisphere, in a southwesterly direction. Little is 
known about what makes these storms move and change direction, other 
than that they are affected by the high altitude winds and rotation of the 
earth. Scientists cannot predict where a cyclone will strike land, making this 
hazard one of the most dangerous.
Cyclones cause loss of lives, houses, crops, food stocks, and land. Winds 
do the most damage to buildings, but most deaths result from the flooding 
that accompanies the storm. As a cyclone approaches and moves across a 
coasdine, it brings huge waves and raises the tides sometimes as much as 5 
meters or more above normal. This rise may come rapidly and produce 
flash flooding in the coastal lowlands, or it may come in the form of giant 
waves, known as a storm surge (popularly called tidal waves). Waves and 
currents erode the beaches and barrier islands, undermine buildings, and 
wash away roads and irrigation ditches. The torrential rains that accompany 
cyclonic storms can also produce flooding and mudslides.
The most dramatic effect of cyclones is the damage they cause to houses. 
Contrary to popular belief, few houses are blown over. Instead, they are 
pulled apart by winds moving swiftly around and over the building. The 
wind lowers the pressure on the outside and creates suction on the walls 
and roof. Because the houses explode, few people are killed even when the 
structure is completely destroyed. Most deaths and injuries in cyclones are 
caused by flooding and flying debris. This is important to consider when 
developing environmental policies and housing reconstruction plans.
As in the case of earthquakes, most deaths in tropical cyclones are more 
direcdy attributable to human activities than to the storm itself. We can 
make houses wind-resistant. We can give low-lying areas extensive pro­
tection from flooding. With simple planning, we can avoid areas vulnerable 
to the action of waves, erosion, flooding, and mudslides. Even if hazardous 
areas must be occupied, there are measures we can take to reduce the 
vulnerability of people living in the structures and settlements.
Mudslides in hilly or mountainous areas are usually a direct result of 
human activity. Heavy rains quickly supersaturate hillsides that have been 
deforested or stripped for farming, and immense landslides result. In 1974, 
Hurricane Fifi struck Honduras. Little wave or wind damage was recorded, 
but large loss of life occurred in the massive mudslides caused by the 
torrential rains. The largest number of people killed were in squatter 
settlements located in the flood plains of the Ulma River, where the basic 
political and economic conditions (that is, failure to resolve the land
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STORM SURGE
As a tropical storm forms, winds increase and atmospheric 
pressure drops.
Decreased atmospheric pressure causes the sea level to rise.
As the storm approaches land, winds pile up water to raise 
the sea level even higher, and the sea sweeps inland.
distribution issues that create squatter settlements) contributed to the 
disaster.
Ironically, a widely promoted disaster preparedness measure has also 
caused casualties. Public officials often encourage people to move to 
churches and schools for safety, without realizing the potential problems 
inherent in these structures. Buildings with large, open rooms generally are 
not reinforced to withstand high winds or flooding. In the case of Hurricane 
David in August 1979, there was little advance warning for the residents of 
the small island of Dominica, and no churches or schools were open. 
Although more than 95 percent of the structures received substantial
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damage, fewer than 40 people lost their lives. In the nearby Dominican 
Republic, however, over 1,200 lives were lost, almost 60 percent of them in 
the collapse of churches and schools—400 from the destruction of one 
church alone. Here prior warning had been given and people encouraged 
by the civil defense authorities to go to larger buildings for protection. The 
high loss of life can be attributed almost directly to public officials acting 
without adequate knowledge about the performance of buildings in hur­
ricanes.
FLOODS
Floods kill. They kill by destroying houses, crops, and food stocks. They 
strip farmland, wash away irrigation systems, and erode large areas of land 
or make them otherwise unusuable. Each year, floods take an increasing 
number of lives and an increasing amount of property. In fact, flooding is 
the one natural hazard that is becoming more of a threat rather than 
remaining constant or diminishing. Floods are caused not only by rain, but 
also by human changes to the surface of the earth such as farming, 
deforestation, and urbanization. These actions increase the runoff from 
rains. Thus, storms that previously would have caused no flooding today 
inundate vast areas.
Not only do we contribute to the causes of floods, but reckless building in 
vulnerable areas, poor watershed management, and failure to control the 
flooding also help create the disaster condition. Ecologists have found 
evidence recently that human endeavors may be directly affecting the 
weather conditions that produce extensive and heavy rains. Irrigation of dry 
lands contributes to increased humidity and evaporation, which in turn 
lead to increased rainfall. This is particularly heightened in desert areas 
where large lakes are built to provide water for irrigation or for nearby 
settlements.
DROUGHTS
Drought has long been recognized as one of the most insidious causes of 
human misery. While generally associated with semiarid or desert climates, 
drought can occur in areas that normally enjoy adequate rainfall and 
moisture levels. In the broadest sense, any lack of water for the normal 
needs of agriculture, livestock, industry, or human population may be 
termed a drought. The cause may be lack of supply, contamination of 
supply, inadequate storage or conveyance facilities, or abnormal demand. 
Drought, as commonly understood, is a condition of climatic dryness that is 
severe enough to reduce soil moisture and water below the minimums 
necessary for sustaining plant, animal, and human life. Drought is usually 
accompanied by hot, dry winds and may be followed by damaging floods.
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THE DROUGHT CYCLE
NORMAL HYDROLOGICAL BALANCE, Water supply is 
adequate to meet demand. The community grows and 
land use intensifies.
DROUGHT. Meteorological changes reduce rainfall, while 
urbanization, overgrazing, deforestation, and farming 
reduce water retention of the soil. The normal 
hydrological balance is broken. The topsoil erodes and 
the water table is lowered making recovery difficult. Food 
production and drinking water are reduced and people 
migrate out of the area.
The basic causes of drought are still not clearly understood. It is generally 
believed that droughts are a consequence of changing global weather 
patterns. These may be triggered by a number of factors, including the 
interrelationship of the earth’s rotation, solar radiation, heat transfers to the 
earth’s surface, minute matter in the earth’s atmosphere, variations in 
topographic relief on the earth’s surface, and the earth’s thermal con­
ductivities.
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Economic activities can also contribute to the development of drought 
conditions. In the early 1970s, overgrazing led to the rapid expansion of the 
Sahara Desert southward, creating widespread drought in the Sahel region. 
Similarly, poor cropping methods and improper soil conservation tech­
niques often contribute to drought conditions.
Drought is accompanied by reduced cloud cover, which increases 
exposure of land to solar radiation, resulting in increased transpiration and 
evaporation rates. These conditions add to the potential severity of the 
drought. When conditions become very dry, above-normal moisture is 
required to replenish moisture reserves in the soil, streams, and lakes. This 
situation tends to perpetuate drought and, once established, is very difficult 
to reverse.
The effects of drought depend on its severity and duration and the size of 
the affected area. The impact depends on the level of socioeconomic 
development. Societies that are more developed and economically diversi­
fied can better adjust to a drought and can recover more quickly. The poor 
regions, especially those reliant on any crop or pastoral economics, are 
most severely affected.
Drought effects can be classified as primary and secondary. Primary 
effects follow directly from the lack of water: decreased food production 
and impairment of agricultural economies, damage to land, loss of plant 
and animal life, reduction of human consumption and hygienic use of 
water, proliferation of insects, and damage to the natural environment. 
Secondary effects follow from the primary ones: economic loss, radical 
population shifts, and post-drought erosion and flooding.
The worst effect of drought is the loss of food. Any period of abnormal 
dryness lowers soil moisture and subsequently reduces crop production. 
Crop failures of substantial magnitude set in motion a chain reaction of 
human suffering and economic difficulties. In the developing countries, 
crop shortages can lead to famine that, without timely and well-managed 
aid, can cause large numbers of deaths.
In recent years there has been some debate as to exactly how much 
human endeavors affect drought and drought conditions. While there is no 
doubt that the basic condition is weather-related, the severity and length of 
time the drought lasts are affected by human actions. Poor cropping 
patterns, overgrazing, the stripping of topsoil, poor conservation tech­
niques, depletion of both surface and sub-surface water supplies, and, to an 
extent, unchecked urbanization, all have an effect on the creation of 
drought conditions and contribute to the relative severity of the drought.
This knowledge has led to some rather unsetding discoveries. In the Sahel 
(Africa) in the 1960s, several development programs introduced stronger
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and more durable breeds of cattle. The objective was to increase meat 
production and to decrease cattle losses, thereby reducing the economic 
hardships for herdsmen. Some studies have indicated, however, that these 
newer cattle were one of the primary causes of the overgrazing that led to 
increasing desertification, which in turn contributed to the chain of events 
that led to the drought and famine of the 1970s.
OTHER HAZARDS
There are, of course, many other natural hazards occurring each year. 
Among these are fires, tornadoes, landslides, and volcanoes. Depending on 
the magnitude of the phenomenon and the size of the affected population, 
it may or may not be considered a major international disaster. Each has 
various primary and secondary effects, and each in turn is affected to some 
extent by those human actions that contribute to the creation of a 
vulnerable condition. As we have seen, there is no disaster that is not 
directly affected in some way by human endeavors.
Classification of Disasters
Disasters are classified as rapid on-set or cataclysmic, and long-term or 
continuing. In a cataclysmic disaster, one large-scale event causes most of 
the damage and destruction. Following this event, there may be a tre­
mendous amount of suffering and chaos, but things soon begin to improve. 
In a long-term, continuing disaster, the situation after the event remains 
constant or may even deteriorate as time passes. Cataclysmic disasters 
include earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, cyclonic storms, and floods. 
Continuing disasters include droughts, crop failures, and prolonged civil 
strife. The damaged area in a cataclysmic disaster is usually relatively small, 
while the area affected in a continuing disaster may be extremely large.
Cataclysmic disasters destroy buildings and entire human setdements. 
Loss of life is sudden and therefore dramatic.
In terms of food and food distribution, cataclysmic disasters are normally 
more disruptive than destructive. For example, they may disrupt the 
transport and marketing systems. They can disrupt or damage irrigation 
systems and, to a limited extent, they may destroy food supplies. But the 
extent of destruction depends on the season, the location of the disaster, 
and the total area affected. On the other hand, while continuing disasters 
disrupt transportation and distribution networks, they can also bring them 
to a complete halt and ultimately destroy the system itself.
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Phases of a Disaster
Disaster specialists have consistently made efforts to classify the time 
periods of a disaster. Among the standard classifications used are: the pre­
disaster period, the warning phase, the emergency phase, the rehabilitation 
phase, the recovery phase, and the reconstruction phase. These phases are 
ordinarily used to describe actions and activities by agencies. They are 
artificial and easily exaggerated. There are several agencies, for example, 
that define the emergency period in terms of the number of days it takes 
them to develop and execute a program, rather than in terms of the needs 
of the victims.
After most disasters, three phases can be identified according to what 
actually happens in the affected community: the emergency phase, the 
transitional phase (also called by many the rehabilitation phase), and re­
construction.
The emergency phase is characterized by actions that are necessary to 
save lives. They include search and rescue, first aid, emergency medical 
assistance, restoration of emergency communication and transportation 
networks, and in some cases, evacuation from areas still vulnerable to 
further disaster. Other actions taken during the emergency phase include 
initial disaster assessment and emergency repairs to critical facilities.
The transitional phase initially includes people’s returning to work and 
the permanent repair of infrastructure, repair of damaged buildings, and 
other actions necessary to help the community return to normal as quickly 
as possible. This phase coincides with the period in which emotional 
recovery normally occurs. In many ways, the recovery period is the most 
difficult for the victims. During this time, depression may set in as people 
finally realize the full extent of losses. Limited outside intervention during 
this phase can be of great assistance in helping victims to recover. Assistance 
in the form of cash or credit, activities that produce jobs, and constructive 
projects are among the more appropriate types of aid.
Reconstruction is characterized by the physical reordering of the com­
munity and the physical environment. During this period, people recon­
struct housing and other buildings, and repair roads and other community 
facilities; agriculture returns to normal. The time span is often very difficult 
to define. It may start fairly early, even during the recovery period, and may 
last for many years. The reconstruction of housing in particular is an activity 
that takes many years to complete.
It is difficult to set time limits on these three phases or accurately to 
define the limits of each, even for one specific type of disaster. For example, 
the emergency phase of a hurricane or a flood may be only a few days, or as 
long as a week. A volcano may precipitate an emergency period of only a
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When the Guatemalan earthquake disrupted normal city services, this woman was 
forced to draw her drinking water from a broken water line. (Photo: Laffont/Sygma)
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few days or up to a month. An earthquake may have continuing aftershocks 
after the first major tremor, thus prolonging the emergency for a number of 
weeks, as was the case in China in 1976. A drought and a resulting famine 
can last for months or even a year or more. And of course wars and the 
refugee crises they can initiate may last for many years.
The best way to identify the various phases is to examine what is 
happening in the disaster-affected community. An agency can then initiate 
activities that are appropriate to that phase. If response is not related in this 
way to community actions, the aid provided may come at a time when the 
community is not prepared to deal with it properly. One of the most 
common mistakes is the provision of housing reconstruction assistance 
during either the emergency or the transition period, rather than during the 
appropriate reconstruction phase. In Guatemala, scores of relief agencies 
rushed to provide housing reconstruction assistance within the first few 
months. Approximately six months after the programs began, most were 
phased out; however, reconstruction activities for the vast majority of the 
people had not yet begun. Many Guatemalans preferred to continue to 
reside in small temporary buildings until the earth tremors had ceased and 
until they had accumulated adequate materials and cash to pay for 
reconstruction of permanent dwellings. While there is no doubt that the 
relief agencies did make a contribution to providing housing for large 
numbers of the people, nonetheless only a few programs (notably Programa 
Kuchuba’l and the Save the Children Alliance Program) remained in 
operation during the critical time that most people in the rural areas rebuilt 
their own homes.
The graph on page 43 shows the peak reconstruction periods as 
measured by requests to a relief agency for housing assistance after the 
Guatemalan earthquake. It illustrates that activity was directly related to the 
seasons and reached its peak several years after the earthquake had passed. 
This shows that the reconstruction period varies in intensity and duration.
There is a danger in trying to define these phases, especially if agencies 
see their roles in terms of a particular phase. For example, an agency that 
sees itself as an emergency relief organization tends to limit its involvement 
to what it defines as the emergency phase. Because the emergency is rather 
short-term, two things normally result. First, the agency expands its 
definition of the emergency period to span several months; it then delivers 
emergency equipment and resources long after the actual emergency needs 
have passed. Second, the agency tends to push its employees and counter­
parts to develop programs and have them completed, or at least have 
resources committed, before the end of the arbitrary emergency period. As 
a result, the local staff is forced to rush into a confused and disorganized 
situation, gather information that may not be accurate, and develop
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programs that either ignore the local coping mechanisms or take key 
leaders away from other activities more appropriate for the time period. 
The usual results are programs that are poorly conceived and executed.
Effects of Disasters
“No two disasters are alike” is a common saying among relief officials. Yet it 
is surprising how many agencies respond to disasters as if they were all 
alike. Over the years, it has become standard practice to supply certain 
goods to every disaster area. Among the best-known items are tents, clothes, 
high-protein foods, milk powder, and blankets. Each of these, of course, 
may be useful in specific situations. Yet a close examination shows that each 
is appropriate only in a limited number of situations. An agency’s 
standardized responses often reflect a lack of understanding of the 
differences between disasters and of the disruptive effects and conse­
quences of each. The responses are also reinforced by myths that have 
evolved over the years regarding what is appropriate for disaster aid.
Each type of disaster can have a number of disruptive effects. These in 
turn cause generally predictable problems and needs of four kinds: 
environmental, medical, social and economic, and administrative and 
managerial.
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
Disasters can have any number or combination of four effects: destruction 
and damage to homes and buildings; decreased quantity or quality of water 
supplies; destruction of crops and/or food stocks; and the presence of 
unburied human bodies or animal carcasses.
These environmental effects vary considerably from disaster to disaster. 
For example, earthquakes affect buildings but not usually crops, while 
hurricanes may affect both. Table 2-1 lists each of these effects and the 
hazard that produces them.
MEDICAL EFFECTS
In his study of disaster epidemiology, Karl Western (1972) lists four possible 
medical effects of disasters: traumatic injuries, emotional stress, epidemic 
diseases, and indigenous diseases affected by the disaster. Table 2-2 
indicates the patterns of injury resulting from natural and man-made 
disasters; table 2-3 indicates the patterns of disease.
These tables may produce a few surprises, especially when one thinks of 
the standard practice of rushing massive medical aid to a disaster-striken 
community. Table 2-2 shows that while some disasters do create a need for 
surgical assistance, the period of need is extremely short. Thus by the time
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Table 2-1 Environmental Effects of the Major Natural Hazards
HAZARD EFFECTS CONSEQUENCES
Earthquake Tremors (ground Damage buildings, dams; cause avalanches;
shaking can collapse underground structures such 
as caves and tunnels.
Liquifaction Buildings on surface sink into soil.
Ground failure Landslides; settlement.
Ground rupture Damages buildings on the rupture; breaks
(horizontal utility lines in the ground; may alter flow
displacement) of subsurface streams; offsets streams, 
roads, and bridges.
Tsunamis Flooding and impact damage from giant
(seismically waves destroy manmade structures and
generated sea crops; scour land; salinate wells and
waves) standing water.
Tropical Cyclone High winds Damage buildings and other manmade 
structures; destroy some standing crops, 
especially basic grains; damage orchards 
and other trees.
Intense rains Cause flooding, which damages human 
settlements and may force evacuations; 
cause landslides; damage certain crops, 
especially tubers; may cause excessive 
erosion.
Storm surge Causes rapid flooding, which damages 
human settlements and forces evacuation; 
scours and erodes topsoil; deposits salt 
on fields; may increase salinity in 
subsurface water table; destroys most 
crops.
Volcano Blast Destroys timber, crops, houses, bridges.
Lava flow Inundates all in its path; causes grass and 
timber fires; may force evacuation of 
human settlements.
“Bombs” (ejected Can damage structures they hit; may start
lava and other fires; may force evacuation of human
large materials) settlements.
Flood (Can be
Ash fallout Can destroy crops; damages machinery; can 
render croplands temporarily unusable 
(but restores nutrients over long term); 
may force evacuation of human 
settlements and destroy animal habitat; 
creates respiratory problems; can clog 
waterways.
Inundation Results in damage to human settlements;caused by forces evacuation; erodes topsoil; may
unusually intense change course of streams, rivers; destroysrainfall or by most crops; deposits silt in some
changes to earth’s 
surface such as 
deforestation 
upstream)
downstream areas that may be beneficial.
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Table 2-1 fcont.)
HAZARD
Drought
EFFECTS
Reduced cloud 
cover; increased 
daytime 
temperatures; 
increased 
evaporation rates; 
increasing 
likelihood of dust 
and sandstorms
CONSEQUENCES
Dramatic reduction of surface water; severe
crop losses; soil erosion.
Food shortages; increased hunger and
malnutrition.
Losses to livestock.
Population shifts and migration.
most aid from outside the country can be marshaled and sent to the disaster 
area, the need has passed.
Table 2-3 makes clear that there is almost no actual immediate threat of 
epidemic arising from a disaster itself. While numerous secondary threats 
exist, in actuality few of these occur. If a communicable disease does break 
out, with proper epidemiological surveillance methods the source of 
outbreak can be quickly identified, the disease isolated, and an epidemic 
prevented, all by a very small staff using established epidemiological 
procedures. In no case in recent memory has there been a need for mass 
immunizations following natural disasters.
Table 2-4, also from Western’s study, lists the most serious com­
municable diseases that follow disasters and the most effective methods for 
prevention and control. The public health measures are listed in order of 
priority. From this table it is clear that immunizations are generally 
regarded as the .last defense against the disease. In most developing 
countries, people have been exposed to many of the endemic diseases and 
have built up some degree of natural immunity. Often these natural 
immunities are best left intact. Mass immunizations—which often require 
multiple dosages over a scattered period of time and which have only a 
short-term effect—may actually increase the people’s vulnerability to dis­
ease once the medical relief program has ended.
Often the most effective means of combating disease is through en­
vironmental engineering rather than medical methods. Yet most disaster 
assistance has focused on meeung medical needs of victims and has 
generally ignored environmental needs. Many agencies perceive disasters in 
terms of a medical emergency and try to develop their response accord­
ingly, rather than to carry out public health measures dealing with the 
environmental elements of the disaster. For this reason, few foreign 
agencies have any medical impact on disaster recovery, as the needs they are 
prepared to meet are nonexistent or have disappeared by the time the 
agencies arrive.
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Table 2-2 Patterns of Injury and Surgical Needs in Disasters
INJURIES EXCEED DEATHS SURGICAL NEEDS PERIOD NEEDED
Warfare High ContinuouslyTropical cyclones (without 
damaging storm surges) Moderate First 72 hoursTornadoes Moderate First 48 hoursFires Moderate-low First 24 hours
DEATHS EXCEED INJURIES
Landslides Low First 72 hoursAvalanches Low First 72 hoursVolcanic eruptions Low First 72 hoursTsunamis Low First 72 hoursTropical cyclones (with 
damaging storm surges) Moderate First 72 hoursFloods Low First 72 hoursEarthquakes High First 72 hours
FEW OR NO SURGICAL NEEDS
Famines
Insect swarms
SOURCE: The E pidem io lo g y  o f  N a tu r a l  a n d  M a n -M a d e  D isas ters: The S ta te  o f  the A r t, Karl Western, London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of London, 1972. Page 81.
Table 2-3 Patterns of Disease Resulting from Disasters
ACTUAL IMMEDIATE
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SECONDARY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
DISASTER TYPE THREAT THREAT
Cataclysmic disasters
Earthquakes None None
Tropical cyclones
(without storm surge) None Waterborne,* vectorbornet diseases.Tropical cyclones Waterborne diseases (except cholera),
(with storm surge) None vectorborne diseases
Floods Waterborne
diseases
Waterborne, vectorborne diseases
Tornadoes None None
Fires None None
Tsunamis None Waterborne diseases (except cholera), 
vectorborne diseases
Landslides/avalanches None None
Continuing, long-term disasters
Warfare None All waterborne, personal contact, t  and 
vectorborne diseases a possibility due 
to overcrowding
Drought/famine Malnutrition Malnutrition increases susceptibility to 
all diseases, but particularly measles, 
diarrhea.
* Waterborne diseases: typhoid, paratyphoid fevers, sewage poisoning, cholera, schistosomiasis,
leptospirosis
fVectorborne diseases: louseborne typhus, plague, malaria, viral encephalitis, relapsing fever 
tPersonal contact diseases: shigellosis, diarrhea, skin infections, hepatitis, measles, whooping cough, 
diptheria, influenza, tuberculosis
Table 2-4 Communicable Diseases That May Follow Disasters and the Most Effective 
Methods of Prevention and Control
DISEASE PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES
Water and/or Food-Borne Diseases
Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers
Food poisoning
Sewage poisoning
Cholera
Schistosomiasis
Leptospirosis
C on tact D iseases  
Shigellosis
Nonspecific diarrheas 
Streptococcal skin infections 
Scabies
Infectious hepatitis
R esp ira to ry  S p rea d  
Measles
Whooping cough 
Diphtheria 
Influenza 
Tuberculosis
Louseborne typhus 
Plague (rat flea) 
Relapsing fever 
Malaria (mosquito) 
Viral encephalitis
Adequate disposal of feces and urine 
Safe water for drinking and washing 
Sanitary food preparation 
Fly and pest control 
Disease surveillance
Isolation and treatment of early cases (typhoid and 
paratyphoid fevers, cholera)
Mass immunization (typhoid fever and cholera) 
Person-to-Person Spread
Reduced crowding 
Adequate washing facilities 
Public health education 
Disease surveillance in clinics 
Treatment of clinical cases 
Immunization (infectious hepatitis)
Adequate levels of immunization before the disaster 
Reduced crowding
Disease surveillance in clinics and community 
Isolation of index cases
Immunization of selected groups in the population 
(example: children—measles)
Continued primary immunization of infants 
(diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus) 
Vectorborne Diseases
Disinfection (except malaria and encephalitis) 
Vector control 
Disease surveillance
Isolation and treatment (no isolation for malaria)
SOURCE: The E pidem io logy o f  N a tu r a l a n d  M a n -M a d e  D isas ters: The S ta te  o f  the A r t , Karl Western, London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of London, 1972. Page 90.
Table 2-5 Immediate Social and Economic Consequences of Disasters
LOSS OF LOSS OF LOSS
SHORT-TERM PERMANENT LOSS OF INDUSTRIAL BUSINESS OF
MIGRATIONS MIGRATION HOUSING PRODUCTION PRODUCTION CROPS
CATACLYSMIC DISASTERS
Earthquake X X X
Cyclone X X X X
Flood X X X X X
Tsunami X X X X
Volcano X X X
Fire X X X X X
LONG-TERM,
CONTINUING DISASTERS
War X X X X X X
D rough t/famine X X
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Table 2-5 shows the immediate social and economic consequences of 
disasters, some of which are easy to see; the more profound social and 
economic upheavals and changes they bring are more difficult to identify 
and monitor.
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
Economic impact. Disasters disrupt rather than destroy economies. During 
an emergency, people must leave their jobs and devote their time to 
disaster-related activities, such as search and rescue, or to caring for 
survivors. During this period normal economic activities are severely 
curtailed, even if the sources of employment are unaffected by the disaster. 
This period is short-lived, however, and in the later phases of a disaster 
economic activities quickly assume a high priority for both businesses and 
victims alike. Whether or not an economy can recover quickly depends on 
the losses sustained. Physical damage to businesses and industry may 
temporarily halt some activities, but most enterprises can operate at 
reduced levels even with the loss of equipment. Often the workers in a 
damaged factory can be put to work helping to repair or rebuild the facility. 
In any case, the loss of jobs is usually only temporary.
Of far more concern is the impact of disasters on persons who are 
participating only marginally in the economy, people such as subsistence 
farmers, small shopkeepers, fishermen. After a disaster it is not uncommon 
for many small enterprises to fail. For the owners, a disaster can wipe out 
not only their investments but also their savings.
Several observers have noted that boom economies often develop after a 
widespread disaster such as an earthquake or hurricane where there is
DISRUPTION DISRUPTION DISRUPTION 
DAMAGE TO OF MARKETING OF OF
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS TRANSPORT COM MUNICATIONS
BREAKDOWN 
OF SOCIAL
PANIC LOOTING ORDER
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X X  X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Table 2-6 Effects of Natural Hazards
EFFECTS ON LAND SURFACE EFFECTS ON STRUCTURES
Earthquakes Fissures on surface Damages buildings, roads, dams and 
bridges
Landslides Buries surface structures, temporarily 
dams rivers causing localized 
flooding
Liquifaction of soils Damages buildings
Collapses underground May damage structures on surface,
caves, tunnels may change underground streams
Avalanches Damages buildings, roads, dams, 
and bridges
Cyclonic Storms High winds Damages buildings, power lines, 
towers
Flooding (rain and run-off) Damages buildings, bridges
Flooding (storm surge) Damages buildings, roads, 
bridges extensively
Droughts Dry soils No major damage
Windstorms Minor damage
Desertification No major damage
Floods Erosion Undercuts foundations
Mudslides Buries buildings and damages other 
manmade structures
Silting No major effect
Tsunamis Flooding Destroys or damages buildings, 
bridges, irrigation systems
Volcanoes (Blast) Destroys or damages buildings, other 
surface structures
Lava flows Buries buildings, sets fires
Ash deposits No major effect
Localized fissures Damages buildings, dams, bridges
major physical reconstruction. Long-term effects are not yet known, but at 
least one study indicates that if low-income victims are given priority in job 
hiring, boom economies can be a means of adjusting some of the losses 
[Human Organization 1979).
The effects of a natural disaster on the economy of a community are 
difficult to quantify, and surprisingly little attention has been given to 
economic reconstruction needs. This is in major contrast to post-war 
reconstruction efforts, such as the Marshall Plan, where great emphasis is
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EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURE 
None
Loss of crops on affected area, 
usually minor
None
Localized loss of irrigation 
usually temporary 
Localized crop losses
Damage to standing crops 
especially grains 
Damage to standing crops in 
flood areas
Extensive damage to crops, 
irrigation systems; leaves 
harmful salt deposits, scours 
topsoil, contaminates wells 
Kills crops 
Erodes topsoil 
Covers farmland with sand, 
alters cropping patterns 
Destroys crops, changes 
cropping patterns 
Localized crop losses
Improves soils
Localized destruction of crops; 
minor salt water 
contamination of soils, wells 
Minor damage
Buries crops and renders land 
unusable
Destroys crops, makes land 
temporarily unusable pollutes 
streams
No major effect
EFFECTS ON TREES
None
Loss of timber on affected 
area, usually minor
None
None
Localized timber losses 
Widespread loss of timber 
Minor losses along streams 
Loss of trees near shoreline
Kills some trees 
Minor damage 
Kills trees, increases scrub 
growth
Reduces forests
Localized timber losses
No major effect
Loss of trees along shoreline
Widespread timber losses near 
eruption
Destroys forests and starts 
forest fires 
Kills trees
No major effect
placed on helping business and industry to rebuild. (To an extent, this may 
be due to the fact that insurance is available to protect industry from most 
disasters, while it does not cover war risks.)
An interesting approach to earthquake reconstruction was taken by the 
People’s Republic of China in the aftermath of the Tangshan earthquake in 
1976. Here the government decided to concentrate on rebuilding the 
industry first rather than giving housing equal or top priority. The reason­
ing was that if jobs were provided, people would be better able to cope and
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could later participate financially in the new housing schemes. The planners 
felt that this approach would give them time to explore all the options for 
physical planning, especially siting choices, and give them a chance to 
replan a safer city.
While the Chinese certainly have far more control over reconstruction 
than do most other countries, the general approach bears watching.
The impact on land. Each type of natural disaster has its own effects on land 
values. After an earthquake, land values normally increase, especially in 
urban areas, and surprisingly even in marginal areas. This is because of 
increased demand for “safe” land from people who have lost their land or 
who live on sites still threatened by aftershocks. Since earthquakes have no 
effect on agriculture, agricultural lands will usually experience the same 
increase in price as urban land.
As a general rule, land values decline following the eruption of a volcano. 
Agricultural land will on an average lose more in value than urban land, 
especially if ash fallout is extensive.
Land values following cyclones vary depending on the type and extent of 
damage. If a storm surge has struck, the value of the land inundated usually 
declines, especially if large salt deposits remain. Beachfront property also 
declines in value, in both urban and rural areas. Sites that prove safe, that is, 
above the flood level, or that were protected from high winds (by hills or 
manmade structures), may increase in value. In general, however, land 
values decline.
Small marginal farms usually cannot survive economically following a 
cyclonic storm. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, following the 1977 
cyclone, a high proportion of the small farmers (those who owned two acres 
or less) were forced to sell their land because they could not afford to 
rehabilitate it and reinstall the irrigation systems. This may result in a 
substantial increase in the number of people migrating to urban areas, 
creating a housing shortage.
Floods have little effect on land value in rural areas, but in urban areas, 
flood plains are usually considered undesirable for housing and other types 
of development. Therefore, the land will have less value than other sites. In 
the less developed countries (LDCs), undesirable or low-cost lands attract 
squatter settlements, which are extremely vulnerable to disasters. Unless 
alternate land is offered at a reasonable price, these hazardous settlements 
proliferate. A disaster striking an area such as this will have little effect on 
land values, but the survivors often require new land in exchange for the 
sites that have been flooded.
Land issues are of special concern in disasters because in many cases they 
have been a major factor in disaster vulnerability. As mentioned above, a
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Displaced disaster victims invade surrounding lands for living space following the 
Guatemalan earthquake.
large percentage of squatter settlements and other housing occupied by 
low-income people is situated in areas that are particularly vulnerable to 
disasters. Often people move to this land because they cannot afford safer, 
more suitable sites or because large landowners refuse to sell more suitable 
sites. Thus when a disaster occurs, a disproportionately high percentage of 
the people affected are those living on these sites.
Disasters typically exacerbate land problems. It is usually obvious that 
those disproportionately affected were living on vulnerable sites. People 
soon undertake political action to provide suitable sites for those made 
homeless and landless by the disaster, as well as for those still living in areas 
vulnerable to secondary disasters. Typical here are land “invasions” (illegal 
occupations for the purpose of developing land), political demonstrations, 
and land acquisition activities by humanitarian organizations.
Failure to address land issues can affect a proposed reconstruction 
program. Self-help housing programs are not likely to be successful unless 
people are either landowners or have long-term leases or agreements to 
occupy the land. New sites offered must not be vulnerable to secondary or 
future disasters.
A unique problem often arises after disasters that is related to land 
ownership. Relief organizations often distribute reconstruction materials 
without distinguishing between landowners and tenants. Does the landless
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victim who accepts this material and uses it in the reconstruction of a 
permanent house then own the structure? In many cases, especially in Latin 
America, the ownership of any permanent structure is automatically 
conferred on the landowner. There have been cases where the disaster 
victims purchased reconstruction materials from relief agencies and rebuilt 
their houses only to be evicted upon completion of the building.
Social and political impact. Disasters often highlight the social struggles in a 
society and underscore the inherent inequities within a political system. 
Earthquakes and hurricanes, for example, affect a disproportionately high 
percentage of the poor in developing countries, for it is they who live in 
unreinforced, poorly built structures, often located on marginal lands. A 
disaster makes it very evident that the poor are vulnerable because they are 
poor, and this can lead to profound political and social changes within a 
society: many governments destabilize in the years immediately following a 
disaster. In the Sahel drought, every government fell, many directly as a 
result of dissatisfaction with relief efforts.
The case often cited is of the chain of events leading to the independence 
of Bangladesh. In 1970, a tropical cyclone generated a massive storm surge 
that swept across the barrier islands and the delta regions of East Pakistan, 
killing as many as half a million people. The failure of the Pakistani 
government to respond to this disaster with massive aid highlighted many 
of the inequities inherent in the relationship between East and West 
Pakistan. Using the disaster as a rallying point, a major political movement 
took control of the Pakistani government in the general election that 
followed several months later. The West Pakistani clique in power refused 
to relinquish control and, within a short period of time, civil war erupted. 
Fierce fighting and reprisals against the Hindu minority led to a massive 
exodus of refugees from East Pakistan into eastern India. The burden 
placed on the Indian government by these refugees led India to invade East 
Pakistan to help create the independent state of Bangladesh. The fighting 
during this period, plus the massive dislocation of people both inside 
Bangladesh and outward to India, disrupted agriculture and set in motion 
the beginning stages of a famine.
Students of this period point out that the cyclone and storm surge set in 
motion the sequence of events by underscoring the inequities in the 
treatment of the poorer eastern sector by the more afflent West Pakistan. 
They argue that other events could easily have initiated the same sequence, 
but in fact it was the disaster that provided an event of such magnitude that 
political inequities could not be ignored.
Disaster relief efforts may also play a part in heightening awareness of 
social problems and may fuel repression by reactionaries within a society.
Disasters: Causes and Effects 55
In the aftermath of the Guatemalan earthquake, many outside relief 
agencies chose to work in the Indian communities, largely ignored by their 
own government. Relief and reconstruction activities provided oppor­
tunities for the Indians to develop leadership and contact with the develop­
ment agencies, many of which stressed conscientization (developing an 
awareness of the roots of one’s poverty). This led to growing demands for 
change. That these demands threatened the oligarchy ruling Guatemala, 
there can be no doubt. As early as the summer of 1976, only five months 
after the earthquake, relief workers in several programs were warned 
privately by the military that they were being watched and should not raise 
the Indians’ expectations too much. Whether the disaster created the unrest 
by highlighting the social disparities in the country and the government’s 
inability to deal with the situation, or whether it was simply one of the 
contributing factors that led to the virtual civil war that erupted four years 
later, one thing is clear. Prime targets for assassination by right-wing death 
squads have been the leaders of the reconstruction programs.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL EFFECTS
Administrative problems in disasters are made more difficult by four 
factors, which increase in importance with the extent of the disaster.
Effects on community leadership. The loss of leaders due to death or injury can 
impair disaster response. Yet there is rarely a heavy loss of national leaders 
even in earthquakes and cyclones, because they live in better or stronger 
housing and thus are rarely injured. Leaders at the provincial or national 
level are slightly more exposed, while leaders at the village level are usually 
more vulnerable.
Since disasters often isolate communities and require them to rely on 
local leadership, a key element of a disaster plan should be to provide safe 
shelter for local leaders and their offices.
Disruption of formal organizations. When a disaster strikes, large formal 
organizations are most disrupted. Small, community-based organizations 
are generally better able to function, even with loss of leaders. In Guatemala 
hundreds of villages were isolated by landslides and forced to rely on their 
own leadership and resources until the national government could reach 
them. They did so remarkably well.
When formal organizations are disrupted, there is often a breakdown of 
clear lines of authority. In the emergency period, this can actually be 
beneficial, because it allows nonformal ad hoc organizations to develop 
quickly in order to solve specific problems. In his study The Disaster 
Community (1961), Charles Fritz points out that people band together in
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times of disaster to overcome common hardships. This results in the rise of 
local leaders and increases the efficiency of local organizations in dealing 
with the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
In short, no one stands on formality and things get done simply because 
they have to.
Damage to critical facilities and lifelines. Widespread disasters can destroy or 
damage facilities that may be critical not only for responding to the disaster, 
but also for maintaining a safe environment and public order. Among 
these are communications installations; electrical generating and trans­
mission facilities; water storage, purification, and pumping facilities; sewage 
treatment facilities; hospitals; police stations; and other public and private 
buildings.
The temporary disruption of communications is a critical problem for 
disaster managers. Damaged facilities make it more difficult to gather 
information and transmit it to decision makers. It is interesting to note how 
many emergency operations plans rely heavily on telecommunications. Yet 
no provision is made to protect these facilities from hazards.
Disruption of transportation (and isolation of resources). During the initial stages
of a disaster, almost all surface means of transportation within a community 
are disrupted. Bridges can be knocked out; roads can be cut by landslides or 
floods; rubble can block streets and highways. This can present a two-fold 
problem: First, rescue and other emergency vehicles are restricted. Second, 
unless adequate thought is given to positioning, vehicles and equipment 
may be isolated. In a recent hurricane in the Caribbean, most trucks 
designated to carry sand and sandbags to help combat localized flooding 
during hurricanes were prevented from responding by flood waters that cut 
off the only route from their parking lot to the area they were supposed to 
protect.
All of these administrative and managerial problems can be overcome 
through adequate pre-disaster planning. We will deal later with some 
measures that can reduce the impact of these problems.
EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES 
OF DISASTERS ON RESPONSE
Table 2-7 lists appropriate responses according to the type of disaster for 
both local authorities and foreign intervenors in the initial period, as well as 
during the later stages. It is my assessment based on personal experience of 
needs in various types of disasters. Initially, most of the needs are met by 
the local authorities and indeed by the victims themselves. In the cata­
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clysmic disasters, there is very little that foreign intervenors can do, other 
than to support the work of local authorities with cash or to help re­
establish basic services and critical facilities. This is not to say that most 
agencies do not in fact try to intervene at this stage, but the truth of the 
matter is that such intervention is usually wasted. It arrives too late and only 
adds to the general confusion rather than bringing order into the situation.
In continuing or long-term disasters, however, both the initial and 
secondary response by local authorities and foreign intervenors should be 
the same. However, foreign intervenors can also provide technical assis­
tance in such specialized fields as earthquake and wind engineering. In a 
supportive role, intervenors can offer credit to groups that otherwise would 
be ineligible through the credit and loan schemes of the local government. 
The secondary response ideally is a partnership between local authorities 
and the foreign intervenor, so that more people can be served more rapidly 
and gaps left in the local aid coverage can be filled by foreign aid.
In the particular case of war, where refugees have gone from one country 
into another, foreign intervenors are often called upon to respond in lieu of 
the local government. This may be for a variety of political reasons, as well 
as the local government’s inability to deal with the situation in economic 
terms. In many war situations, a role unique to the foreign intervenors can 
arise, namely, refugee repatriation or relocation to a third country.
Table 2-8 lists appropriate types of aid for communities struck by various 
types of disasters. The table is an oversimplification, as many of the issues 
relating to the provision of aid will be discussed later. It does, however, give 
a brief overview as to basic aid requirements following each major disaster 
type. It assumes, of course, that the actual relief item is culturally appro­
priate. For example, short-term feeding does not mean the sending of 
“junk foods” from the U.S. to a disaster in Africa; and emergency shelter 
does not mean providing a Western architect’s idea of an instant house to a 
society that is perfectly capable of building an adequate structure from 
indigenous materials.
To make certain that the most important myths and misconceptions are 
thoroughly deflated, here is a summary of what disasters are not and what 
aid is not needed. 1
1. Earthquakes do not cause loss of crops. The victims therefore do not 
require massive food aid.
2. Earthquakes do not create conditions for epidemics.
3. Earthquakes do not create a need for clothes or other material goods. 
(These items may be buried, but they can be recovered.)
4. Earthquakes do not necessitate migrations of people; therefore refugee 
camps are not necessary.
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Table 2-7 Response to Disasters (Ideal)
INITIAL RESPONSE BY 
TYPE OF DISASTER LOCAL AUTHORITIES
CATACLYSMIC
Earthquake Search and rescue; medical
assistance; disaster 
assessment
Cyclone
Flood, tsunami
Volcano
Fire
Evacuation; search and 
rescue; medical assistance; 
disaster assessment; 
provision of short-term 
food/water; water 
purification; epid. 
surveillance; provision of 
temporary lodging 
Evacuation; search and 
rescue; medical assistance; 
disaster assessment; 
provision of short-term 
food/water; water 
purification; epid. 
surveillance; provision of 
temporary lodging 
Evacuation; search and
rescue; short-term feeding; 
emergency shelter
Evacuation; search and
rescue; short-term feeding; 
emergency shelter
CONTINUING/LONG-TERM
War Medical assistance; food
(including intensive and 
supplementary feeding); 
water; emergency shelter; 
protection; sanitation
Drought/famine Medical, nutritional services,
water (on site, if possible); 
epid. surveillance
INITIAL RESPONSE BY 
FOREIGN INTERVENORS
Cash; assistance in reopening 
roads, reestablishing 
communications, contact 
with remote areas; disaster 
assessment
Cash; assistance in reopening 
roads, reestablishing 
communications, contact 
with remote areas; disaster 
assessment; assistance with 
water purification
Cash; assistance in reopening 
roads, reestablishing 
communications, contact 
with remote areas; disaster 
assessment; assistance with 
water purification
Cash
Cash
Medical assistance; food 
(including intensive and 
supplementary feeding); 
water; emergency shelter; 
protection; sanitation; 
provision of medicines
Medical, nutritional services, 
water (on site, if possible); 
epid. surveillance
‘Assumes refugees are in refugee camps outside their own country.
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SECONDARY RESPONSE BY SECONDARY RESPONSE BY
LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOREIGN INTERVENORS
Repair/reconstruction of 
infrastructure, housing, 
public buildings; jobs; 
credit; assistance to 
business
Repair/reconstruction of 
infrastructure, housing, 
public buildings; jobs; 
assistance to agri. recovery 
(loans, seeds, farm 
equipment, animals), 
small business, fishermen
Repair/reconstruction of 
housing; jobs; credit; 
technical assistance; assistance 
to small business and 
institutions
Repair/reconstruction of 
housing; jobs; credit; 
technical assistance to agri. 
recovery, small business, and 
institutions
Repair/reconstruction of 
infrastructure, housing, 
public buildings; jobs; 
assistance to agri. recovery 
(loans, seeds, farm 
equipment, animals), 
small business, fishermen
Repair/reconstruction of 
housing; jobs; credit; 
technical assistance to agri. 
recovery, small business, and 
institutions
Relocation, credit, financial 
assistance to victims; 
assistance to agri., small 
business
Repair/reconstruction of 
infrastructure, housing, 
public buildings; jobs; 
assistance to agri. recovery 
and small business
Relocation, credit, financial 
assistance to victims; 
assistance to agri., small 
business
Repair/reconstruction of 
housing; jobs; credit; 
technical assistance
*Food (inch supplementary 
feeding, feeding of school- 
age children); housing; 
sanitation; social services; 
typing; legal services; 
nutritional surveillance
Reestablishment of agri. 
sector (loans, seeds, farm 
equipment, animals); 
technical assistance; 
nutritional surveillance
*Food (inch supplementary 
feeding, feeding of school-age 
children); housing; sanitation; 
social services; typing; legal 
services; nutritional 
surveillance; resettlement 
assistance
Reestablishment of agri. sector 
(loans, seeds, farm 
equipment, animals); 
technical assistance; 
nutritional surveillance
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Table 2-8 Appropriate Aid
SHORT-
TERM LONG-
FEEDING TERM
CATACLYSMIC EMERGENCY TEMPORARY (NORMAL FOOD
DISASTERS CASH SHELTER LODGING IMMUNIZATIONS FOODS) AID
Earthquake X X
Cyclone X X X
Flood X X X X
Tsunami X X
Volcano X X X
Fire X X X
LONG-TERM,
CONTINUING DISASTERS
War X X X X X
D rough t/famine X X X X
■'Depending upon the climate
5. Emergency shelter is rarely needed, even after earthquakes. People can 
build adequate emergency shelter from the rubble and usually do so 
long before emergency shelters or tents arrive.
6. Tropical cyclones do not cause outbreaks of cholera. Cholera must be 
endemic to the community before the cyclone strikes. If a tidal wave 
(storm surge) accompanies the cyclone, chances are the threat of 
disease will be lessened, because cholera is neutralized by salt water.
7. Hurricanes that are not accompanied by tidal waves do not pollute 
water supplies.
8. Massive food aid is rarely required following a cataclysmic disaster such 
as a hurricane.
9. Used clothing is almost never needed; it is almost always culturally 
inappropriate and, though accepted by disaster victims, it is almost 
never worn.
10. Blankets can be useful but, if needed, can be found locally and need 
not be imported.
11. Foreign intervenors should not directly intervene immediately after 
cataclysmic disasters. Their assistance is most effective in the recon­
struction period, not the emergency phase.
12. Most needs are met by the victims themselves and their local govern­
ments and agencies, not by foreign intervenors.
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LOANS
INTENSIVE SUPPLEMENTARY SURGICAL MEDICAL OR AGRICULTURAL
FEEDING FEEDING AID SUPPLIES CLOTHING BLANKETS CREDIT ASSISTANCE
X X* X
X* X X
X* X X
X X
X* X XX X* X X
X X X X X* XX X X X X
3
The Borracho Hurricane
In order to see how each part of the disaster relief system works or does not 
work, I have constructed a fictitious disaster and described events as they 
often occur. All the events and actions of the agencies are based on actual 
occurrences.
A hurricane has been chosen for this exercise because it enables us to 
look not only at post-disaster actions, but also at activities that occur prior to 
a disaster when there is a warning period. While each type of disaster is 
unique, the following scenario is typical of all sudden natural disasters. 
Although based on actual occurrences, the examples here are intended for 
educational purposes only and do not reflect on the ability or capacity of 
any individual or agency. Most agency names are fictitious.
The Setting: The Republic of Borracho is a small, heavily populated 
country situated on the coast of a major landmass in the Tropics. The land 
bulges out into a shallow gulf, and coastline forms 60 percent of its border. 
Isolated fishing villages dot the coast, but most of the fertile coastal plain is 
inhabited by farmers who work small subsistence rice paddies. The 
remainder of the countryside is mountainous, and here small farmers strive 
to eke a living from eroded hillsides denuded by years of deforestation.
The poverty of the mountains has driven thousands of families to the 
capital, which lies on the south coast of the country. Many families live in 
squalid shanty towns scattered throughout the city, and many have recently 
been moved to Puerto Esperanza, a controversial new town built on a 
marshy area several kilometers from the capital. Puerto Esperanza, touted 
by the government as a model community and criticized by the opposition 
as an instant slum, is less than one meter above the high-tide level.
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CHRO N O LOGY OF EVENTS FOR 
THE BORRACHO REPUBLIC HURRICANE
August 27:
Ships passing through the Central Tropics report a rapid drop in baro­
metric pressure to weather stations nearby. The weather stations pass this 
information* to the International Hurricane Tracking Network (IHTN), 
which soon verifies the formation of a tropical depression and notifies the 
surrounding countries.
August 28:
Satellite observation and aircraft monitoring indicate that the depression 
has become a tropical storm.
In Borracho, the chief weather service forecaster follows procedure and 
notifies the director of the Emergency Preparedness Committee (EPC). The 
forecaster also reviews the difference between a hurricane watch (a first- 
stage alert given 48 hours before a hurricane is expected to strike) and a 
hurricane warning (posted when the hurricane is only 24 hours away). The 
director of the EPC notifies a few key government personnel and suggests 
that preliminary actions be taken in case a hurricane should develop. The 
government press agency is instructed to contact the weather bureau each 
hour to get an update on the storm information. One hour later, a synopsis 
of the storm is broadcast over the national radio system.
The public takes little notice of the storm, which is still more than 1200 
kilometers away.
August 29:
Satellite photos and reconnaissance flights through the storm indicate that it 
is now a full-fledged hurricane. The IHTN alerts governments of the 
countries in the region and various international organizations including 
the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) and the League of Red 
Cross Societies.
The International Emergency Assistance Agency, an aid ministry of one 
of the countries that has helped Borracho to improve its disaster prepared­
ness capabilities, offers expanded assistance should the hurricane strike.
At 2:00 p.m., the director of the EPC calls a meeting to bring members 
up-to-date on the hurricane’s progress and projected direction. By 4:00 
p.m., the scheduled time of the meeting, only half of the committee 
members have been located, and the meeting is postponed until 7:00 p.m.
Later the meeting convenes with only seven of the twelve members 
present. The weather service forecaster repeats his briefing. The committee
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asks him to predict the hurricane’s path, which he refuses to do. One of the 
committee members goes into another room and telephones the Inter­
national Hurricane Tracking Network. He is given a more detailed briefing 
and a description of the projected hurricane track. The briefer at the IHTN 
adds that in his own estimate the hurricane is not likely to strike Borracho 
because it is moving in a direction that will take it north of the country. The 
committee member returns and tells the committee what he has learned. 
The committee decides not to issue a statement because it would alarm the 
public.
Elsewhere, the monthly meeting of the Association of Humanitarian 
Agencies in Borracho (AHAB) is being held. At the end of the meeting, one 
of the members asks what plans are being made to prepare for the 
hurricane. The chairman replies, “Borracho doesn’t have hurricanes.”
August 30:
The hurricane intensifies and begins to move in a westward direction. The 
radio gives hourly reports on its position and notes that it has changed 
direction and is now moving toward the northeastern coast of Borracho.
At 10:00 a m., another meeting of the EPC is called. The weather service 
has indicated that it will issue a hurricane watch that afternoon unless the 
storm changes direction. The committee begins to draw up its operational 
plans. The first item is to find a strong building with good communications 
to use as an emergency operations center.
Word leaks to the press that a hurricane watch will be issued later that 
day, and the announcement is carried in the hourly newscast on the 
national radio system. When the weather service is contacted for verification 
of the story, the forecasters deny that a watch has been set. The denial is 
reported on the radio the next hour.
During the afternoon, meetings are held at various government minis­
tries to prepare for the hurricane. The protection of equipment critical to 
the operation of each ministry is given a high priority. Building materials 
and sandbags are requested from the public works department to protect 
installations in the low-lying and exposed areas, but available supplies are 
soon exhausted. Precautionary measures along the coast are fairly exten­
sive; little attention is given to areas further inland.
The Borracho Red Cross reviews its plans for dealing with the disaster. It 
has a series of guides issued by the League of Red Cross Societies to serve as 
a model for its own activities. As staff review the guides, it becomes clear 
that most are for actions that should have been taken long ago, and there is 
little that can be done before the disaster strikes. Nevertheless, at the end of 
its meeting, the director notifies the government that “the Red Cross is 
ready.”
The Borracho Hurricane 65
In a large government hospital in the capital city, the administrator goes 
through his checklist. The backup generator is ready; the staff have been 
alerted; and a number of patients have been discharged early so that extra 
beds will be available in case of an emergency. One problem is found, 
however. The stockpile of drugs for diseases that the hospital administrator 
suspects might occur following a hurricane is low and in some cases, drugs 
are missing entirely. The administrator contacts the EPC, which in turn 
contacts the International Emergency Assistance Agency and asks that these 
medicines be sent immediately.
In the country that formerly ruled Borracho, which has a large Bor- 
rachian immigrant community, there is growing interest in the hurricane. 
The news media, sensing this interest, prepare to dispatch reporters to 
Borracho to cover the hurricane.
August 31:
At 1:00 a.m., the storm intensifies again. At 1:15 a.m., the weather service 
issues a hurricane warning.
The prime minister calls the EPC to check on its activities. The director 
assures the prime minister that everything possible is being done. At the 
same moment, the EPC is trying to develop an evacuation plan and to find a 
list of buildings designated as hurricane shelters to give to the news media.
At dawn, the citizens of Borracho awake to hear the radio announce the 
hurricane warning. The newspaper publishes the newly found list of 
buildings designated as hurricane shelters, some of which no longer exist. 
The EPC then goes on the radio with a “new” list of shelters and urges 
persons in low-lying areas along the coast to evacuate.
Within several hours, the police in the Rio Dulce area (a broad, low-lying 
river delta region) report that they cannot reach several fishing villages on 
the coast because rising tides have cut off the roads. The police request 
trucks and boats to help evacuate these villagers. The Borracho Defense 
Force sends several convoys of trucks carrying assault boats to help.
As a precautionary measure, the EPC recommends that residents of 
Puerto Esperanza be evacuated as soon as possible.
By noon the only signs of the approaching hurricane are the rising tides 
along the upper portions of the eastern coast. Winds are now gusting, and 
there are intermittent rain showers.
Members of the EPC are running out of time. Hundreds of details 
remain, and each minute someone thinks of some new precautionary 
measure that should be taken. One of the problems facing the committee is 
what to do about numerous complaints of profiteering in the sale of 
emergency supplies. At 2:30 p.m ., the director asks the prime minister to
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declare such practices illegal, which he does in a newscast 30 minutes 
later.
At 3:00 p.m the EPC receives a call from the International Emergency 
Assistance Agency informing it that it is impossible to deliver the requested 
medical supplies due to the proximity of the storm.
At 4:30 p.m ., the foreign news teams arrive and begin their live televised 
reports. The first story describes the profiteering and shows pictures of 
several well-armed store owners defending their property against looters.
At 5:00 p.m ., the weather service announces that the hurricane’s course 
has now changed, putting it on a track for the central and southern portions 
of the country. The impact is predicted for the early morning hours of the 
following day. Winds are now gusting up to 60 kilometers per hour.
The EPC receives the news with great anxiety. Most of the preparedness 
activities have focused on the northern regions, not the south. Warnings are 
quicky issued to evacuate Puerto Esperanza.
Twenty minutes later, the prime minister goes on the national radio and 
television to issue a plea to all persons in low-lying areas to evacuate as 
quickly as possible. He suggests that those who cannot escape should seek 
shelter in churches and schools.
At nightfall, the column of army trucks arrives in the delta. Thousands of 
families have waited until the last moment to leave and are now trying to 
walk out of the area. The main road is packed with thousands of evacuees. 
After two hours, the trucks are unable to move any further.
In Puerto Esperanza, the sea level is one meter above normal. Water is 
coming across the road that separates the community from the sea, and 
large breakers are quicky eroding the roadbed. Vehicles attempting to 
evacuate have stalled. The residents of Puerto Esperanza begin moving 
away from the sea on the only other road that links the area with higher 
ground, but this road is also low and crosses two streams that are now 
flooding. At 10:00 p.m ., a bridge collapses and the people are stranded.
Word of the plight of Puerto Esperanza is flashed to the EPC. It orders an 
army engineering battalion to attempt to evacuate the people. The army 
sends a truckload of small boats to the fallen bridge but, by the time it 
arrives, the surface is too rough and the plan is abandoned. Twenty-five 
hundred families begin scrambling to their rooftops. Two thousand people 
will not make it to safety.
Midnight:
Communication from the capital to outlying areas is lost.
At 2:00 a .m ., passage of the eye of the hurricane is recorded at Puerto 
Blanco, 45 kilometers north of the capital. Winds in the capital reach a peak 
of 200 kilometers per hour.
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Aftermath:
By dawn on September 1, the winds have subsided to 100 kilometers per 
hour, and a few people are beginning to venture outside to see the damage. 
By 10:00 A.M., winds are still gusty, but it is possible to leave shelters and 
other structures without too much danger.
In the capital, wind damage is severe. Almost every house has been 
damaged somewhat. The slums have suffered heavily, with total destruction 
of buildings as high as 85 percent in some areas. Casualties exceed the 
capacity of the hospital by 200 percent. A major disaster is reported at 
Puerto Esperanza, but has not yet been verified. No news has yet been 
received from the rural areas, and the Defense Force reports that contact 
has not been reestablished with the trucks sent to evacuate the delta.
At noon, the prime minister orders a helicopter to take him, the director 
of the EPC, the Red Cross chairman, and several cabinet ministers over the 
affected area. In their flight over the capital, the prime minister is shocked 
at the extent of the damage. As the helicopter moves over Puerto Espe­
ranza, the extent of the devastation and loss of life is shockingly apparent. 
The few survivors cling to the tops of the few buildings that have survived 
the storm. As the helicopters of the prime minister’s party swoop low 
overhead, all aboard see frantic gestures for help.
As the prime minister’s helicopter returns, he is informed that a tidal 
wave has swept approximately 45 kilometers into the delta region. Over­
flights report that whole villages have vanished.
At the Emergency Operations Center, reports are fragmented and 
confused. The death toll and damage are reported high in all parts of the 
affected area. It is difficult to discern a pattern because the reports are not 
submitted in any standard form or classified according to priority. The 
Emergency Preparedness Committee is barraged by reporters clamoring 
for information. Members of the EPC decide that their first action should 
be to conduct an extensive survey of the damage. Their second action is to 
appoint the Red Cross as coordinator for all emergency relief.
On Embassy Row, ambassadors are beginning to receive cables asking if 
offers of aid should be made. One ambassador is upbraided for not sending 
an immediate disaster assessment and a request for aid.
By nightfall, more contingents of foreign press arrive. By the next day, 
their reports will have made Borracho the number one news story in the 
world.
At 8:00 p .m . ,  the EPC meets with representatives of the voluntary 
agencies and the foreign embassies. The director of the EPC reports on 
casualties and damage and lists the pledges of aid and assistance that have 
been received from other governments. The agencies ask for instructions, 
but it soon becomes clear that no reconstruction plans or activities have
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been prepared. The EPC’s apparent indecision and lack of leadership is 
reported to the prime minister.
All through the night, casualties continue to arrive at hospitals and aid 
stations in the affected zones.
Overseas, donations of relief goods are collected at voluntary agencies, 
churches, and the consulates of Borracho. Donations are especially heavy 
from communities with large numbers of Borrachians.
In Geneva at the headquarters of both UNDRO and the League of Red 
Cross Societies, lists are established to record all major donations. They are 
to be updated daily and sent to a long list of voluntary agencies and foreign 
ministries.
September 2:
At 7:00 a.m ., the prime minister announces that he has taken personal 
command of the emergency operations and reconstruction and has 
appointed a new Disaster Relief Committee to take over from the EPC. He 
calls on the international community for help. He orders the army to patrol 
the city to prevent looting.
At 7:30 a.m., the Red Cross sends a telex to the League of Red Cross 
Societies requesting tents, clothing, medicine, and food.
In the foreign ministry, offers of assistance are pouring in. At the airport, 
the first flights of relief goods are arriving. They consist of tents, medicine, 
blankets, and military ration packs.
At 10:00 a m ., a local doctor reports a possible case of cholera. The 
prime minister orders mass innoculation of all persons in the disaster 
area.
At 11:00 a m ., hospitals appeal to the prime minister’s office for 
assistance in replenishing medical supplies. The prime minister passes this 
request to the governments that have offered assistance. At the same time, 
the airlift of medical supplies requested prior to the emergency is arriving at 
the airport.
The voluntary agencies and churches hold a meeting at the damaged 
headquarters of the Association of Humanitarian Agencies in Borracho to 
decide what to do. After hours of discussion, they decide to donate all 
money received to the government and all materials to the Red Cross. 
Churches report that spontaneous donations of clothing are heavy and ask 
the Red Cross to arrange for helicopters to carry the donations to the 
mountains. The Red Cross agrees and diverts several helicopters from 
search-and-rescue operations. The director of the Red Cross will later lose 
his job over this decision.
At Red Cross headquarters, the first accurate casualty reports from 
outside the capital are beginning to arrive. Heavy losses are reported in the
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delta. The largest number of casualties occurred when churches and 
schools used as shelters collapsed or were flooded. In one church alone, 
400 people are reported dead.
The Red Cross, severely constrained by lack of resources and with no real 
organizational infrastructure outside the capital, asks for a meeting with the 
government to clarify responsibilities. At this meeting, it is decided that the 
Red Cross will continue to have responsibility for relief coordination in the 
capital and that the government will reassume responsibility for all other 
areas.
In the industrialized countries, televised reports of the devastation have 
begun to arrive. The most vivid reporting is about the tragedy of Puerto 
Esperanza. The story depicts the ineptitude of the government and ends 
with a statement that, unless massive international assistance is received, 
survivors will starve to death. Overnight, relief agencies report donations in 
excess of half a million dollars.
Realizing that the telecast has had a major impact on donations, the 
director of a voluntary agency with a program in Borracho contacts the 
network and asks that the organizations working there be identified.
Several agencies decide to send their disaster officers or senior personnel 
to the area to assess needs and to coordinate emergency activities.
At UNDRO a decision is made to dispatch someone to assist in 
coordination and disaster assessment.
September 3:
The airlift of aid continues. The majority of aid is provided by foreign 
governments, many of which have stockpiles of relief goods. Shipments 
from nongovernmental agencies also begin to arrive. Some of these 
materials, especially aid from governments, come from stockpiles, and 
these are sorted, bundled, and well-marked. Other materials are simply 
packed according to size, with each bundle containing a hodgepodge of 
different materials, which must be sorted upon arrival in Borracho.
By midmorning, the Defense Force is besieged with politicians clamoring 
to use military helicopters to fly over the disaster area to see the damage.
By noon, groups of villagers from remote highland areas begin to filter 
into aid stations to report massive destruction and heavy loss of life due to 
landslides and flooding in the denuded mountains.
Overseas, more news stories arrive daily with scenes of death and 
destruction in Borracho. The voluntary agencies (volags) that do not have 
programs in Borracho feel public pressure to get involved. For years Alpha 
Organization, a medium-sized international development agency, has 
wanted to initiate a program in Borracho, but did not have the money. The 
overseas program coordinator argues that the hurricane has provided an
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Stages in a disaster: a A satellite photo reveals a storm system, b The morning after, a 
storm has become a disaster for the inhabitants of this village, c A relief agency comes 
in to distribute supplies, d Sometimes, however, the aid is neither appropriate nor 
distributed soon enough to those who need it most, e Victims construct temporary 
housing out of available materials.
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ideal opportunity to begin a program because funds can be raised not only 
for relief but also for development activities. Alpha decides to initiate an 
appeal and begins to recruit a staff for the Borracho program.
September 4:After press reports of looting the previous night, the government slaps a 
nighttime curfew on the disaster area.
Now that certain roads have been re-opened, the government begins 
distribution of relief goods outside the capital. Supplies had been confined 
to deliveries of food and medicine by helicopter, but now truck convoys are 
able to take larger amounts and a wider variety of aid to the rural areas.
At the airport, a call goes out for volunteers to help sort relief materials. 
The sheer volume of the material and the confusion caused by poor 
packaging require several thousand people working at the airport and at 
other sorting centers.
Throughout the affected area, a tremendous salvage effort is taking place. 
People are busy trying to gather up as much building material as possible, 
especially the tin roofs found wrapped around trees, curled on the ground, 
or lying intact. Thousands of makeshift shelters have been built out of the 
rubble. Several foreign press correspondents assigned to do a story about 
the need for tents ask a group of victims to stop hammering so that their 
sound man can record an interview with a relief official arriving with a 
shipment of tents.
Overseas, the voluntary agencies are queried by the press about their 
plans for relief and reconstruction. Privately many of the staff are worried 
that more detailed programs have not been formulated. In order to speed 
things along, several agencies send additional staff to get things moving.
September 5:
At midday, the absence of clouds allows high-flying reconnaissance planes 
to photograph the area.
Helicopters arrive from the overseas military bases of a friendly govern­
ment. Their first activity is to airlift a complete field hospital to the delta 
region.
Throughout the day, massive aid continues to arrive by air. Supplies are 
unloaded from military and commercial transports and transferred to 
helicopters for delivery to the rural areas.
In the capital, the Disaster Relief Committee calls a meeting of relief 
agencies. To reduce duplication of effort, the government asks each agency 
to take responsibility for relief and reconstruction in one particular sector. A 
list of communities is placed on the board and each agency selects one to 
assist. Several voluntary agencies that have worked in the country for many
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years are not present at the meeting (later referred to as the “lottery”), and 
the areas where they have had extensive experience are assigned to other 
agencies. No attempt is made to verify the qualifications or capacities of any 
of the new agencies present at the meeting.
September 6:
Reports of corruption and favoritism in the distribution of relief supplies 
are reported in the press. The prime minister asks the churches to form 
committees to oversee the distribution of relief goods in each community.
During the day, three different voluntary agencies call coordination meetings in separate locations.
At midday, the government calls for more volunteers to help sort and 
package incoming relief goods. The total number of people involved in 
sorting materials now exceeds 4500.
In the early afternoon, the prime minister visits Puerto Esperanza and 
promises massive aid in a rousing “phoenix from the ashes” speech 
broadcast on national radio and issues an appeal for cooperation from all 
political parties and factions in the reconstruction effort. Two hours later, 
the leader of the opposition calls a press conference where he notes 
massive corruption” and vows to make equality of aid an issue in the next election.
September 7:
At 10:00 a m ., the Disaster Relief Committee calls a coordination meeting 
between the government and voluntary agencies to discuss housing recon­struction.
At midday, the UNDRO official arrives and offers to coordinate foreign 
assistance. The DRC agrees and that afternoon the UNDRO representative 
calls a coordination meeting for the next day.
That evening, a radio station operated by a group of evangelical mis­
sionaries resumes operation. Church leaders tell disaster victims that it is 
their sins that have brought calamity to Borracho and calls for a national of prayer.
September 8-14 (Week Two):
Throughout the week, aid continues to pour in. At the airport, aid is 
classified into two categories: the well-marked and -packaged aid arriving 
from governments and the more experienced relief agencies, and the so- 
called junk aid, which includes individual contributions and gifts thrown 
together and shipped with few, if any, markings. Many packages are 
irrelevant to the needs of the people of Borracho. Workers chortle amongst 
themselves about electric frying pans, cans of smoked oysters, used nylon
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stockings, odd lots of shoes, and instant mashed potatoes (which are 
inadvertently used by a number of women as a laundry detergent).
During the morning, a group of visiting congressmen arrive on a fact­
finding mission. They demand helicopters to fly over the disaster-stricken 
area. Later that day, an interim aid agreement between their government 
and Borracho is signed.
During the week, numerous coordination meetings are held some 
under government sponsorship, others at the instigation of one or more of 
the voluntary agencies, and one called by UNDRO.
Early in the week, photographs from the high altitude reconnaissance 
flights arrive and are given to the government; Borracho, however, has no 
photo interpreters.
During the week, the relief agencies in Borracho are offered large 
donations from foundations, intergovernmental organizations, and their 
own governments. Most of the donors are anxious that the money benefit 
the victims as soon as possible; therefore they attach a restriction that the 
money be spent within thirty to ninety days.
Daily, new relief agencies (some “instant agencies, such as Friends of 
Borracho) arrive. They are assigned areas of responsbility by the DRC. 
Expatriate volunteers also start to arrive. Among this group are several 
doctors who pester local medical officials for assignments and interpreters.
Also arriving are a number of manufacturers representatives from 
companies that produce small prefabricated buildings. Each claims to have 
the “ultimate solution” for rebuilding low-cost housing. Some houses are 
touted as temporary and others as permanent. The DRC, unable to choose 
among them, decides to hold a housing fair where the manufacturers can 
set up their units and show them to the public. The people s preferences 
will be determined and a housing system will be selected.
At a meeting of the DRC, many village relief committees report long lines 
for food at distribution centers. The same day, the government is offered a 
huge food-aid package of surplus commodities. There is one restriction: the 
food must be given away. Despite some opposition from farmers and 
cooperatives, the government signs the food-aid agreement.
At midweek, the hospital administrator reports a new problem. Parents 
have been arriving to look for small children evacuated from the mountains 
by helicopter. The DRC asks a voluntary agency to help reunite families.
Several embassies in Borracho advise the volags that they have money for 
housing reconstruction and they will accept proposals if they are submitted 
within one week. Proposed projects must be completed within sixty to 
ninety days.
Several embassies also offer the volags surplus food commodities to 
distribute. The food must be given away or distributed in food-for-work 
schemes.
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At a meeting of the DRC, several agencies point out that the distribution 
of free aid to the victims can be counterproductive. The chairman of the 
DRC reacts firmly, saying that to ask victims to pay for food or other aid 
would be against the humanitarian principles of disaster relief, and he 
orders that all aid be given free to the victims. Several local development 
groups argue that this will create dependencies, but the government is 
adamant.
In the private sector, architects and engineers offer their services to 
voluntary agencies as advisors. At first the agencies are excited at the 
prospect of having this technical assistance, but they soon discover that few 
of the professionals are familiar with the traditional housing built by the 
majority of the people in the country and that their idea of low-income 
housing is far too expensive for most of the agencies, not to mention the 
victims themselves.
Housing is rapidly becoming a major issue. The chairman of the DRC 
appeals for rapid housing action, citing the approaching rainy season (five 
months off). He states that it is government policy that all housing must be 
made of “permanent materials” that are hurricane-proof. A few agencies 
point out that the cost of permanent construction will limit the number of 
people who can be served and that so-called permanent materials require 
more sophisticated reinforcement for safety. The government, however, 
refuses to change its policy.
September 15-21 (Week Three):
During the third week, emphasis begins to shift away from emergency relief 
activities to concern about interim recovery and longer-term reconstruction 
needs.
Foreign military engineers arrive with heavy equipment to help repair 
roads and bridges, and most of the roads are soon reopened.
Helicopter pilots report fewer cargoes and are withdrawn. The prime 
minister, sensing a change in mood, appoints a National Reconstruction 
Committee to coordinate long-term recovery, but announces that the 
Disaster Relief Committee will remain active until all relief needs have been 
met.
By this time, a central volag coordinating committee, acting under the 
leadership of the Association of Humanitarian Agencies in Borracho, has 
evolved. It is subdivided into various “topic” committees to deal with issues 
such as housing and agricultural recovery.
Late in the week, groups of international banking officials arrive for talks 
on reconstruction loans to the government. The prime minister orders the 
Finance Ministry to give top priority to refinancing the national debt.
Insurance adjusters complete their initial reports. The business com­
munity is pleased that most claims will be paid promptly and that the
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insurance companies have been lenient. The businessmen begin to hire 
construction workers to help rebuild. The wages for carpenters and masons 
skyrocket and even tradesmen with limited skills find there is no lack of 
jobs.
There are reports that a boom economy is developing and prices are 
climbing at an astounding rate, especially for materials and tools that will be 
used in reconstruction. The government, fearful of creating a black market, 
hesitates to establish price controls.
The Disaster Relief Committee is informed that relief goods, including 
food from the food-for-work programs, are showing up in local markets. 
The government issues an order banning such sales.
Local farmers protest the distribution of free food, and farmers’ organiza­
tions report that, if the food donations continue, farmers who have been 
able to salvage some of their crops will have no market for them.
Housing reconstruction and agricultural recovery are proving difficult for 
some of the volags. They cable their headquarters for permission to hire 
several noted specialists recommended by a local university. Fearful that the 
hiring of consultants will add to overhead costs that donors would criticize, 
the headquarters decide against hiring the specialists.
The National Housing Bank announces low-interest loans for housing 
repair and replacement, with special criteria to enable the poor to apply.
The field director of Beta Aid, a voluntary agency, reports difficulties in 
setting up the reconstruction program outlined in his initial proposal and 
requests an extension of the ninety-day limit. The donor refuses, citing 
public pressures to act quickly. In order to speed the program, the field 
director hires workers from another region, chooses a simple design for all 
the houses, and begins to mass-produce them. The Beta program will later 
be praised among the foreign agencies as a model of speed and efficiency, 
but condemned by local people as a program that built slipshod housing 
and failed to employ people in the disaster area in need of work and cash.
Overseas, Borracho no longer retains front-page interest, and voluntary 
agencies note a sharp decline in donations.
September 22—28 (Week Four):
At the beginning of the week, the UNDRO representative submits his final 
report on the disaster and then leaves the country. The coordination 
meetings, now poorly attended, are reduced to biweekly affairs. The prime 
minister declares that the emergency is over and lifts the curfew.
The government announces a change in policy on the distribution of 
relief goods and agrees to allow sales of certain items. It also goes on record 
as encouraging the subsidized sale of building materials. It is left to the 
agencies to establish eligibility requirements. In the countryside, the
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differing programs and varying levels of assistance provided by each agency 
lead to complaints by the disaster victims. The National Reconstruction 
Committee (NRC) considers setting uniform reconstruction policies. After 
much discussion, it decides not to set the policies, fearing that the voluntary 
agencies and their donors will resent such a move.
New agencies continue to arrive. Those already operational report a large 
number of visitors “touring” the programs for ideas and advice. Some 
agencies complain that visitors are taking up excessive amounts of their 
time.
In some areas, agencies form consortia to work together, but in other 
cases, rivalries develop and agencies become bitter critics of each other.
Many programs report a sudden loss of staff. Until now volunteers filled 
the majority of positions and carried out almost all of the relief work. As 
relief efforts wind down, volunteers leave to return to their normal work. 
Among the first to go are farmers and unskilled laborers. Some offer to 
continue working if the agencies will pay a decent wage, but the agencies 
refuse to do so, believing that people should not be paid for helping 
themselves. As the defections increase, however, the policies of the agencies 
change and a number of workers are retained at minimal wages.
In a remote mountain village, ECHO International (a newly arrived 
agency) calls a town meeting and, through interpreters, tells the people that 
ECHO has been assigned to help rebuild the village. It orders the people to 
stop rebuilding until the agency decides what to do.
News media in Borracho report that reconstruction programs are in­
advertently helping only landowners and homeowners, because renters will 
not rebuild houses for fear that the owners will then force them out. The 
issue of the land tenure pattern and the need for land reform are not 
mentioned.
Overseas, news accounts also mention reconstruction inequities. Several 
agencies are accused of not reaching the poorest of the poor. One agency 
that has elected to concentrate on rebuilding and improving traditional 
housing is criticized for rebuilding slums. Other news reports criticize the 
aid programs for inadvertently supporting a corrupt, nonrepresentative 
government.
October—March:
Aid continues to arrive. The local relief committees have been re-formed as 
reconstruction committees. Food aid is now arriving in ever increasing 
quantities. There is continuing opposition to the food program, however, 
especially from the Agricultural Ministry. Its fears that farmers would not 
replant are coming true. The ministry thus proposes a system of price 
supports, but the only farms eligible are the larger farms along the coast.
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Continued complaints over inequities in aid lead the government again 
to consider establishing uniform reconstruction policies. After much 
debate, the NRC decides to develop a “model approach” and recommend 
that agencies use it as a guide. The agencies completely ignore it.
A group of landless tenant farmers, left homeless by the hurricane and 
led by community organizers from the opposition party, occupies a large 
tract of undeveloped land at the edge of the capital. The government, 
fearing the political consequences of evicting it, agrees to acquire the land 
and sell it to the families. To keep the incident from being repeated, the 
government announces that people involved in the occupation will not 
receive financial assistance or materials for housing reconstruction. A 
church agency offers to provide building materials in defiance of the 
government. Other landless families then embark on similar “invasions.
At a meeting of the NRC, a group of low-income families from a large 
town in the Rio Dulce region protests that the agency assigned to its 
community has not been seen since the day after the “lottery.” A check by 
the NRC reveals that the organization, Wings of Deliverance, is not a 
registered charity but a tax shelter created by several businessmen to justify 
a trip to Borracho. The total contribution of Wings of Deliverance is one 
thousand dollars.
As reconstruction progresses, the government realizes that its policy on 
permanent housing is unrealistic and agrees to permit reconstruction 
programs to rebuild traditional housing as long as the resulting con­
struction is “safe.” The Housing Bank, however, refuses to grant loans to 
people working with traditional materials.
Other problems complicate reconstruction. Land costs escalate. Small 
farmers unable to recover sell their land and move to the towns. In the 
capital, it is especially hard to find adequate housing. The number of land 
invasions increases.
At a meeting of the NRC, the secretary reports on a survey of housing 
reconstruction programs. Forty-five nongovernmental organizations are 
involved in housing reconstruction. Twenty-nine are located in the capital 
or the immediate vicinity, ten are located along the highway connecting the 
capital and the delta, and the other six are located in the mountains. The 
report also shows that only 35 percent of the total area affected by the 
hurricane is receiving reconstruction assistance. Therefore the government 
must establish a housing program to fill the gaps.
The prime minister orders the Ministry of Housing to begin constructing 
housing projects for disaster victims. Puerto Esperanza, where the recon­
struction efforts have been very slow, is selected as the site for the first of the 
new housing projects.
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Overseas, Borracho is gone from public consciousness. Funding for volag 
reconstruction projects must now compete with other projects or get by on 
the remainder of the donations raised during the emergency.
Returning home, a relief organization prepares a ten-page “evaluation” 
of its program that consists mainly of a brief description of the hurricane, a 
summary of the materials donated, and a picture of its disaster officer with 
the prime minister.
Midyear:
Six months after the disaster, all but a few foreign agencies have departed, 
claiming to have completed reconstruction of their assigned areas. The 
NRC surveys indicate that work is incomplete. Sixty percent of the urban 
residents and 85 percent of the people in the rural areas are still without 
replacement housing.
Midyear marks the end of the first post-disaster harvest. Observers notice 
a resurgence in housing demand, as people now have the time and capital 
to rebuild. However, only a few agencies remain to provide technical or 
financial assistance. Even among those agencies that want to stay, funds for 
continued operations are not available. To help meet the new demand, the 
government seeks a loan from the International Bank to finance other 
reconstruction activities. After two months, the loan is approved in prin­
ciple, but funds cannot be made available until the next fiscal year, further 
delaying reconstruction.
In the agricultural sector, surveys indicate that decreased agricultural 
production necessitates continued food aid for another year. A report by 
the Agricultural Ministry that the number of small farmers has declined by 
seven to ten percent, and that a significant portion of the land formerly 
devoted to growing rice in the delta region is now used to produce cotton 
and other cash crops, goes unnoticed.
• • •
Having now experienced the Borracho hurricane, what was wrong in the 
various responses? Keep this scenario in mind as you read further. You may 
also wish to return to this chapter after you have finished the book.
Community Reaction to a Disaster
COPING MECHANISMS
In order to understand how a society responds to a disaster, it is necessary 
to understand more about a little-known subject, namely, how a society 
“copes” with an unusual or stressful situation. In every society there is a 
variety of internal social structures that help individuals and families 
through difficult periods. These are known as coping mechanisms. In a 
disaster, they become collective instruments for organizing action on behalf 
of the disaster victims. The relationship of individuals and families within 
this system may be either formal or informal. Generally, the relationship 
has been worked out over generations. Each person knows how to react and 
use the various mechanisms available. Examples of coping mechanisms 
are: the family, the extended family, religious organizations, and clans. 
They can include more formal organizations such as villages and local 
governments. In Latin America the patron system would also be included. 
Coping mechanisms have been classified by anthropologist Margaret 
Kieffer (1977) as either internal or external.
Internal Mechanisms
SOCIAL UNITS
The most basic coping mechanism is that of the family. In its simplest form, 
the nuclear family consists of parents and their children. Extended families 
consist of more than one nuclear family that are related by kinship, share a 
common residence, or are joined together in economic activities with an 
authoritative or ceremonial head. Social units are the strongest of all the 
coping mechanisms. Kinship is a strong bond, and even when members of 
a family unit move away from a community, there remains a strong
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association and obligation to those remaining. In time of need, people may 
look to their family for support if a strong social tie remains.
In a disaster, the primary means for coping are the social units. Families 
first help members of their own family, then relatives, then neighbors. In 
the immediate emergency period, assistance includes searching for and res­
cuing victims, transporting them to nearby medical facilities, recovering 
belongings and erecting emergency shelter, providing temporary lodging to 
those who have lost their homes or are still threatened by the disaster, 
providing immediate food supplies, clothes, and blankets if they are 
required, and the mutual sharing of salvage and repair work. The comfort­
ing of each other during this time is one of the most important aspects of 
coping.
In the transition phase, it is the social unit that is most looked to for 
emotional recovery. During reconstruction, family and friends offer a 
combination of money and labor to help the victims or each other to restore 
homes and agriculture.
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Examples include local religious institutions such as churches, mosques, 
temples, and the social organizations affiliated with them, such as men’s 
and women’s societies and social service organizations. Religious insti­
tutions help individuals to cope in a number of ways. During the 
emergency period, many people look to religious organizations for 
leadership, and this is probably their most valuable function. Religious 
institutions and leaders also provide much in the way of emotional support 
and comfort to the victims. More functional assistance includes provision of 
shelter and burials. In some areas, churches are called upon to ensure that 
emergency aid is distributed equitably. In Dominica, following Hurricane 
David, the Dominican Christian Council was asked to supervise much of 
the early distribution of relief goods.
During the transitional phase, religious institutions continue to provide 
leadership and social services, and many take on such additional roles as 
lending money, providing small cash grants and material aid to meet 
individual needs, and serving as consignee for relief goods. In Jamaica, 
following the 1979 floods, many churches that owned land in the disaster- 
affected area loaned or leased it to flood victims so that they could plant 
crops and cultivate them while waiting for the flood waters to recede.
In the reconstruction period, direct involvement of most religious orga­
nizations tends to fade, except for the leadership role. Religious orga­
nizations are, however, an excellent contact for outside groups, allowing 
them entry into the community. They thus serve as a major focal point for 
long-term reconstruction actions.
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Survivors of the Guatemalan earthquake turned to the church to cope with the 
disaster. (Photo: Ron Sawyer)
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
At the village level, the number of political organizations is fairly limited. 
These include local formal or informal government (a mayor or town 
council, or village chief and village elders), local chapters of the major 
political parties, and the local offices of the provincial or national 
government. Political parties play a major role in disasters only if the party 
structure is the de facto government of an area, such as is the case in many 
socialist countries. The degree to which local offices of provincial or 
national governments can play a part in disaster response depends on the 
degree of autonomy that is granted and, of course, the leadership qualities 
of the persons within each of the government agencies.
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Following disasters, the internal political organizations provide a variety 
of assistance to disaster victims. During the emergency, the local govern­
ment provides leadership, supervises the distribution of relief goods, 
organizes and supervises evacuations, and provides equipment and tools. If 
the situation demands, the local government can also be called upon to 
provide order and protection.
During the transitional phase, the government continues to provide 
leadership and, in many cases, serves the additional important function of 
providing information. At the same time, government concentrates on 
those areas that are normally within its special responsibility; that is, the 
restoration of community services, especially the repair and reconstruction 
of critical facilities and lifelines. Governments also often provide land to 
disaster victims, either for temporary occupation or permanent resettle­
ment.
During the reconstruction period, the government again provides leader­
ship and also planning services. Local governments aid or serve as a point 
for the distribution of the national or provincial government’s assistance to 
victims. For example, local governments may run a credit scheme for the 
national government.
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
There are three such systems: informal, interpersonal economic relation­
ships; patronage; and mutual assistance organizations such as cooperatives, 
labor unions, guilds, or federations. In the villages, a relative or friend 
within the community may make loans to an individual. The patron in rural 
Latin American communities is usually a person or organization that 
employs a large number of peasants or peones. It benefits the patron to help 
his peones recover quickly from a disaster, as it helps to keep up production. 
Aid from a patron may be in the form of time or money, although recovery 
will rarely be to a level above what the peon had known before.
Mutual aid groups such as cooperatives are becoming more and more 
prevalent in the developing countries. They may be of a type formed within 
the community itself, or an affiliate of an organization with regional or 
national membership. The greatest number of these organizations are 
agricultural cooperatives and labor unions. In a disaster, these orga­
nizations provide leadership as well as some degree of financial security. 
Members of the organization often band together during the transition and 
reconstruction phases to help each other out in various reconstruction 
activities. These organizations can be the source of loans and grants to 
individual members and, in rural areas, are often among the first to be able 
to provide seeds, tools, and fertilizers for agricultural recovery. In recent
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years, international relief organizations have looked increasingly to co­
operatives as their counterparts in the delivery of disaster assistance.
Local economic organizations usually play a major part only in transition 
and reconstruction phases. During this time, their contributions are one of 
the most important factors in the conclusion of a successful post-disaster 
program.
External Mechanisms
External mechanisms include social organizations, church-related groups, 
political organizations, economic institutions, social and economic devel­
opment organizations, and in some cases, the national government.
The effectiveness of external organizations depends largely upon their 
ability to understand and deal with the cultural constraints within the host 
society, their view of development, and their ability to communicate 
effectively with the victims.
These groups may become involved during any phase of a disaster. 
Organizations with a wide national base can be among the most effective in 
assessing and providing early emergency aid. Many international relief 
agencies have found national groups to be effective counterparts for 
channeling disaster assistance.
Summary of Mechanisms
Margaret Kieffer (1977) has devolved several generalizations about coping 
mechanisms. The following are among her most important observations.
1. In anv coping situation, that which is most familiar will enhance the 
coping mechanism and its ability to operate.
2. The less complex rural cultures have shorter recovery periods.
3. In more complex situations, alternatives at the internal level are dimin­
ished; conversely, external mechanisms are more applicable to the 
urban settings.
4. In the rural communities, external mechanisms will be more efficient 
and effective if they operate through an existing internal mechanism.
5. The more contact a traditional culture has had previously with modern 
culture, the more readily will it accept assistance.
6. Strong external influence may act, often inadvertently, to break up internal coping 
mechanisms and their effectiveness.
The effects of intervention on coping mechanisms are the subject of the 
next chapter.
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CLASSES OF VICTIMS
For present purposes, there are three classes of disaster victims. First are 
primary victims—those persons living within the disaster-affected area who 
have suffered injury, the loss of relatives, or damage to their property.
Secondary victims are those residing within the affected area or on the 
border of the affected area, who suffer economic loss due to the disaster or 
to actions resulting from relief operations. Examples of secondary victims 
are those involved in economic activities dependent upon goods or crops 
destroyed by disaster, or shopkeepers with stores inside the disaster area 
who are not able to sell their goods either because of lack of cash on the part 
of the victims or because materials that are normally sold have been 
supplied without charge by relief agencies.
Tertiary victims are those who are indirectly affected, who live in the same 
country but not necessarily in the disaster-affected area. For example, 
people receiving development aid suddenly lose this aid because resources 
are reallocated for the disaster victims. This occurred in Andhra Pradesh, 
India, following the 1977 cyclone. Within the region, water was allocated 
evenly during the main growing season to three different irrigation systems. 
After the summer season, there was only enough water left to supply one 
sector for a second crop. Thus the water was supplied to each system once 
every three years. The cyclone struck two of these sectors just before the 
summer crop was to be harvested. Though it was not the turn of either 
sector to receive water for a winter crop, the government decided to shift the 
water allocation to one of the affected sectors, so that those who had lost 
their crops would be able to plant again and thus recoup some of their 
losses. The farmers in the sector that was to have received water that year 
thus had to share the burden for the disaster. Many were small farmers 
already living a marginal existence, and the reallocation of the water cut 
heavily into their economic livelihood.
COMMON MYTHS ABOUT VICTIM BEHAVIOR
Earlier we looked at some of the common myths about the cause and effects 
of disasters, especially as they relate to victims’ needs. There are, however, a 
number of other myths that shape the perception of international agencies 
and the donor public that should be reviewed and debunked.
The first of these myths is that victims are totally helpless in disasters. As 
we have seen, this is not the case. The victims always have a variety of 
resources upon which to draw, and each society has many ways of dealing 
with disaster. It has often been pointed out that the lower on the socioeco-
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nomic scale, the more self-reliant the family is; the*more self-reliant, the 
easier it is to cope with disaster.
The second myth, and one that is perpetuated by the relief agencies, is 
that disasters are situations that require outside assistance in order for the 
victims to cope. Here is an example of the type of headline that often 
appears:
VICTIMS CAN’T COPE 
WITHOUT YOUR HELP
This is a gross distortion of the actual fact. Outside assistance has the 
potential to be helpful if provided in the right way, but Third World 
societies have coped without outside assistance for centuries, and until aid is 
provided in a culturally sensitive manner, its benefit will continue to be 
limited.
Myth number three is that disasters wipe out indigenous coping mechan­
isms—that somehow the disaster creates a condition where local organ­
izations (both formal and informal) are not capable of operating properly. 
Research has shown that, contrary to popular belief, a crisis reinforces local 
coping mechanisms and that local organizations often work better in times 
of crisis than in normal periods. As we shall see later, the true danger is that 
aid programs that ignore local coping mechanisms often disrupt the latter’s 
ability to function properly and in some cases damage them by under­
mining their credibility within the community.
A myth believed by many people, probably generated by Hollywood, is 
that victims respond to disasters with abnormal behavior. It is a commonly 
held view that disasters incite panic, hysteria, rioting, and shock and leave 
victims too dazed to deal with the situation. Numerous sociological studies 
have shown that this is not the case. Even in times of war, people usually 
react deliberately both during and immediately after the disaster. While it is 
true that much confusion reigns and social organization mav be disrupted, 
very quickly there is a coming together that results in spontaneous action by 
the refugees as they look after their own interests. Abnormal behavior is the 
extreme exception, not the rule.
A corollary to this is that grief traumatizes disaster victims to the point 
where they must be led into activities in order to save themselves. While it is 
true that grief and shock often follow the loss of close relatives in a disaster, 
grief is something that must be worked out individually and something that 
relief agencies are rarely prepared to deal with. Coping with grief is an 
individual process. It is doubtful that any relief program, however well- 
intentioned, could help victims overcome their losses simply by providing 
material aid.
Intervention

5
Disaster Assistance: 
Some Concerns
The disaster and the havoc that it causes form only one part of the picture. 
The ways in which agencies respond to disasters and the implications of that 
response for the development of the affected countries are of major 
concern, for inappropriate responses, constituting a second disaster, occur 
frequendy.
The popular concept of disaster assistance is as follows. Soon after a 
disaster strikes, resources are marshaled and shipped in. Foreign agencies 
work hand-in-hand with local government, relief committees, and societies 
to provide organization and materiel to replace disaster losses. After several 
months, reconstruction begins and soon things return to normal. Disaster 
assistance is seen as humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian assistance is 
viewed by most as above question. After all, if one is trying to help, how can 
that be bad?
If there were no further concerns, there would be no need for this book. 
But there is a far greater range of issues to be considered, the implications of 
which are just becoming more clearly understood. Unfortunately, many 
relief and development agencies have not yet even identified these issues, 
much less begun to come to grips with them.
EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION ON COPING MECHANISMS
It is imperative that an intervenor attempting to conduct a relief or 
reconstruction program first identify the various coping mechanisms that 
exist and understand their role in society. Otherwise the relief program 
could damage the coping mechanisms or substantially reduce their ef­
fectiveness. This is especially the case with external coping mechanisms. As 
they play a major role in the society even in normal times, the danger is that 
the intervenor, in order to attain short-term goals, will have an overall
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negative effect on society in the long-term. Many development programs 
depend upon these coping mechanisms and on the self-reliance that they 
encourage.
Unfortunately, most intervenors do not understand the role played by 
coping mechanisms in a culture. Many cannot identify them, nor do they 
make an attempt to do so.
As outsiders, they are not familiar with the society and how it works. Even 
agencies working in the area prior to a disaster, who are familiar with some 
of the coping mechanisms, may not have seen how they work collectively to 
respond to a disaster.
Intervenors are often blinded to the long-term implications of a program 
by the more obvious short-term emergency needs created by the disaster. 
In a very real, humane attempt to respond urgendy to these needs, they 
often do not take the time to explore and identify what is currently 
happening in the community.
Intervenors operate without the social and anthropological data and 
background that is needed to identify coping mechanisms. Even in the 
more sophisticated relief agencies, there are few full-time staff members 
capable of conducting an analysis of the disaster-affected society and 
providing information that can be used for planning programs. While 
agencies have attempted to retain sociologists or anthropologists for short­
term analyses, these efforts have usually fallen far short of providing the 
type of information that program planners can use to develop a program.
Thus a major problem confronting any intervenor is how to identify the 
coping mechanisms that exist in the society and how to relate outside help 
to these built-in disaster response systems. Furthermore, outside assistance 
must be provided in such a way as to encourage a collective response using 
these mechanisms. Failure to do so can create a large number of problems 
that may ultimately damage or destroy the mechanisms as a means of 
coping. Intervention can do this in any one of the following ways.
First, it can undermine the authority and prestige of local leaders. When a 
major relief program with resources of material, staff, and equipment is 
established, it creates an instant alternative to local resources. If local 
leaders are not involved, their prestige may be affected and they may 
eventually lose authority.
Intervention can become a disincentive to self-help. In many com­
munities, the expectation of aid has delayed reconstruction efforts. In 
Guatemala, following the 1976 earthquakes, a study of three villages 
showed that when one village, which was rather small and isolated, learned 
of the massive relief efforts being undertaken in nearby communities, it 
delayed initiating activities that the people were perfectly capable of 
undertaking themselves (Rosene 1977).
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Even within a single community, intervention can become a disincentive 
to self-help. In the village of San Andres Itzapa, Guatemala, an intervenor 
“adopted” the village to provide reconstruction assistance and ordered a 
halt to all local activities until the intervenor could decide what it was going 
to do (Rosene 1977). While this is an extreme case, the very presence of an 
outside agency and curiosity about what it intends to do, especially if no 
local leaders are involved in the decision-making process, can in itself be a 
major disincentive.
Massive intervention can undermine confidence in the coping mechan­
isms, especially external ones. It can do this in one of two ways. First, local 
agencies with only limited resources can come to be perceived as ineffective. 
The experience in Guatemala provides a good example of this. Local 
agencies could offer only a limited amount of materials for housing and 
shelter. The foreign agencies, on the other hand, could provide whole 
houses. Thus many Guatemalans began to deride the local agencies for 
their limited resources and capabilities.
Second, local agencies are often judged by the standard of the intervenor 
rather than on the basis of their own contributions.
Few intervenors are familiar with the development issues within a 
community prior to their intervention. Thus they stand a good chance of 
reinforcing the status quo and patterns of underdevelopment. Researchers 
have noted that following disasters, the victims often become more depen­
dent on local patrons, especially lending institutions and community power 
brokers, than they were prior to the disaster (Rosene 1977). Basic problems 
within a community are often exacerbated by the disaster, but the ability to 
deal with the disaster collectively has been reduced and the power trans­
ferred from indigenous coping organizations to an oligarchy or an organ­
ization seeking vaster control over the society. In a recent disaster in the 
Caribbean, a foreign relief agency formed a committee made up of 
residents of the community whom they perceived as leaders to handle the 
relief and reconstruction program. Just prior to the disaster, however, the 
people in the community had formed a social and political movement to 
wrest power from precisely the same group of people and had begun to take 
economic and political control of the community. The actions of the relief 
agency, which were taken primarily because these “leaders” spoke the 
language of the intervenors, led to the oligarchy regaining control of the 
community through the way in which it distributed the reconstruction and 
relief aid.
Relief efforts may obscure underlying political realities. Often, con­
tradictions and inadequacies within a society are brought to light in a 
disaster and its aftermath. Just as disaster relief may hinder a positive 
adjustment to natural hazards, it may also hinder appropriate social and
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political adjustments. In many cases, the very offer ofbilateral relief is based 
on political and economic considerations. Here massive disaster relief has 
served to obscure perception of social realities and inhibit a process of 
positive adjustment.
Even when the intervenors try to use the local coping mechanisms, their 
intervention can often still be disruptive. Simply overloading the abilities of 
a local group and its staff is a common problem. The old saw that the best 
way to kill an organization is to give it too much money appears to have 
validity in disaster practice. A corollary, of course, is to give too much work 
or to expect too much from the members of the local group. Overloading 
an organization in this manner only makes it appear weak and ineffective.
Finally, intervention can wipe out the development efforts of indigenous 
organizations almost instandy. One of the primary goals of development 
efforts is to encourage self-reliance on the part of the people. Yet a massive 
relief program that does not take development questions into consideration 
can create disincentives to self-reliance, can establish dependencies on 
outside organizations, and can foster doubts on the part of the people about 
their own ability to control their lives and destinies. The chaos left behind 
when intervenors do not fully consider the implications and impact of their 
programs can delay, and in some cases even inhibit, further development 
work. Following the 1977 cyclone in Andhra Pradesh, the development 
organizations coming into the area reported difficulty in developing econo­
mic and agricultural programs due to the animosity resulting from the ways 
previous relief programs had been conducted (ARTIC 1978).
The development issues most overlooked by intervenors are, in sum­
mary:
1. The need to facilitate cooperative actions. It has been frequently shown that if a 
society is to develop socially or economically, it must attain a degree of 
sophistication in conducting cooperative activities. Many agencies over­
look this connection, and some of their programs have reduced the 
possibility of cooperative action in future programs.
2. Participation in decision making. An agency that offers a pre-determined 
plan or one prepared without the full participation of the disaster victims 
misses the opportunity to increase the people’s ability to make choices 
and to help them attain self-confidence in decision making. In essence, 
this represents a continuation of one of the major obstacles to develop­
ment.
3. Dependency relationships. The degree of dependency on institutions or 
resources beyond the control of a low-income population is a major 
contributor to social and economic underdevelopment. The depen­
dency relationship may involve leadership, money, or materials. Depen­
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dency relationships are normally very one-sided in favor of the provider. 
Many relief and reconstruction programs have been shown not only to 
maintain the dependency relationships but in some cases to establish 
new ones (Taylor 1977).
4. Political reform. Foreign intervention often ignores fundamental political 
problems within a society and therefore tends to exacerbate the pre­
disaster situation.
5. Political reform and land tenure. Few agencies recognize the long-term 
impact of relief programs, especially in the field of housing, on land 
tenure.
6. Fostering unrealistic expectations. It has been pointed out that many relief 
programs have led to unrealistic expectations on the part of the 
recipients. The provision of free housing for a relatively small number 
of people following the Andhra Pradesh cyclone created the expectation 
that everyone who had lost a house would soon be receiving a pukka 
(brick and cement) house from either the government or a relief agency. 
In fact, it was impossible for the government to provide housing of this 
type for even one-tenth of the total number of affected families.
It should be clear now that relief and reconstruction programs cannot be 
viewed or carried out as separate or distinct operations. They must be 
conducted in the same manner as development programs.
It is apparent that many organizations, including some of the most 
progressive development groups, fail to make this connection and, promp­
ted by the urgent post-disaster needs, concentrate their energies on rapid 
delivery of relief items. The approaches that they would normally use in 
development (such as extensive citizen participation, support of existing 
social systems, development of local initiatives) are all put aside in the belief 
that the disaster requires an immediate response and the development 
approach is too slow. Organizations that normally encourage “bottom-up” 
decision making suddenly take on a “top-down” orientation.
Yet normal development approaches cannot be discarded in emergen­
cies. Experience has shown that they must be used in developing and 
executing all relief and reconstruction projects. Organizations that dis­
regard the development approach can set back or even wipe out years of 
progress toward development.
THE NATURE OF THE AGENCY-VICTIM RELATIONSHIP
The first and most important set of issues that agencies need to deal with 
concerns the way in which they relate to the victims. The interrelationship 
between agency and victims is the major factor determining whether a relief
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program succeeds. But even further, it is also the major factor determining 
the impact the relief program will have on the society.
Almost from the very beginning of intervention, the first question that 
arises is one of accountability. Ask staff members of almost any relief 
organization to whom they are accountable, and they will probably reply to 
their home office, to their accountants and, almost always, to the agency’s 
donors. Some may respond that they are also accountable to the govern­
ment of the country in which they are working, A few may even say that they 
are accountable to their counterpart agency in the country. But where in 
this list is the victim? If this is truly the helping relationship that most 
agencies would like to achieve, why has the victim been left out?
The lack of accountability does not translate to a lack of concern for the 
well-being of the people in the affected community. But without at least 
some accountability to the victims, agencies come to feel that they have 
almost free rein in developing their programs and are not responsible for 
either the consequences or the impact (not that many agencies ever even 
consider that the impact might possibly be negative).
The concept of accountability to the victims of a disaster is a concept long 
overdue in relief practice. Without accountability, programs inevitably 
become paternalistic in nature or end up serving the needs of the donors 
and the agencies rather than the needs of the victims. Unfortunately, 
accountability requires a complicated and time-consuming approach to 
problem solving, rather than a streamlined, simple one.
Paternalism is often the most difficult thing for relief agencies to come to 
grips with. In any cross-cultural situation (whether involving persons from 
agencies in the advanced nations and someone from the Third World, or 
persons from different ethnic or socioeconomic classes within a society), 
there is potential for paternalism to be either expressed or felt. Paternalism 
may be overtly expressed, but more often it takes subtle forms. This is not 
to say that it is intentional; but the fact remains that it is there. For example, 
the people within the relief or reconstruction program are more often 
designated as recipients than participants.
If a relief program is set up by intervenors from outside the community 
and all decisions are made by the intervenors, what message is expressed to 
the people in the community? What they may infer is that they are not able 
or trusted to handle their own needs. Certainly a demonstration of massive 
response points to the inadequacy of the local government and its agencies; 
and the more decision making that is removed from the local community, 
the more the feeling of helplessness is accentuated. The central question in 
determining whether a program is paternalistic is deciding whether it
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supplements and complements the existing community processes, or 
ignores them altogether. If it ignores them, the chances are that there is an 
assumption of inadequacy and the program is subtly reinforcing the feeling 
of helplessness on the part of the victims.
In an extreme case, this feeling of helplessness can pervade an entire 
culture. The situation in Bangladesh is often cited as typifying the problems 
of paternalistic aid. In 1970, when a massive storm surge and cyclone swept 
inland from the Bay of Bengal, killing over 250,000 people, massive relief 
efforts were mounted within the country. The following year, a fierce civil 
war broke out, displacing 20 million people, disrupting agriculture and 
commerce, and bringing the country to a complete standstill.
Following the war and achievement of independence for Bangladesh, 
further relief efforts were mounted by the international community to help 
the country recover. So extensive were these efforts that relief agencies 
provided assistance in almost every field, and foreign advisors could be 
found in virtually every ministry from agriculture to health. Bangladesh was 
proclaimed an “international basket case” and in the five years after the civil 
war, millions of dollars worth of material aid, food, and technical assistance 
were given to the country.
Despite the aid, tremendous food shortages existed within various sectors 
and aid agencies continually called upon the world community to respond 
to the needs of Bangladesh. Soon almost everyone believed that Bangladesh 
as a nation was totally helpless and gradually starving to death. The people 
in Bangladesh began to feel the same way. The more aid came in, the more 
they “realized” how helpless they were! In this situation, many of the 
Bengali professional class “bailed out” and emigrated; those that chose to 
stay constantly talked about how bad things were and how more aid was 
needed. Soon those Bengalis who were in charge of various programs 
designed to reverse the declining situation began to believe that they could 
not find Bengali solutions and that they themselves were inadequate for the 
tasks at hand. It became commonplace within the government to assume 
that everyone was starving and that the situation was totally hopeless. 
Bangladesh became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
A special set of problems in the agency-victim relationship occurs when 
the intervention results in the first extensive contact an isolated rural 
community has with outsiders. In the past two decades, there have been few 
areas untouched by such intrusions; but in many parts of the world, the 
influence and impact have been limited. When a disaster occurs in a remote 
area and massive outside aid is brought in, the villagers may have access for
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the first time to modern goods and services. For example, some villages in 
Africa had their first contact with modern medicine, education, and 
mechanization with the coming of relief aid during the Sahel drought.
The way in which this aid is provided can affect the way the recipients 
come to perceive not only the goods and services involved, but also the 
delivery mechanisms. If the first contact is one in which everything is given 
away and no return is asked, either in the form of work or cash, might not 
the recipients begin to believe that these services should be provided 
indefinitely on the same basis? A further concern is whether continued 
delivery over a long period of time can create a feeling of dependency.
For the development agency providing long-term aid, the agency-victim 
relationship can be especially difficult. Many agencies that have worked for 
years to develop local leadership and to foster community participation in 
decision making rush to provide massive aid like everyone else. If the 
agency succumbs to the “disaster syndrome” and drops its development 
approach in favor of charity, it stands a good chance of wiping out much of 
what it accomplished in its previous work. In the eyes of the people, the 
agency suffers “image reversal” when it abandons development goals for a 
welfare approach.
Unfortunately, even if an agency continues to use development ap­
proaches, it runs the risk of being adversely affected by competing relief 
programs. For example, World Neighbors had been working in the Central 
Highlands of Guatemala (in the communities of San Martin, Chimalte- 
nango, and San Jose Poaquil) for many years prior to the 1976 earthquakes. 
During this time, it had worked to develop local leadership, to form 
cooperative savings and loan institutions, and to encourage self-reliance in a 
variety of community concerns. After the earthquake, it was only logical that 
the organizations already present in the community should be relied upon 
as a basis for reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, it was decided that the 
reconstruction program should support and improve community processes 
and foster a spirit of self-reliance. But notice what happened when other 
agencies joined in.
One of the components of the reconstruction program was the dis­
tribution of corrugated metal roofing sheets (known locally as lamina) to 
assist people in reroofing their homes. The lamina was sold at a subsidized 
price. The people benefited from the lower cost, more people could be 
served, and no one was given charity. (For those who could not afford to 
buy, work programs were established so they could earn credits toward the 
purchase price.)
The program became operational in a very short period of time and, 
within a matter of weeks, thousands of families had been able to purchase 
the lamina at reduced prices. Soon, however, a number of other programs in
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adjoining areas began to provide the same material free or for minimal 
labor. Several months later, other reconstruction programs began offering 
not only free lamina but also, in some cases, free houses. The result was that 
the people who had originally purchased the lamina began to complain that 
World Neighbors was trying to take advantage of them. Only after much 
effort was the agency’s relationship with the people of the community 
restored.
THE ECONOM IC IMPACT OF DISASTER RELIEF 
AND RECONSTRUCTION
A relief or reconstruction program is essentially an economic system 
superimposed on a community that has been affected by a disaster. Take, 
for example, the provision of material aid. In order to get the goods to the 
people, an entire network is set up to provide storage, transportation, and 
distribution to and within the community. The capabilities of logistical 
systems and the range of goods provided expand yearly. No longer are just 
food, clothing, and blankets provided to disaster victims; often an entire 
range of goods that would make a department store owner envious are 
shipped to the scene. When the distribution system is set up, it is almost 
always controlled by the relief agency acting through its representatives in 
the community.
When disaster strikes a community, the economic systems of the com­
munity are also affected. Physical facilities may be destroyed or damaged, 
and the distribution of goods and services disrupted. If the community is to 
return to normal, it is essential that these systems be restored as quickly as 
possible. But just as these systems are struggling to recover, new systems in 
the form of relief and reconstruction programs appear and compete directly 
with them. A recent example occurred on Fiji. One island group was 
severely affected by an intense hurricane that destroyed much of the 
agricultural production of the country and approximately 80 percent of the 
housing. Massive relief efforts were organized by the government. To 
qualify for the relief, family members had to show that they were 
unemployed as well as being disaster victims. During the period that the aid 
continued, the normal economic systems (such as small stores, material 
suppliers, and their respective distribution networks) were bypassed. The 
aid, in effect, became a competing system. Thus the victims were denied 
much-needed capital that would have enabled them to recover more 
quickly. Several of the smaller stores eventually closed, and a number of 
suppliers put off reordering stock.
Thus the relief program delayed recovery of the normal economic 
systems within the community. When the program was due to terminate, it
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was not surprising that program staff found that the food program had to be 
continued because there were still inadequate supplies in local stores. In 
short, the relief program created a dependency situation that was contrary 
to the objective of a quick return to normalcy.
This adverse impact relates not only to the distribution of goods, but also 
to the effects on local labor. This is especially the case in the housing sector. 
When a relief agency develops a housing program that provides a per­
manent replacement structure built with either pre-fab techniques or self- 
help or voluntary labor, the carpenters and masons who are an essential 
part of the normal building process are often circumvented. In order for 
these men to survive, they often must leave the community to find work. In 
Guatemala, there was an exodus of skilled masons and carpenters to the 
capital. While this was due in part to the good salaries offered in Guatemala 
City, there is no doubt that many also were faced with the lack of job 
opportunity resulting from various reconstruction programs set up by relief 
agencies.
The important Conclusion to draw is that humanitarian issues like 
meedng fundamental human needs for survival and emotional recovery 
dominate only the emergency period. In the succeeding phases, the issues 
are essentially economic. Housing, reconstruction, agricultural recovery, 
the restoration of jobs, small businesses, and government services—all are 
questions of economic revival. Programs that do not help restore the 
existing economic systems within a community are, in hard reality, a waste 
of time and effort.
DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS OF RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION
Only recently have people begun to study the disincentive effects of relief 
and reconstruction programs. As yet, there is very little concrete evidence 
either to support or to refute the contention on the part of many relief 
strategists that a mishandled relief program can have extensive disincentive 
effects not only on the recovery of the disaster-affected community, but also 
on long-term development.
This area is too important to ignore. We must have more data. Yet the 
gathering of data is often very difficult because of the challenge it makes to 
our underlying assumptions about humanitarian assistance. A typical dis­
incentive chain goes like this. First, immediately following a disaster, large 
amounts of food aid are brought in. A distribution system is set up by the 
relief agency, which operates through local working groups or committees. 
The food is then given away to the disaster victims. In the meantime, 
because the food distribution system is apart from the normal system, local 
merchants cannot sell the foodstuffs that they have and must lower their
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prices in order to compete with the free food that is being distributed. If the 
food aid program is providing the same items that are normally sold by the 
stores, the suppliers will be severely affected and unable to move much of 
their own stock. The result is that they will not be able to offer a good price 
to local farmers to resupply goods that are usually sold and, in order to keep 
their profit margins up, they will pay less to farmers for the goods that they 
do purchase.
Marginal farmers, who grow only one crop, will be hit hardest. In 
practice, one of two things happens: either farmers sell out and leave the 
land, or the next year they are forced to plant less than in the previous year 
due to lack of capital to purchase seeds and fertilizers.
This disincentive chain can be affected by factors at any link and, of 
course, the final results often depend on the particular country and other 
environmental/economic aspects beyond the disaster. It has been noted, 
however, that in cases where massive food aid has been provided after 
disasters, agricultural production, adjusted for disaster-induced losses, has 
still shown a decline.,
In considering the disincentive effects of post-disaster aid programs, it is 
important to remember that in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, there 
often is a very real need for the materials being distributed. The question is 
not basically one of need, but rather the manner in which the need is met.
THE "SET BACK" PROBLEM
“Set back” is difficult to define in absolute terms. It is something that 
happens following a disaster that can be perceived only by those who were 
involved in long-term development work before the disaster occurred and 
who are witness to the changes brought about by the disaster itself and the 
recovery process. The term “set back” has been coined to describe the 
negative consequences to development of post-disaster intervention. It is 
caused by the failure of intervenors to consider fully the impact of disaster 
assistance.
In a broad sense, the set back problem represents the loss of an 
opportunity to use the disaster to resolve basic problems. In some cases, it 
even represents the imposition of new obstacles that must be overcome in 
order to attain pre-disaster development objectives. Following earthquakes 
or hurricanes, for example, many relief agencies rush to initiate housing 
reconstruction projects. Many have no experience in the housing sector and 
do not know how to build safe houses. Instead of taking advantage of a 
situation that has eliminated much of the previous unsafe housing and 
provided intervenors with a unique opportunity to start from scratch, 
scores of housing programs systematically rebuild thousands of structures
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each year that actually increase the vulnerability ofitheir occupants to the 
very disasters that destroyed the houses in the first place.
COMPETITION FOR DEVELOPMENT FUNDS
Relief and reconstruction efforts compete with development programs for 
available funds. In countries where disasters occur frequently, they can 
create an enormous financial burden unless adequate steps are taken to 
mitigate their effects. Fiji provides a good example. In the 1970s, the 
country was repeatedly struck by hurricanes, which forced the government 
to commit a large portion of the foreign aid received to reconstruction. In 
the early 1980s, roughly 20 percent of the foreign aid was spent on overhead 
costs alone for reconstruction efforts from four separate hurricanes (Cuny 
and Perez 1982). In the housing sector, failure to plan for mitigation of 
periodic disasters has had a profound effect. Not only have the disasters 
added to the overall demand for new housing, but the government’s 
decision to replace the lost houses with expensive prefabricated buildings 
has added to the overall cost of reconstruction. Because the replacement 
houses are not hurricane-resistant, should another hurricane strike the 
same areas, the government would be placed in the position of having to 
rebuild houses not yet paid for. This would require funds and other 
resources that might otherwise have been devoted to social and economic 
development programs.
r
THE EXPECTATION OF AID: A DISINCENTIVE TO INITIATIVE
Highly publicized relief efforts in recent years have led many countries to 
expect similar efforts in their behalf should a disaster strike. Often countries 
or communities that are perfectly capable of dealing with a disaster 
themselves postpone taking effective action until they determine what aid 
they might receive. In some cases, governments and local agencies have 
advised people not to do anything because it might make them ineligible 
for disaster benefits. This attitude is of major concern for both relief and 
development agencies because it places a larger burden on the relief 
agencies and gives a disproportionate share of the decision making to the 
outsiders.
Change after Disasters
It is a common adage within the relief and development community that 
disasters have the potential to introduce change and to improve the society 
during the reconstruction period. Often after a disaster, one hears govern­
ment or relief agency staff talk about the possibility of rebuilding a model 
society and describe the tasks ahead much in the terms of a phoenix rising 
from the ashes. That such a desire is felt and expressed is certainly laudable. 
If millions of dollars will suddenly be available, why not use them to rebuild 
a better community?
Unfortunately, the record of success in producing the phoenix has not 
been overly noteworthy. For the disaster victim, recovery means returning 
to normal, and normal usually means whatever existed before the disaster. 
The success ratio of these attempts to use disasters as opportunities for 
change has been rather low, even in the more industrialized nations where 
more extensive resources exist.
This poor showing does not mean that a number of opportunities for 
modest change are not present. But usually these opportunities require a 
subtle approach, patience, and a long-term commitment on the part of the 
agency.
There are three generally recognized ways in which change can be 
introduced following a disaster. The first is known as “invisible change.” 
This approach is often used in dealing with housing or material aid. It refers 
to the process of making an improvement of some sort that does not 
outwardly affect the appearance or performance of an item or a particular 
activity. One example of invisible change is found in the improvement of 
traditional building techniques to enable adobe housing better to withstand 
the forces of earthquakes. In Guatemala, Programa Kuchuba’l introduced a 
variety of methods designed to make the traditional adobe houses more 
earthquake-resistant. Included were better methods for strengthening the
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walls using vertical columns and tying the columns together by means of 
wire cross-bracing. Both the posts and the cross-braces were covered by a 
thick stucco and were therefore invisible. To someone who had not seen the 
housing construction process, the houses would appear to be very tra­
ditional.
A second approach is known as the “substitute method” and is often used 
when introducing new varieties of crops. The provision of a new type of 
seed—one that is stronger or that resists various pests, but that requires no 
basic change in normal cropping patterns—can be substituted following a 
disaster such as a hurricane or flood where crops have been affected.
The “building block method” is the third approach: an agency begins to 
introduce change slowly by first working to re-establish a semblance of 
normalcy, and then introducing limited innovations. An example is the 
establishment of an Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) in 
Guatemala by the Save the Children Alliance following the 1976 earth­
quakes. Earlier, the Alliance had considered establishing a development 
program in Guatemala. When the earthquakes struck, rather than jumping 
in immediately to set up an IRDP, the organization chose instead to 
concentrate first on a limited number of reconstruction objectives. The first 
sector chosen was housing. During the first few months, a housing 
reconstruction team was formed and began to build a skeleton organization 
in the community where it planned to conduct the IRDP.
For its initial housing efforts, the Alliance chose to use the same invisible 
change approach initiated by Programa Kuchuba’l. After the program had 
been established and the invisible goals attained, staff added additional 
activity areas (such as public health, agriculture, and adult education). They 
also chose to build up the normal system before introducing the next level 
of change. Not only did each component of the overall program use the 
building block approach, but the program as a whole used this method to 
establish a presence in the community.
These approaches represent ways in which an agency can intervene subtly 
in a situation where people’s primary motivation is to get back to normal as 
quickly as possible. However, disasters may also create a demand for 
change in certain sectors. Demand change is simultaneously both the 
easiest and the most difficult type of change to respond to with an adequate 
program. An agency must first identify the source of the demand and probe 
its depth. Following the Andhra Pradesh cyclone, there was a tremendous 
call for improved housing to withstand hurricane-force winds. This de­
mand was interpreted by many of the relief agencies as being unanimous on 
the part of the people living within the affected communities. What the 
populace had in mind was improved traditional housing or pukka structures 
made of brick that were common to the area. Many of the agencies
Change After Disasters 103
interpreted the demand as being so strong that people would be willing to 
have non-traditional housing as long as it was made of pukka materials. 
Because it was cheaper to build duplexes and larger multifamily houses 
than to build single-family pukka structures, some agencies proposed 
housing schemes using multifamily designs. Others proposed one-room, 
single-family units intentionally designed to be rather small so that the 
available resources could be stretched as far as possible.
In both cases, the agencies overestimated the willingness of the people to 
sacrifice their traditional houses (which met the functional needs of the 
families) in order to move into the safer pukka structures provided by the 
agencies. Today, many of the agencies’ housing units stand vacant, while 
immediately next to them, a traditional building has been erected and 
occupied.
The lesson here is that even where people are demanding change, 
agencies must determine in advance how much will actually be accepted.
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Let’s review some of the lessons from past experience and the findings of 
the major research in disasters. For brevity, I am presenting them in an 
abbreviated form and placing them in two broad categories: General 
Aspects of Intervention and Aid and Assistance.
General Aspects of Intervention
Lesson 1: Relief and reconstruction operations should be conducted 
within the context of development.
Lesson 2: The process through which a family obtains disaster assistance is 
more important than the actual aid received.
Lesson 3: The people can do it and they known how.
Lesson 4: The people consistently prefer private and informal solutions 
over public and formal ones, even when the latter may objectively be 
more adequate.
Lesson 5: When properly executed, intervention can provide a strong 
stimulus to recovery and a base for positive changes.
Lesson 6: The rehabilitation system may constitute a more powerful agent 
for change than the impact of the actual disaster (Bates et al. 1963).
Lesson 7: Activities should be appropriate to the phase of the disaster.
Lesson 8: “Organizations that [arrive] on the scene soon after the im­
pact . . . [are] successful to the degree to which they [fit] themselves into
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the rescue pattern already established by thelocal groups” (Form and 
Nosow 1958).
Lesson 9: The role of intervenors is to support activities that local 
individuals or organizations cannot carry out themselves.
Lesson 10: The lack of uniform reconstruction standards or policies (or 
failure of all intervenors to agree on basic approaches to relief) creates 
undue competition and leads to inequitable distribution of 
assistance.
Lesson 11: Massive relief can be counterproductive.
Lesson 12: The anticipation of large-scale assistance by foreign agencies 
makes local organizations reluctant to take relief measures.
Lesson 13: Aid may inadvertently be provided in such away as to inhibit the 
recovery process and create dependence.
Lesson 14: Relief efforts may obscure underlying political realities (Cuny et 
al. 1982).
Lesson 15: Disaster relief may hinder the victims’ own efforts to better 
prepare for a recurrence of the disaster.
Lesson 16: Despite the availability of local resources and solutions appro­
priate to post-disaster needs, there is a strong and growing demand at 
all levels in the Third World for “Western” (that is, highly 
technological) responses.
Aid and Assistance
Lesson 1: The subject of disaster assistance has been viewed predominately 
from the standpoint of the intervenors. Thus many of the common 
relief approaches have evolved in ways that facilitate delivery of relief 
assistance. If agencies are to provide effective aid, they must view 
disaster assistance from the standpoint of the victims and their 
requirements.
Lesson 2: Many post-disaster needs can be determined based on the natural 
hazard, season, and location.
Lesson 3: “In almost every disaster, outside agencies underestimate the basic 
resources still available in communities” (Quarantelli and Dynes 
1972).
Lesson 4: Material assistance following disasters generally:
a. is far in excess of actual needs;
b. is in proportions larger than needed or usable;
c. requires services and facilities that could be used for more 
essential tasks;
d. often causes conflicts among relief agencies;
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e. adds to the problem of congestion;
f. in some cases may disrupt the local economy (Dynes 1970). 
Lesson 5: Relief materials from within the disaster-affected country are more
likely to be compatible with normal use patterns than those delivered 
from a different culture; and the most useful materials provided by 
intervenors are those purchased in or near the disaster area.
Lesson 6: Re-establishment of the local economy and job security is usually 
more important for disaster victims than material assistance.
Lesson 7: Assistance provided by international relief agencies rarely plays a 
major role in the actual emergency phase.
Lesson 8: It is unrealistic to assume that foreign assistance sent to a disaster 
area will be applied in the emergency phase. Therefore, the emphasis 
on speed or “emergency response” should be changed to developing a 
response relevant to needs at an intermediate or advanced phase of 
recovery.
Lesson 9: Contributions from external donors are most effective in pre­
disaster and reconstruction phases (Cuny et al. 1982).
Reconstruction is a complex process and often involves sophisticated 
techniques and activities with which local groups will need assistance. 
Providing assistance at this point is a meaningful role that intervenors can 
play.
POSITIVE ASPECTS OF INTERVENTION
Previous problems and consequences notwithstanding, there are of course 
positive aspects to intervention. Disasters often precipitate dynamic social 
and economic change, and intervention can play a part in shaping that 
process by providing expertise and resources not otherwise available at key 
points during the post-disaster period. Intervention can support coping 
mechanisms rather than harm them. Resources and new opportunities can 
strengthen existing institutions and help them better serve the community. 
And intervention can provide an opportunity for new leadership to emerge 
and for new groups to form to meet needs not adequately served by existing 
groups or effectively handled by established leaders. Intervention can also 
provide an alternative means of attaining development progress when 
existing organizations or leaders impede change.
Examples of intervention with positive results can be found in every 
disaster. There are hundreds of examples of families and even whole 
communities benefiting from aid they received: new and safer houses, new 
jobs and businesses, and expanded opportunities.
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But what is important is the collective impacf of the response. This is 
much more difficult to measure, but again, some positive examples can be 
found. One of the most noteworthy occurred in the aftermath of wide­
spread famine in the Bihar region of India in the 1960s. Until then the 
principle staple of the people was rice. When periodic droughts hit the 
region, the irrigation systems could not supply enough water to grow the 
rice, and thousands of small farms went out of production. An international 
team of experts was assembled by the Government of India and the U.N. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to develop an integrated re­
construction plan for the area. The team decided that one way of reducing 
vulnerability to droughts was to try to convert a large percentage of the 
riceland to the production of wheat, which requires less water and can 
better withstand dry periods. At the time, wheat was relatively unknown in 
Bihar, so a public education program was established to introduce the crop 
to farmers and create a demand (and taste) for flour among the general 
populace. At the time, the program was quite controversial, and many 
observers doubted that it would be successful. Yet today wheat accounts for 
a significant amount of the grain produced in the area (some years as much 
as 45 percent) and the number of people affected by famine has been 
reduced.
The Relief System
DEFINING THE SYSTEM
Much has been written recently about the foreign aid organizations and 
their role in international development in the Third World (Eugene Linden 
The Alms Race 1976; Denis Goulet The Uncertain Promise 1977; John G. 
Sommer Beyond Charity 1977). While the workings of these organizations 
and their interrelationships in normal circumstances are similar to the 
patterns that occur after disasters, there are enough differences to warrant 
closer examination.
The relief system consists of donors and intervenors. At the upper levels 
of the system, those who collect and channel resources to those active in the 
field are collectively known as the donors. Intervenors are the organizations 
that carry out the activities in the affected countries. In the middle levels of 
the system, some organizations are both donors and intervenors (for 
example, AID). An organization that is a donor in one disaster may be an 
intervenor in another. Generally, however, roles are firmly established.
What is generally referred to as the “international relief system” can be 
divided into five tiers: the first three represent the international level, the 
fourth the regional or country level, and the fifth the project level. Into 
these tiers are fitted a complex network of organizations, each of which has 
a specific role or resources to offer following a disaster. If the system is 
viewed theoretically as a multi-tiered funnel for collecting resources and 
channeling them into a disaster-affected community, it is possible to 
visualize the workings and interrelationships at each level.
The Five Tiers
Starting at the top are the individuals and companies that contribute funds 
or materiel; these are the primary donors. It is impossible for donors to
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deliver directly to the victims; therefore, they must donate to an organi­
zation that either works in the community or can in turn pass on their gift to 
an organization that is on the scene. The organizations that receive the gifts, 
including churches, governments, and foundations, form the second tier.
The second-tier organizations have a number of options in distributing 
the donations. They can pass them on to the groups in the next level, 
composed of the international relief and development organizations 
(known collectively as voluntary organizations or volags), or to international 
intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations or the Organi­
zation of American States (OAS), or they can bypass this level and give 
directly to the fourth tier, the local government and nongovernmental 
organizations. In practice, most funds are passed directly from second-tier 
to third-tier groups.
Page 109 shows the tiers, the patterns of donations, and the inter­
relationships of the various organizations. For example, churches normally 
give to volags in the third tier rather than to lower levels in the system. 
Governments donate to all levels, depending on the disaster and the 
political implications of the aid. Foundations contribute to volags, inter­
national organizations, and sometimes direcdy to local nongovernmental 
organizations, but almost never to the local government. At the third tier, 
volags and international organizations often support each other. For 
example, many volags give money directly to specialized UN organizations 
such as UNICEF, while many of the UN organizations (such as the 
UNFICR) contract the volags to carry out their programs. Similarly, volags 
often donate to regional organizations and vice versa, and even laterally to 
other volags.
The volags serve as a conduit for funds to three of the groups in the 
fourth tier. First, they support their own field offices and the projects that 
their staff develops. They also fund other international volags or the local 
nongovernmental organizations in the affected country. Often, too, they 
provide funds to missionaries through organizations in the third tier or 
directly to those in the fourth tier. Volags often also fund each other in the 
third tier and the UN or regional intergovernmental organizations. In fact, 
volags have a record of funding just about every type of organization in 
both the third and fourth tiers, except local governments. Thus, in effect, 
volags often become not only operating agencies but also de facto founda­
tions. OXFAM U.K. and OXFAM America acted as a foundation following 
the 1976 Guatemalan earthquake by funding another volag, World 
Neighbors, which was in turn supporting a variety of projects in the 
earthquake zone.
The fourth tier represents the first group of organizations in the affected 
country. It comprises the host government, local nongovernmental organ­
izations, and the offices or field representatives of the foreign volags and
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missionaries. Their interrelationships are not as complex as at the 
international level, for here there is a competition for funds. Here too the 
decisions are made on how the funds will be spent inside the country, and 
such decisions are critical for the outcome of the overall relief and recon­
struction program.
The final level the resources must go through before reaching the victims 
is the project level. This fifth tier represents the operational level at which 
the funds are dispersed and the point at which the victims’ needs are 
resolved.
Most of the organizations in tiers 2 through 4 are both recipients and 
donors. In terms of the relief system, all organizations in these tiers, and 
many in the fourth tier, are collectively known as donors.
Motivation
Who are the donors and what motivates them? The individuals and families 
in the first tier make their donations either spontaneously or in response to 
a request from an organization in one of the lower tiers. Donations are 
voluntary and humanitarian concerns are the prime motivation.
Corporations and business organizations are also in the first tier and 
make donations to second- and third-level organizations, but their 
motivations are more varied. Humanitarian interests, of course, are a 
factor, but there are also issues of self-interest that come into play. A 
corporation with operations in the disaster-affected country cannot ignore a 
disaster and must demonstrate its concern and goodwill to the victims and 
host government. It can do this indirectly, by funding the voluntary 
organizations or the local nongovernmental organizations providing dis­
aster relief or a foundation that will make the choice for the company. Or it 
can do it directly by setting up small-scale projects that benefit the 
company’s workers or their communities. For example, many corporations 
have offered low-interest loans to their workers for housing reconstruction.
Corporations may contribute funds to support the national objectives of 
their own government, especially if these are thought to lead to gains for the 
corporations in the future. Thus, if a disaster is seen as creating a potential 
for political instability, governments and corporations alike may offer 
substantial aid to a wide range of institutions in the affected area.
This combination of self-interest and humanitarian concern on the part 
of corporations need not be considered negative. As an example of indirect 
aid, Programa Kuchuba’l received an early boost with a donation of $10,000 
from the Philip Morris Company, which enabled it to produce a large 
number of training aids that were used throughout the program. If a 
corporation becomes direcdy involved in relief efforts, the results are
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usually mixed. Even the best-intentioned corporate relief programs often 
fall short of their objectives, usually because the corporations are not 
attuned to all the issues involved. A corporation in Guatemala that 
produced building materials spent approximately half a million dollars for 
a housing program that benefited only 100 families. Within several months, 
most of the low-income families who had moved into the project had sold 
the houses and left, claiming that the cost of maintaining and running the 
houses was beyond their means.
The objectives of the churches, governments, and foundations that make 
up the second tier are more complex. For the churches, humanitarian 
concerns dominate, but concern about the impact of the disaster on 
missionary works and a measure of opportunism also prevail. What better 
chance than a disaster to demonstrate the goodwill and humanitarian 
efforts of an organization and to establish or expand a presence in a 
community where previously the denomination had little influence? 
Churches donate primarily to the relief and development organizations of 
their own denomination, to affiliated ecumenical groups, or their own 
missionaries. Occasionally, church donations will be channeled to the 
voluntary organizations. In some cases, churches will also donate to the 
United Nations, especially UNICEF and the World Food Programme, and 
to other intergovernmental organizations that have a specific program for 
the disaster-affected area.
Foundations play a limited role among the second-tier organizations and 
serve primarily as a conduit for corporate and private funds to other organ­
izations. Usually the foundation has a specific interest in a particular 
country or a particular activity such as agriculture or housing. Foundations 
are among the organizations most responsive to their donors, especially the 
large corporations that provide funds (and often direction). The founda­
tions are normally motivated by the wish to achieve a certain set of goals 
outlined by the founders and donors; these cover a wide range. Generally 
they can be described as humanitarian or are related to economic de­
velopment or certain political objectives.
Of all the organizations in the second tier, governments are usually the 
most influential and powerful. And at the same time, their actions are often 
the most difficult to define. They are motivated by myriad factors including 
humanitarian, geopolitical, and economic objectives, by treaties or other 
prior contacts, and, regrettably, by military objectives. Unfortunately, many 
of the military objectives are obscured by the true humanitarian objectives 
and vice versa. In some cases the political and economic objectives can be 
linked to humanitarian goals. If aid is provided quickly to the government 
of a country affected by a disaster, continuity and stability can often be 
ensured, and a timely donation of economic aid can keep an economy from
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being affected too adversely. Principal businesses" and industries can be 
restored quickly, which benefits not only the recipient but also the donor 
government. Usually, however, the primary political objective is to main­
tain or attain influence.
In order to carry out their post-disaster objectives, governments donate 
to almost every type of organization on the next two tiers. It is the local 
government with which the donor government has its primary relationship 
and to which it directs the primary flow of aid. This arrangement can be 
both a constraint and an opportunity, depending on the capabilities of the 
host government.
The second pattern of government funding is for the donor to give to the 
voluntary organizations in its own country that have contracts or programs 
in the affected area. These donations have drawn much criticism in recent 
years. Many organizations are so heavily funded by their governments that 
they become, in effect, an arm of the government’s foreign policy. The 
ready availability of cash and material has “hooked” many organizations, 
and they are almost totally dependent upon their foreign aid ministeries for 
support. There has been growing concern that this alliance undermines the 
credibility of the volags and reduces their ability to be innovative and to 
operate independently. The implications of this connection cannot be 
overemphasized. If the national government of the volag does not want it to 
conduct a relief program in the affected area, it can bring a tremendous 
amount of pressure on the volag to stay clear. And if it wants a volag to 
become involved, it can, similarly, make things very easy for the agency. 
While a few agencies have been able to remain independent of their 
governments and provide true humanitarian aid without regard to political 
consequences, the number is unfortunately rather small and dwindling. On 
the other hand, there can be no doubt that, because governments make 
extensive resources available to volags, a much wider range of services can 
be offered. The question facing the volags, then, is where to draw the line 
and how to accept the government’s aid without becoming a pawn in a 
political game where the true agendas are often hidden.
Governments also contribute to the relief programs of international 
organizations. Specialized agencies of the United Nations command a large 
portion of these funds. They are a handy conduit for governments and 
allow a government without an extensive foreign aid program to make a 
contribution without actually having to decide the details of how the money 
is to be spent in the field. Such transfers of funds are effective in that they 
assure that special problems will receive at least some attention and 
countries that would not otherwise receive attention will get at least some. 
For the more influential countries (such as the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.),
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contributions to these organizations are done more pro forma than anything 
else.
On the third tier are the volags and the intergovernmental agencies that 
act as service agencies, and it is here that overall policy and planning for the 
international relief effort of the nongovernmental organization occurs. 
Actions at this level are shaped by a variety of factors. Humanitarian 
concerns are, of course, the prime motivator. When a disaster strikes, most 
agencies feel compelled to do something, especially if they have programs 
in the disaster-affected area. The raison d’etre of many organizations is to 
respond to disasters, or at least to respond to human needs in times of 
crisis. Therefore, they must become involved.
For others, disasters appear to provide an opportunity not only to serve 
other people but also to expand the range of services and the influence of 
the organization. Often this is coupled with an opportunity for growth, 
especially if the disaster is on a large-scale, commanding much public 
attention. The greater the tragedy and the more extensive the media 
coverage, the greater the opportunity for a successful appeal. Therefore 
many organizations, for reasons of self-preservation, start up disaster relief 
programs.
Some volags enter a disaster to support the political objectives of their 
own government. During the Vietnam War, several volags began programs 
to aid refugees and to help war victims in direct support of the American 
(and indirectly of the South Vietnamese) government.
There is a special factor motivating development organizations in disasters. 
This is called “development through disaster opportunity.” Several organ­
izations perceive disasters as a radical event that will speed up the develop­
ment process. They reason that disasters create an atmosphere for change 
and that, with a massive influx of money and material, opportunities exist 
to have a significant impact on the society. Organizations often choose this 
moment to begin their development programs, entering first with a relief 
program, then moving to a reconstruction and later a development pro­
gram. (Such was the case with the Save the Children Alliance following the 
Guatemalan earthquake).
The intergovernmental organizations that make up the second group on 
the third tier, like the volags, have the dual role of being both operational 
agencies and providing funds. Their primary task is to support the relief 
and reconstruction operations of their member governments. Thus the 
primary involvement is with the governments of the disaster-stricken areas. 
In some cases they do provide funds to volags.
The actions of international organizations are guided by the concerns of 
their member governments—not only the recipients of aid, but also the
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most influential donors. Thus their objectives are often more political and 
economic than humanitarian, and occasionally the objectives have military 
overtones.
The final members of the third tier are church and missionary organiza­
tions. If the organization is denominational, the objectives are usually quite 
clear and reflect the policies and aims of the membership of that particular 
religious group. If the organization is ecumenical, however, it may operate 
under a confusing set of instructions. It must deal with a variety of internal 
contradictions and myriad philosophies. The ecumenical movement in 
relief and development is probably too young to be evaluated conclusively; 
yet at present it is apparent that these organizations often spend more time 
trying to determine what is acceptable to each of the member religious 
groups than what is appropriate for the victims. Ecumenical organizations 
also become entangled in many of the same snares as the nondenomi- 
national voluntary agencies. They too are often heavily funded by their 
national governments. It is always difficult for these organizations to draw 
the fine line between humanitarian service and political complicity. There 
can be no doubt that the ecumenical movement offers one advantage, 
however, namely, the ability to generate extensive resources and to provide 
a single entity for their distribution.
The fourth tier is made up of the local government, the local nongovern­
mental organizations (NGOs), the field offices or representatives of the 
international voluntary agencies, and the missionaries working in a par­
ticular country. This tier is classified as both the second level of the relief 
system and the lowest level of the donor community and can also be 
considered either as intervenors or as coping mechanisms. Nonetheless 
they are donors, crucial because they actually have face-to-face contact with 
the ultimate recipients of the donations: the disaster victims. As with the 
organizations of the upper tiers, the organizations of the fourth tier have 
rather clearly defined funding patterns. The government usually gives funds 
to its own agencies for projects and to the nongovernmental organizations 
of its own country. Local NGOs generally support their own projects and no 
one else’s. Missionaries similarly fund their own projects or people with 
whom they have had contact.
Only the volags have a diverse funding pattern and may fund the 
activities of any of the other three groups (although, if they have their own 
projects, the bulk of their funding will go to these).
At this level, where face-to-face contact with the victims occurs, aid would 
seem to be offered for the best of motives. Yet even here, politics and 
economic objectives often intrude. Governments have been known to show 
favoritism in the distribution of relief supplies. Local NGOs often support 
community groups for political as well as humanitarian reasons. And even
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missionaries have been found using aid as a means of furthering their own 
religious objectives.
KEY ACTORS IN THE RELIEF SYSTEM
While the entire relief system, especially at the donor level, is composed of 
hundreds of different organizations, only a relative handful can be con­
sidered key actors. What makes these organizations “key” is a combination 
of the resources they command, the contributions of money, goods, or 
technology that they can make, or the influence they wield as “pacesetters” 
relative to the state of the art.
U.S. Government
No other country responds more fully to disasters than the U.S. It responds 
to some extent at all phases of a disaster and is extensively involved in 
predisaster planning, mitigation, and preparedness. The U.S. is one of the 
largest sources of funds for disaster relief and operates throughout the 
Third World.
In the initial stages of a disaster, assistance is coordinated by an office in 
the State Department. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) sends representatives to the affected area to help the American 
Embassy officials on site determine what the requirements are and how the 
U.S. Government can best respond. If the country has an AID Mission, it 
will be responsible for coordinating the American Government’s actions on 
site. The Mission may decide simply to provide funds or materiel or a 
combination of both. If it has an existing program, such as one in housing 
or agriculture, it may redirect the personnel from that program to the 
disaster area. Normally, however, the AID Missions prefer to fund the 
American voluntary agencies active in the country or to provide the funding 
directly to the host government.
Because the United States is a major power, there are, of course, many 
political ramifications to the aid that it provides. Critics have often pointed 
out that the American aid programs in general tend to support the status 
quo in the developing countries. In addition, they often criticize the 
programs for being a mechanism for distributing American goods and 
thereby providing an indirect subsidy for American agriculture and manu­
facturing interests. The food programs of the U.S. Government, in par­
ticular PL-480 Title II, have drawn the bulk of this criticism in recent 
years.
The response of the U.S. in any one disaster is normally dependent upon 
its relationship with the affected country. If the country is considered
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“friendly” or strategically important, the aid provided following a disaster 
can be massive. Typical responses include the sending of Disaster 
Assessment Teams (DAST) and the immediate provision of a small cash 
grant to the host government. Within the next few days, several plane loads 
of relief supplies will be forwarded, including water tanks, family-sized 
tents, and an initial donation of PL-480 food stuffs.
The U.S. Embassy can arrange for private donors to ship relief supplies at 
government expense to the affected area and can make available a wide 
variety of resources to the American and often other agencies working in 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. If the disaster is particularly severe, 
OFDA will approach Congress for a large appropriation to help in 
reconstruction and will notify the host government and the American 
voluntary agencies that it will entertain proposals for the use of these funds.
If substantial clearance and road repair activities are required, teams of 
military engineers, complete with supporting equipment, may be offered to 
help restore roads, repair bridges, and reestablish communications.
If extensive search and rescue is required, and there are adequate 
American military resources nearby, helicopters and small aircraft can be 
put at the immediate disposal of the host country. Following the 1970 
earthquake in Peru, an American helicopter carrier was diverted to the 
Peruvian coast, where the entire complement of helicopters was assigned 
for several weeks to assist in the relief and rescue operations (a highly 
visible, if not cost-effective response).
While these vast resources may seem impressive, especially to the local 
people, their effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio must seriously be ques­
tioned. Could not the money be better spent to stimulate local response 
using more appropriate technology and emphasizing participation of the 
victims?1
Government Aid Outside the U.S.
The second group of key actors among governments includes the United 
Kingdom, Canada, France, and Sweden. All have large and extensive aid 
programs in their own right, and each has extensive contacts among the 
disaster-prone countries in the developing world. The U.K. and France are 
often tied to their former colonial territories by a combination of sentiment 
and economic interests and thus can be counted on to respond in these 
areas quickly and on a large scale. Canada and Sweden, on the other hand, 
are a bit more selective with their aid programs as they do not have the same
1. Furthermore, the victims often see the use of American military equipment and personnel 
as threatening. American officials providing humanitarian assistance are often unaware of 
the connotations of a massive response that relies on military capabilities.
The Relief System 117
resources to offer, but can be counted on in a wide variety of situations. 
Sweden and Canada both are newcomers to the aid game, not having been 
colonial powers, and therefore often find that their aid is more acceptable in 
political terms than that of the U.K. or France, which are often constrained 
by the same limitations as the U.S.
Following a disaster, all of these countries respond in much the same way 
as the U.S., offering a combination of direct and indirect assistance, cash 
and material aid, and military personnel and equipment to help in the 
immediate emergency relief.
The U.K. and France each have a considerable number of private organ­
izations that are normally involved in development or relief activities and 
can work through these groups. Canada and Sweden, on the other hand, do 
not have a large number of nongovernmental organizations operating 
overseas and therefore their aid tends to be more direct.
Smaller Government Aid Programs
The third key group includes West Germany, Holland, Japan, and Saudi 
Arabia. Each of these has relatively small aid programs, and the programs 
of Japan and Saudi Arabia are highly regionalized. The Dutch are one of the 
up-and-coming supporters of international development and relief activi­
ties and are generally unique in that they often fund private organizations 
from other countries.
These governments normally provide financial assistance only and rarely 
become operational in a disaster. Occasionally they provide material and in 
a few cases have provided military equipment, such as aircraft or en­
gineering equipment, if it has been requested by the host government. As 
more private groups develop in these countries, the support they receive 
will likely follow the patterns shown for other European governments and 
the U.S. The continued growth and development of the European 
Economic Community, with its associated international development and 
aid programs, will provide another arm of assistance for each of the 
European countries. Whether the overall effort will be to expand or reduce 
each country’s individual response remains to be seen.
There are, of course, many other governments that provide assistance 
following disasters and indeed, virtually every government close to the 
affected area or with religious or economic ties makes some form of contri­
bution.
Communist Bloc Aid
The USSR, China, and Cuba, as well as many of the Eastern European 
nations, also provide disaster relief, though aid from these countries varies
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greatly in quantity and quality. Normally they provide cash, though on 
occasion they have donated food or agricultural equipment and have 
replaced industrial equipment lost in the disaster. Probably their best- 
known relief operation outside of their normal client states was in Peru 
following the 1970 earthquake. The Russians organized a massive airlift of 
food and medical supplies and were involved in the reconstruction of 
housing around the town of Huaraz.
Cuba’s disaster aid program is typical. When its neighbors in the 
Caribbean are struck by earthquakes or hurricanes, Cuba usually offers a 
rather small amount of aid. In Nicaragua following the 1972 earthquake, 
Cuba donated several planeloads of relief supplies including water puri­
fication equipment and medicines. It also offered a team of public health 
workers and a medical field hospital, which proved to be very effective. 
Political considerations, however, did not allow the Cubans to remain on 
site for longer than several weeks, and their aid program soon ended.
In recent years the Chinese have become more active in post-disaster 
assistance; previously they have been involved only with their immediate 
neighbors and a few countries that were client states in Africa. Chinese relief 
aid is generally limited to the provision of technical assistance and funds. 
Since China’s own experience with severe earthquakes in 1976, it has shown 
much interest in sharing information with countries with similar earth­
quake problems. It is expected that China will become a major participant 
in international relief and reconstruction efforts.
It is difficult to assess the aid provided by Communist countries. The 
political rhetoric surrounding the aid often obscures the true impact of the 
assistance, and because it is given in a highly political environment, it is not 
likely that effective evaluations will be carried out.
Intergovernmental Organizations
The intergovernmental organizations are often key participants in the 
international relief system. The UN, of course, is the largest, and in various 
types of disasters, its specialized agencies have major assignments in the 
overall relief effort. For example, in droughts, the World Food Programme 
is often designated as the lead agency; in refugee situations, the UNHCR is 
normally assigned the coordinating role. Within the UN system, almost 
half its agencies have some responsibility in disasters. There are even special 
UN agencies created to handle long-term aspects of disasters. UNRWA, the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency, was created to handle the 
Palestinian situation. If an operation lasts for more than a year, a UN special 
operation will normally be created, with one of the UN agencies designated 
as the lead agency, as was the case in the Sahel during the drought of the 
1970s.
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The UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) was established in the 1970s to 
coordinate the various relief and reconstruction efforts of the UN system 
and to stimulate prevention and preparedness measures. In the immediate 
post-disaster period, the UNDRO office in Geneva serves mainly as a 
coordinator for information on donations and, in the field, as a convenor of 
coordination efforts among foreign donors. In recent years, UNDRO has 
placed increased emphasis on its preparedness activities.
UNDRO has had difficulty in defining its role and implementing an 
effective program. An evaluation of the office in 1980 by the Joint 
Inspection Unit of the UN found “implementation . . . has been hampered 
by [the] imprecise nature of [UNDRO’s mandate] and [its] inability to 
establish a leadership role; by problems in determining UNDRO’s func­
tions in ‘other’ disasters; [by] the proper mix of relief co-ordination, 
preparedness and prevention work; [by] the extent of an ‘operational’ role; 
and [by] the appropriate initiation and termination of its relief efforts” 
(Allen et al. 1980).
The UN specialized agencies can provide a wide variety of resources 
ranging from technical assistance to food. UNICEF and the World Food 
Programme often have their own staffs within a country who are capable of 
formulating and conducting a relief program. UNDRO normally works 
through the resident representatives of the UN Development Programme, 
or may send a member of its staff to the affected country to help carry out 
the disaster assessment and coordination role.
The European Economic Community (EEC) is rapidly expanding its 
disaster assistance, serving primarily as a conduit for funds and material to 
Third World countries that do not have large bilateral assistance agree­
ments with EEC member countries. In the future, this role is likely to 
expand.
Oil-producing nations have become major aid givers since the 1973 oil 
price increases. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) now supplies more than 25 percent of all aid to the Third World, 
but as yet little of this aid is for disaster assistance. OPEC members have set 
up two multilateral development banks that are likely to become major 
resources for reconstruction financing (New Internationalist 1979).
Another key agency among international organizations is the World 
Bank. The Bank is unique in that it is a lending institution and works only 
with governments. It can provide funds by offering credit or soft loans, 
often supporting them with a wide range of technical assistance. The World 
Bank grew out of the American aid program to Europe following World 
War II, and much of its program is still structured in the same manner. The 
World Bank normally becomes involved only in reconstruction. If it has an 
ongoing program in the disaster-affected area, the World Bank may
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increase its level of support during the emergency or transition phase; 
however, this is rare. The World Bank normally spends its funds on projects 
that will make a contribution to longer-term development. Favored projects 
are in the agricultural, small business, and housing sectors.
Regional Organizations
The importance of regional organizations in any specific situation depends 
on the organizations involved and on the location of the disaster. For 
example, the Caribbean Development Bank could be considered a key 
organization by governments in that region, though in the overall picture, 
bilateral aid from the major powers would generally prove to be much 
more important. Regional organizations rarely have extensive post-disaster 
aid programs and can generally offer only loans, financial assistance, and 
occasionally technical assistance.
Volags
Even though the voluntary agencies do not make a large contribution in 
terms of the amount of resources, they are often “key” simply because they 
are more flexible and can experiment in terms of both the style and content 
of their programs.
The volag system has two levels. The first provides coordination at the 
international level. The League of Red Cross Societies (LORCS), the World 
Council of Churches, Caritas Internationalis, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Council of Voluntary 
Agencies (ICVA), to name a few, serve their member groups by collecting 
and disseminating information and relief materials, and by providing 
technical assistance to them. These organizations handle the majority of the 
appeals and serve as “traffic directors” for much of the material aid that 
goes from the industrialized countries to the developing countries. The 
World Council of Churches serves the ecumenical movement made up of 
the mainline Christian organizations in the West. Caritas serves as co­
ordinator for the Catholic relief organizations, while the League co­
ordinates the relief efforts of the various national Red Cross Societies. The 
League monitors relief operations and sends delegates to work with the 
various national societies to help carry out relief operations.
In Geneva, coordination is done through a committee called the 
LORCS-Volag Steering Committee (Brown 1979). Composed of the 
League, CRS, Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM, and the World Council 
of Churches, the committee provides a forum for exchanging information 
about disasters and for coordinating appeals. The committee has under­
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taken several joint disaster preparedness activities and has published several 
disaster preparedness guides and manuals.
In addition to the steering committee, a regular monthly meeting of the 
League and the other relief agencies, including both governmental and 
private agencies, is held at the LORCS Secretariat to exchange informa­
tion and reduce overlap during current disasters.
Each of the coordinating bodies has its own reserve of funds and, 
sometimes, materiel, which it can commit immediately when the disaster 
occurs. It launches an appeal to other member organizations and affiliates 
as soon as a local organization requests assistance. It may provide aid to 
assess the needs, but its primary role will be to record and coordinate the 
assistance dispatched.
There are many problems associated with the role of coordinator. The 
staffs represent many different countries and, therefore, the coordinator 
must be sensitive to many nationalistic concerns—a sensitivity that tends to 
constrain many organizations. They are also in the difficult spot of being 
the focal point for appeals and must pass them on to the donors, 
inadvertently endorsing the appeals, whether they are appropriate or not. 
While organizations can attempt to investigate requests, normally they 
cannot pass judgment on them and are therefore often unjustly criticized 
when inappropriate aid arrives. It has been pointed out that an effective 
role for these organizations is disaster preparedness; namely, working with 
affiliates in the disaster-prone countries to identify effective responses and 
the appropriate assistance.
Worldwide, there are more than one thousand different organizations 
that might respond to a disaster. Of these, only a few are considered key, 
because at least one can be counted on to respond in any disaster. Among 
these are CARE, Catholic Relief Services of the United States, Church 
World Service (also of the U.S. and a World Council of Churches affiliate), 
OXFAM, the various national organizations of Save the Children and Terre 
des Hommes, and World Vision. Of these, the first three are the largest 
relief organizations in the world, and the resources they command give 
them an influential role in any operation in which they participate. Each is 
involved in both relief and development works, and one or the other is 
generally involved in almost every country in the Third World. CARE has 
its own programs administered by a professional staff, supplemented in 
disasters by volunteers. CRS and CWS usually operate through local 
counterpart organizations, though in a few cases they do have their own 
programs. Their interests are not restricted to any one sector, and they have 
entered housing, agriculture, small business, and many other fields, both in 
normal and in post-disaster times. The programs of the “Big Three” have
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often been criticized as being too closely linked to U. S. policy2 and, indeed, 
in many post-disaster situations the U.S. State Department has relied on 
these agencies heavily. In some cases, they are designated as the official U.S. 
relief agency for a particular disaster, especially if the U.S. has no AID 
Mission in the country. The quality of the performance of these agencies is 
mixed and often depends on whether or not they had a program in the 
affected area prior to the disaster and therefore a good base upon which to 
build. Criticism of these programs has centered on the fact that they often 
tend to be more responsive to the needs and requirements of the U.S. 
Government than to those of the disaster victims. For example, following a 
cyclone in Asia, one agency received AID funding to provide emergency 
housing. The program began within a few days of the disaster, even before 
many of the victims had returned to the area and before the bodies had 
been removed. In order to expedite construction, the agency purchased 
materials in a neighboring state and brought in laborers from outside the 
affected area to build the houses. When it was pointed out to the agency that 
the shelters were being built on land whose ownership was not clear and 
that the victims who desperately needed jobs were not being included in the 
program, the agency requested that the program be extended in order to 
revise it. The revisions were rejected, however, because AID had to expend 
its funds within a ninety-day period.
Other key organizations derive their influence more from experience 
than from resources. OXFAM plays a dual role in disasters as it is both an 
operational agency and a funding agency, depending on the country and its 
prior commitments. OXFAM was founded as a famine relief organization 
and has evolved into a development organization over the years. It has long 
been noted as one of the best disaster response organizations, and its 
programs have been regarded as innovative and relatively successful. Like 
any organization, it is only as good as its people on the scene, but the field 
directors have been granted a good measure of autonomy and as a result 
programs tailored to the needs of people, with extensive participation by 
the victims, have usually resulted. OXFAM has also been a leader in 
research in disaster-related technology. In the field of sanitation it is well 
known for the OXFAM sanitation unit, an innovative, though controversial, 
system for collecting and storing excreta in refugee camp situations, which 
was a major innovation for its time. While not all of its investments have 
proven sound (for example, the OXFAM polyurethane emergency shelters), 
it has taken the lead in disaster-related research.
2. For a discussion of the U.S. Government contribution to agencies, see John G. Sommer, 
B e y o n d  C h arity (1977), especially his table 4 in the appendix.
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Save the Children is an amalgamation of the various Save the Children 
organizations in Europe and the United States. Each organization has its 
own field staff, but following disasters in certain areas it is supplemented by 
staff or volunteers sent by other members of the alliance. Following the 
earthquake in Guatemala, for example, the alliance sent an American and 
British team to conduct a disaster assessment and to determine an area for a 
project. This team was then supplemented by Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, 
and other American and British team members, 
bers.
The SCF Alliance is best known for its work with children and for its 
medical and feeding teams, though it is not restricted to these sectors.
Terre des Hommes is a European organization with affiliates in Holland, 
Austria, Germany, and Belgium. It normally provides aid in the fields of 
medicine, public health, and services to mothers and children. A key 
organization not so much from performance as resources, it nonetheless 
has a growing program and a significant impact wherever it operates.
World Vision Relief Organization is the relief arm of World Vision 
International, a U.S.-based, worldwide Christian organization that provides 
humanitarian assistance in support of the evangelical movement. The 
organization and its affiliates are one of the largest relief organizations and 
can marshal vast resources. In the past, the organization has been criticized 
for allowing its evangelical activities to cross over into its relief work, more 
so than many of the other church-related organizations. In the early 1980s, 
World Vision appointed regional disaster officers and began comprehensive 
disaster preparedness planning for both natural and man-made disasters.
Disaster Research
There is a final key group: the disaster research institutions and disaster 
specialists who provide much of the research and technical assistance that 
guides the others. Among the research organizations are the Disaster 
Research Center at Ohio State University, the Natural Hazards Research 
and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado in 
Boulder, and the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at 
the Catholic University of Louvain in Brussels. Ohio State has pioneered 
sociological and behavioral investigations into disasters, the Natural 
Hazards Workshop has led the field in research on the relationship of 
natural hazards to the human environment, and the Catholic University of 
Louvain group, headed by Dr. Michel Lechat, has been the forerunner in 
disaster epidemiology.
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The International Disaster Institute (IDI) is an organization formed by 
the merger of the defunct Disaster Research Unit at Bradford University 
(U.K.) and the London Technical Group, a small nonprofit organization 
specializing in medical and health aspects of disasters. The IDI is striving to 
become the professional voice of the disaster profession. It publishes 
Disasters: The International Journal of Disaster Studies and Practice, the major 
publication dealing with disasters, and provides a forum for the few people 
who are interested in disasters on a full-time basis.
Mention should also be made of the private consulting firms that 
specialize in research and technical assistance to governments, and volun­
tary organizations operational in disasters. They have had a significant 
impact on disasters by mediating between the research institutions and the 
operational organizations. Most prominent are the engineering firms that 
have developed new approaches to building earthquake- and cyclone- 
resistant structures and organizations such as INTERTECT that provide 
on-site management and planning assistance.
THE PERSONNEL AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE SYSTEM
Perhaps the most important factor in an agency’s response to disaster is the 
quality and level of training of the field staff. An organization’s percentage 
of career and professional staff often depends on its size and its programs in 
the Third World. Normally, however, the career staff are not the people 
who actually conduct the relief operation. The career staff are the managers, 
the specialists at moving aid through diplomatic channels, at planning the 
overall operation and managing the budgets. The people who actually do 
the work are rarely full-time members of the organization and almost never 
professional disaster specialists.
When disaster occurs, a responding organization will normally staff-up in 
one of two ways. First, if the organization already has a development 
program or a skeleton disaster staff, it will recruit additional persons or seek 
volunteers to carry out the program. If the organization has no prior 
experience in the area, it must send a representative there, not only to 
determine the program, but also to recruit the staff. Generally, fewer than 5 
percent of the people involved in disaster relief have ever been involved in 
such work previously. Even at the managerial level, few program directors 
or key staff personnel have had prior disaster experience.
In the initial stages, a large portion of the work is carried out by the 
victims themselves with assistance from volunteers. As a program becomes 
established, the relief agency will contract a number of persons on a short­
term basis to implement the long-term aspects of the program. As each 
program comes to a close, these volunteers and part-time staff are laid off,
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and it is highly unlikely that any will ever again be involved in a disaster. As 
we shall see later, this means that the organization loses its collective 
memory, which, in turn, affects its ability to learn the lessons of the disaster 
and incorporate these lessons into its response to the next disaster.
Who, then, are the so-called disaster experts? Generally, they are the 
upper-managerial level officials and representatives of agencies who go to 
the disaster scene and initiate a program. However, few of these people 
started off as volunteers to come up “through the ranks,” learning about the 
operational constraints on a disaster relief program.
Among the few major agencies that do have a professional development 
program, promotion tends to take them away from the field. Once people 
do well in the field, they are rewarded by being promoted to a headquarters 
job. As people are promoted, they move farther and farther from 
responsibilities in the field. If the relief and development profession is to 
improve, we need to reverse this trend.
PROBLEMS WITHIN THE RELIEF SYSTEM
There are a number of major problems common to the relief system and 
the agencies and organizations within it. As with the influences on the relief 
system, many are unique and many are a result of the system itself.
Decision Making and Authority
The rules and procedures that govern the fieldwork of relief agencies often 
hinder or complicate response to disasters.
Decision making at the headquarters level. When agencies respond to disasters 
in the developing countries, the distances, communications, and transpor­
tation difficulties, as well as cultural obstacles, often inhibit effective 
humanitarian assistance. To be effective in this environment, choices must 
be made at the field level, and the people making these choices need a 
supportive, not restrictive, framework of rules, procedures, and policies to 
assist in this process.
Unfortunately, most organizations attempt to keep a good deal of the 
decision making at the headquarters level. The first move is usually to try to 
improve headquarters-field communications. Direct telex links are estab­
lished; better telephone systems, even radio communications are installed. 
Next, procedures are revised to try to speed decisions through the head­
quarters. Stockpiling of supplies, maintaining of computer lists of experts 
on standby, and many other methods have been (and are being) tried. Yet 
the results still fall short of the desired response. The basic problem is that
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revising procedures and improving technology at headquarters does not 
necessarily improve the field response.
Several organizations working in disasters are seeking alternative ap­
proaches. The concepts being explored fall into three categories. The first is 
called a limited authority approach. The headquarters and local represen­
tatives review previous responses and draw up a list of activities that can be 
handled without consultation with headquarters or that require immediate, 
on-the-spot decisions that cannot wait for consultation with headquarters. 
In the first case, the authority to deal with such activities is delegated 
outright; in the second, policies are developed to provide a framework to 
guide representatives in making their choices. (This approach is in use 
today by organizations such as OXFAM and CARE.)
The second approach is called dispatched authority. When an emergency 
occurs, instead of the representative sending information to the head­
quarters for action, the headquarters sends a team of specialists to the field 
with authority to make (most) decisions on the spot. In some cases the team 
operates under special rules or emergency procedures, but it has been 
found that with this system few substantial rule changes are required. The 
ability to make decisions in the field is improved, and response is facilitated. 
(This approach is used largely by the disaster agencies of governments and 
by severed large volags.)
The third concept is called devolution. Of all the approaches it is the most 
difficult to put into practice as it requires a fundamental rethinking of the 
structures necessary to provide relevant management in a Third World 
environment. Yet this appears to be the most effective structure, and many 
humanitarian organizations are moving toward this approach. Devolution 
is the structuring of an organization so that most of the decision making 
takes place in the affected country. This is accomplished in two ways. First, 
the headquarters’ role is changed from that of decision making to policy 
making and coordination; and second, the organization is structured so 
that senior personnel with authority to act, within the policy framework and 
according to the rules of the organization, are placed in offices near the 
areas where response is required. Among those agencies where this 
approach has been used (for example, CWS), few changes in the rules were 
necessary.
This is the background against which decision making should be ex­
amined. While procedures can be changed to simplify and speed emer­
gency response within headquarters, overall performance in the field will 
not be significantly altered as a result.
Donor constraints on gifts. The conflict of authority between donor and 
agency can be shown in this example: a major donor gives a relief agency
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funds to conduct a post-disaster medical program. The relief agency asks a 
medical university to provide volunteers for the assignment. The university 
agrees, provided that the staff will not be absent for more than sixty days. At 
the same time, an intergovernmental agency offers to provide additional 
support and material if the team will work with the staff of one of its existing 
programs in the affected area. Thus by the time the medical team arrives in 
the country, virtually all decisions relating to its mission have already been 
made, and there is little for a field director to do other than to design a 
program around those decisions. In practice, it is very difficult to reverse 
these decisions once they have been made, as relief agencies are extremely 
reluctant to return to donors and ask them to change or modify the 
conditions placed on their contributions. The problem, however, can be 
dealt with. Several agencies have realized that the time to influence donors’ 
decisions is prior to the outbreak of a disaster. An agency prepares a guide 
for donors, outlining the qualifications and policies under which gifts will 
be received. Donor education is one of the most important aspects to be 
addressed in improving the performance of the relief system and elimi­
nating the problem of prior constraints.
Accountability
It has been pointed out that disaster relief programs, while designed to help 
the victim, tend in fact to reflect the needs of the donors. This is the result of 
attempts by agencies to please their donors, as well as the lack of account­
ability of agencies and donors to the victims.
Two examples can illustrate lack of accountability. In the first, a relief 
agency establishes a food program in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. 
Due to language difficulties and lack of familiarity with the local com­
munity, the staff fails to ascertain what resources are available there. The 
relief effort inadvertently drives up the prices in the local markets, under­
cuts local shopkeepers by distributing massive amounts of free com­
modities, and reduces the ability of local farmers to market the crops they 
have salvaged. While many victims have received food aid, many others 
have been affected adversely. Yet what recourse do they have? Few have 
access to legal means and, in practice, few agencies provide an opportunity 
for those adversely affected to voice their concerns or influence program 
decisions.
The second example concerns storm shelters in hurricane-prone areas. It 
is common practice for many agencies to urge that schools, churches, or 
other large buildings be used as shelters. However, few of these buildings 
can withstand hurricane forces. They collapse, killing those who have 
sought refuge. Who then is accountable? The owner of the building, or the
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relief agency that urged that the shelters be designated without first studying 
the performance of large buildings in high winds?
For our purposes, accountability is defined as the establishing of both 
formal and informal ways in which beneficiaries can influence the content 
and direction of the program, with reasonable expectations that those in 
authority will comply with their decisions.3
There are several reasons why accountability does not exist today to any 
large extent. On one level, many agencies have a very unsophisticated view 
of relief operations, and many feel that because they are trying to do good 
work, the impact cannot be negative. In most cases, this is the most 
restricting factor: failure of the agencies to look beyond what appears to be 
self-evident and to explore in-depth the impact of their programs.
Other reasons are more profound and relate to the very nature of the 
relief system. With decision making often far removed from the scene of 
events, it becomes difficult to attach responsibility for actions in the field. 
Locally, as well as internationally, there are no recognized standards against 
which to measure performance of relief agencies and their programs, and 
governments are usually reluctant to enforce uniform policies or standards 
for fear of alienating the relief agencies and losing the aid they are 
providing. Governments assume that the relief agencies know what they are 
doing, and that they are experienced and professional, the experts that their 
public relations offices portray them as being.
Even if an agency makes major mistakes, there are no precedents for 
making it accountable to the people in the community. There are no 
precedents in international law, and as happens with the so-called good 
Samaritan clauses in medical law, private agencies would probably be 
exempted from most civil actions in any case. Where church-related 
organizations are involved, governments anxious to keep religion and 
politics apart are not likely to criticize or hold liable errant relief programs.
Given the obstacles that exist, how can agencies be held accountable and 
made more responsive to the needs of the people? Aid organizations must 
redefine their role in disasters and come to understand that they are 
participants in a process rather than the manager of that process (Ressler 
1978). The agencies must be committed to an understanding of the long- 
range effects of aid, and their programs must have built-in flexibility and be 
based on time frames, technology, and materials appropriate to the victims.
Accountability requires that decision-making mechanisms be restruc­
tured and decentralized to the local level. The programs must be built upon 
extensive participation by the disaster victims at all levels of project 
planning and execution. The concept of accountability is rooted in the
3. Inter-American Foundation (1977), They K n o w  H o w  . . . , p.88.
The Relief System 129
philosophical assumption that people have the right to determine their own 
lives, cultures, traditions, values, and lifestyles.
Three indicators of program accountability are:
1. Beneficiaries can articulate their demands before the project activities 
begin.
2. Beneficiaries can, on a regular basis, take the initiative and make their 
desires known to the managers of the project.
3. Beneficiaries participate extensively in control and management of the 
project. Complete control is transferred early from the relief agency to 
the beneficiaries (Inter-American Foundation 1977).
Ian Davis (1975) has made clear the relation between accountability and a 
relief orientation: “Practice has shown that the more an organization is 
strictly relief-oriented, the less accountable it becomes. An agency that is 
looking simply to giving away material goods already collected and de­
livered is not likely to be overly concerned with developing a program with 
full and meaningful participation. Short-term relief agencies can enter a 
community, dump the aid and withdraw within a matter of weeks, never 
taking the time to assess the quality of its aid nor the impact.”
Unless mechanisms are developed to hold intervenors accountable to the 
victims, post-disaster programs will continue to have only limited and 
mosdy negative impact. This is not to say that agencies do not have 
responsibilities to their donors. Donors do have a right to know how their 
funds are being spent, and agencies are responsible for seeing that the aid is 
used quickly and constructively, but the ultimate accountability must be to 
the disaster victims, and the final test for evaluating a program must be 
“Does it meet the needs of the victims?”
Overloading Local Organizations
The organizations in the field that carry out actual relief activities are 
subjected to constant demands by donors and parent organizations. 
Development groups in particular are often called upon to expand their 
scope of activities into many areas outside their normal range of work. The 
result of trying to meet all the demands placed on them, by both the donors 
and the victims themselves, is “overloading.” Two forms of overloading are 
obvious. First, the organization can be asked to take on too many projects 
with too much diversity, overtaxing its staff and diluting its effectiveness. 
Second, the organization may expand after receiving funds far beyond its 
capacity to control or dispense widely. Funding of local organizations must 
be handled very carefully. Many an effective development group has been 
destroyed because the amount of funds it received led to an overextension
130 Disasters and Development
of its programs, staff, or capabilities and the resulting poorly executed 
program precipitated a chain of events that led to the organization’s 
downfall.
In disaster situations, overloading is a particular problem for the more 
effective development groups operating in a country. Not only do their 
parent organizations wish to channel funds received as a result of the 
disaster through them, but often other organizations (governmental, inter­
governmental, and even other private agencies) wish to capitalize on the 
experience and expertise of an agency by providing funding or asking it to 
expand its activities into areas of concern to the other intervenors.
Competition
At all levels of the relief system, competition is an inherent feature and a 
common practice. In the upper levels of the system, agencies find them­
selves competing for funds, public awareness, and recognition from the 
same sources. At the middle and lower levels, competition for success is 
added to the list. Competition for recognition and influence can often be 
found in some donor governments.
For organizations in the field, competition for success and recognition of 
their achievements can become an all-consuming motivation. In some 
agencies, success is measured by the number of victims reached, the 
number of houses constructed, the number of tents distributed, or the 
tonnages involved. Many agencies are “rated” in the public eye by the 
amount of material they can deliver in the shortest period of time. There are 
mechanisms within the relief system that inadvertently encourage this 
attitude and competition. Examples are the donor lists maintained by 
various organizations.
The result of this competition is that attention is diverted away from real 
needs so that some agencies can get an edge over the others. In a recent 
study (Cuny and colleagues 1977) on the provision of emergency shelter 
and post-disaster housing, the authors found that “intervenors consistently 
set higher priority on the number of housing units produced, rather than 
on the contribution made to the building process.” The number of houses 
is seen as the end product or result of the program. Success is measured in 
terms of the donor and not of the victims. As a result of the competition and 
the emphasis on numbers, the only contribution to the society is an artifact 
and few, if any, contributions are made to the social, economic, and 
construction aspects of building within the community.
Beyond a distortion of objectives, there are other negative consequences. 
Competition normally results in inequitable distribution of relief materials.
The Relief System 131
Nor do all victims receive equal attention. Each program wants to develop 
its own package and, even within the same communities, the level and 
extent of service offered by competing relief agencies can vary substantially.
A third result of competition is that it discourages cooperation between 
agencies in post-disaster situations, where the lack of technical information 
and expertise is often very marked. Lack of cooperation can mean that 
disaster victims are denied full access to major resources.
Finally, competition always results in redundancy and waste. During the 
early days of Programa Kuchuba’l, a large agency operating in the same 
communities decided that it should have its own housing education 
materials produced by its own artists. This resulted not only in duplication 
of effort to the same audience, but also (in the attempt to be different) the 
program director suggested a bracing method different from that suggested 
in the booklets produced by Programa Kuchuba’l. This method proved 
difficult to build and, if not constructed properly, to have no strength 
whatsoever.
Competition, of course, is not always bad, and many innovative pro­
grams and approaches have resulted. On the whole, however, competition 
is more destructive than constructive, and should be restricted and dis­
couraged. The governments of the affected countries have ultimate respon­
sibility for controlling the competition so that victims receive equal treat­
ment by all intervenors. The methods that can be used are the development 
of uniform relief and reconstruction policies, the setting of basic standards 
for relief, and the development of model program approaches for pro­
viding aid. The time to adopt these methods, however, is long before a 
disaster strikes. Trying to sort through the competing and conflicting values 
and goals of the relief agencies during the actual conduct of post-disaster 
operations is virtually impossible.
Lack of Coordination
Coordination efforts normally go through several stages. In the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster, there is high interest in coordination among the 
relief agencies, and there are usually several attempts to establish effective 
cooperation. After about six weeks this interest falls off. This is because 
most agencies have already established their programs and are much more 
interested in fieldwork. Coordination then becomes a more local or 
regional activity, with the sharing of information and resources by agencies 
working in nearby communities. During this period, coordination tends to 
become sector-oriented; for example, agencies working in housing tend to 
coordinate activities among themselves.
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In the final stage, which occurs well into the operation, usually in the 
reconstruction period, broader interagency cooperation at the executive 
level is established. Agencies that intend to conduct programs for more 
than several months find that coordination is helpful for dealing with the 
local government and vice versa. Furthermore, many agencies will branch 
out into other sectors, and more formal cooperating arrangements are seen 
as beneficial. At this point it is not unusual to see the formation of a new 
organization to serve as an information clearinghouse and to provide a 
forum for interagency meetings.
Coordination, however, could be a lot more effective, especially in the 
emergency period. The actions normally taken to establish coordination 
often serve to add further confusion to the situation. For example, organ­
izations without operational experience in the country are often assigned 
the role of coordinator. Competition among agencies, not only for 
resources but also for publicity, works against cooperation. And many 
groups, convinced (often with an evangelistic fervor) that their way of 
operating is the only way, refuse to cooperate with any group that does not 
adhere to their methods.
Another obstacle to coordination among the international agencies, 
especially the volags, is the need many agencies feel to have a separate, 
identifiable program that they can show their donors. Alan Taylor (1978) 
has written that “individual programs are regularly fashioned with an eye to 
their publicity value, rather than according to whether they will fit in with a 
coordinated, effective and efficient response by all agencies.”
To improve coordination, a certain amount of planning must be done 
prior to the onset of a disaster. Preparedness plans that will promote 
cooperation should be drawn up and agencies operating in the country 
should be designated to serve as coordinator should the need arise. 
However, the most effective cooperation in the world is no substitute for 
pre-disaster planning. The time to decide what to do is when there is time to 
consider all the options thoughtfully, not amidst the confusion and pres­
sure of the emergency.
Obstacles to Change
Change has been slow in coming to the relief system for many reasons. The 
very nature of the system and the way it is organized is the primary obstacle. 
Contributing factors include the following:
LACK OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY
Relief organizations are often slow to change because they have not 
internalized lessons learned in the field. Most relief organizations are
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structured so that in a disaster they can increase in size from a small 
skeleton staff to a large operating group in a very short period of time. This 
model relies heavily on volunteers or short-term employees who have 
particular specialties. In general, these persons will not be familiar with 
disaster issues, nor have a long-term commitment to the organization. Most 
short-term staff see their role only as workers, not as evaluators or critics of 
the system. Only a few will be motivated to write about their experiences, 
and few have a base of experience from which to draw. Thus their reports 
are usually disregarded by the agencies.
There is a high turnover in professional staff of the relief organizations, 
particularly at the field level. Few agencies can afford to maintain a large 
relief staff during nondisaster periods, and thus the accrued experience is 
lost.
Many intervenors are active only in the emergency phase. Few of these 
agencies leave a residual team in the country for any period of time after the 
disaster, or monitor the results of their relief program. Therefore they never 
have a chance to see the long-term results of their actions or to incorporate 
these “lessons” into future programs.
FAILURE TO EVALUATE DISASTER PROGRAMS
Until recently, there were few good evaluations of disaster-aid programs. 
Only a handful of longitudinal studies have been carried out, and even 
information on the major program approaches used by voluntary agencies 
and governments is meager. The Presidential Commission on World 
Hunger, trying to obtain information on the impact of food aid programs 
carried out under the PL-480 provisions in 1978, could find only audits and 
logistics studies of food aid, but no evaluations of their effectiveness or 
impact! This despite the fact that these programs have been in operation 
since the 1950s. (A number of studies of the impact of PL-480 programs 
have since been initiated.)
The reasons why evaluations have not been conducted are varied. For the 
most part, agencies have not seen the need to evaluate their actions or their 
impact; that is, evaluations are not a priority activity. For many, evaluations 
are viewed as costly and time-consuming.
Evaluations also pose a threat to agencies, especially those dependent 
upon public support. If an evaluation is negative and this information made 
public, agencies fear a disruption in their funding.
Evaluations are often difficult to carry out, even when they are desired, 
because of the nature of the system and the high staff turnover. Further­
more, evaluation techniques, until recently, were not particularly well 
developed. Evaluations often centered on the agency and the donors’ 
concerns, not on the victims’ concerns or the impact of the aid program.
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Typical evaluations were more concerned with the accounting procedures 
and the logistics of the program and completely ignored the social aspects.
The result of the failure to evaluate programs is that mistakes are repeated 
again and again and the base of information from which change evolves is 
not developed.
FAILURE TO APPLY RESEARCH
A major constraint on changes in the relief system is lack of research to 
facilitate change. Research in the disaster field to date has been segmented, 
with concentration on the technical aspects (such as earthquake engi­
neering, hurricane monitoring, and weather modification) and to some 
degree the behavioral aspects (such as the reaction of a community to 
evacuation warnings and the response of a society to a disaster). Very little 
of this research has been concerned with the problems of disasters in the 
Third World. Russell Dynes, formerly the head of the Disaster Research 
Center, estimates that over 90 percent of all disaster research has 
concentrated on problems and needs of the industrialized societies and has 
little bearing on problems of the Third World (National Academy of 
Sciences 1978). The major research gap, however, is in the exploration of 
program approaches and strategies for intervenors. Unfortunately, there is 
little financial support for such research, because the agencies have not 
recognized the problem.
Another difficulty with the research that has been conducted is that of 
translating the results into useful applications. The problem is one of 
communication between research institutions and the relief agencies. In 
general, relief agencies (especially the volags) do not have the capability to 
interpret research results and to develop applications from them. To some 
extent, a small number of technical consultants familiar with field oper­
ations have partially filled this void, but many agencies still are reluctant to 
hire consultants and will not make the commitment to establish links with 
the research community.
The lack of cooperation between the research community and relief 
agencies is nowhere more evident than in the field of earthquake engi­
neering. Tremendous advances have been made in this field. Universities 
and engineering firms have participated in international efforts to explore 
the nature of earthquakes and the way they affect structures. Significant 
strides are made each year. Unfortunately, voluntary agencies and other 
relief groups do not participate in these endeavors. A survey of voluntary 
agencies in Guatemala in 1976—77 showed that none of the agencies had 
contact with any of the major earthquake engineering institutions, nor (with 
only one or two exceptions) were the institutions consulted during the 
course of the reconstruction efforts. The earthquake engineering institu­
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tions, for their part, completely ignored the program implementors. Several 
international earthquake engineering organizations sent survey teams to 
Guatemala to study the collapse of buildings, bridges, and other structures, 
but made virtually no contact with those organizations involved in 
reconstruction programs.
Within the earthquake research groups, little effort has been directed 
toward addressing the problems of the people most at risk from earth­
quakes—those of low-income living in self-built earthen housing—even 
though this group accounts for the vast majority of deaths occurring from 
earthquakes each year. If the results of the research are to have any impact 
on reducing vulnerability to disasters, both the research community and 
the relief agencies must establish closer ties.
RELIANCE ON VOLUNTEERS
One obstacle to change that must be confronted by the voluntary agencies 
is the continuing use of volunteers in relief and reconstruction programs. 
As long as agencies continue to rely on volunteers, especially those who 
have no prior training and little information about the society and the role 
of volunteers in disasters, the performance of volags will continue to be 
hindered.
The use of volunteers, of course, is a very complex issue, and for many 
agencies will require addressing some of their most fundamental beliefs. 
Volunteerism is deeply rooted in Western culture and revolves around 
fundamental beliefs that people should rise to help one another and not 
profit from the exchange. Doubtless there is also an element of noblesse 
oblige of the industrial nations toward the Third World, and for some 
institutions, a still-lingering feeling of carrying “the white man’s burden.” 
But there are practical reasons, also, why volunteers are employed. 
Volunteers are cheap labor and are almost always available. In a disaster 
role, they are particularly compatible with emergency needs, as volunteers 
rarely want to work for long periods of time and thus fit well with the 
voluntary agency’s concepts of the. time phases of disaster.
Because few agencies have a sophisticated approach to disasters, they do 
not seek qualified or skilled people, and again the ready supply of 
volunteers fits well into their relief system. But as our understanding of 
disasters becomes more sophisticated, the role of volunteers will have to be 
redefined and de-emphasized in order for these agencies to improve their 
performance.
Reliance on volunteers creates two primary obstacles. The first is that the 
use of volunteers contributes to the problem of lost experience and the lack 
of a collective memory within an organization. In many organizations,
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volunteers make up the majority of the work force at the field level, and 
many eventually fill decision-making positions during the emergency and 
reconstruction periods. To lose this experience after every disaster 
practically guarantees that mistakes will be repeated frequently.
The second problem is that most volunteers are untrained and unskilled 
in the subtleties of disaster work. Because these people will be with the 
agency only for a short time, the organizations are normally reluctant to 
commit precious funds for staff development. Thus, untrained and, in 
many cases, unskilled workers are placed in positions where they will 
confront a host of sophisticated problems. The result is that programs 
designed to help the victims are simplistic and unsophisticated, and again, 
common mistakes are repeated.
A final difficulty' is that many agencies recruit volunteers from their home 
countries for short-term disaster service. These volunteers take jobs that 
could easily be given to local people. Foreigners are used because they 
speak the same language as the agency field staff. For reasons of 
communication, they are given leadership positions over local workers. It 
makes little sense, either from an economic or a public relations stance, to 
hire a foreigner to do work that a local person could do (and probably do 
better), and the resentment that is caused can affect the outcome of the 
program.
This is not to say that there is not a role for volunteers in the relief system. 
Yet agencies that wish to continue to employ volunteers must re-examine 
the nature of their involvement and balance volunteers with trained 
professional staff. If the volags are serious about improving their relief (and 
development) skills and performance, reliance on volunteers must be 
reduced.
LACK OF TRAINING
At all levels of the relief system, there is a lack of training for personnel who 
must deal with disasters. Typically, an agency provides orientation to its 
new staff members on the organization itself, descriptions of its projects, 
and project management systems. But rarely is training provided on 
disaster management, especially detailed information on strategies, 
approaches, and problems to expect. The lack of training is particularly a 
problem within development organizations. Even in those groups that have 
staff training programs, the amount of time spent on disaster orientation is 
usually minimal. Especially lacking is even minimal training about the 
connection between disasters and development.
Some agencies have recently developed disaster handbooks or added a
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section on disasters to their field directors’ handbooks. Beyond this, little 
additional information is provided.
A review of the disaster manuals of a number of these agencies unveils 
additional problems. Most treat disasters as logistics problems and 
recommend approaches and procedures that are coming under increased 
criticism by disaster experts. For field personnel who have received no 
training, these manuals may tend to reinforce stereotypes and inhibit the 
development of effective programs. (Notable exceptions are the OXFAM 
Field Director’s Handbook and the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies.)
One cause of the problem is the scarcity of training programs on disaster 
management and of instructors with field experience. Few courses exist, 
though some schools permit individual studies and research on disaster 
management topics, but only in certain technical fields (such as earthquake 
engineering, epidemiology, geology, and meteorology) are disasters studied 
systematically.
Recent developments are encouraging, however. A number of short 
courses on disasters have been organized (most notably, the Regional 
Disaster Preparedness Seminars of AID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, the University of Louvain’s Disaster Epidemiology Course, the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s training program for 
potential volunteers, and the East-West Center’s disaster management 
training program for government ministries). Much more is needed, 
though, and it is hoped that additional formal training programs will be 
initiated, such as the disaster management diploma program of the 
University of Wisconsin-Extension.
8
Influences on Disaster Response
CULTURAL INFLUENCES AND BARRIERS
Cross-cultural influences on disaster response and the problems they create 
are easy to identify. They stem from the intervener’s lack of familiarity with 
with the victims’ culture, with the resources available to the victims, and 
with the native language. Differing cultural values often pose major 
obstacles to effective relief aid, as even the cultural differences within a 
society can be vast. It is often difficult for relief agencies to determine in 
advance the primary cultural constraints with which they must deal, but 
failure to do so severely impedes their programs’ progress.
One set of cross-cultural problems relates to decision making. The 
likelihood that mistakes will be made because of cross-cultural problems 
usually increases when decisions are made far from the affected area or by 
organizations new to the area. Many relief and development workers feel 
that if a relief program is to be successful, the intervening organization 
must have strong roots within the society in order to deal with the cross- 
cultural problems; and indeed, several organizations refuse to become 
involved in disasters unless they have had prior experience in that country. 
For agencies involved in actual fieldwork, prior experience is extremely 
important. For agencies whose primary interest is providing support to the 
host governments or to organizations in the field, the cross-cultural 
obstacles mentioned above can often be reduced through careful planning. 
But there is no substitute for involvement of knowledgeable people from 
within the society in the decision-making process.
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
Technology influences disaster aid in two ways: First, it enables agencies to 
devise quick, although not necessarily appropriate, solutions to needs. 
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Second, it influences the way in which needs are perceived and thus 
indirectly shapes many approaches. In other words, needs are seen in terms 
of solutions. Take, for example, the issue of emergency shelter. Technology 
makes it possible to build the shelters and to move them from one country 
to another very quickly.
If it were not possible to deliver these shelters immediately, intervenors 
would probably emphasize developing approaches that would complement 
local initiatives. Agencies would choose approaches that would support 
processes occurring naturally after disasters. The following list takes this a 
step further. The column on the left shows the priorities of the relief 
agencies (Agnew and Patterson 1976), the column on the right that of the 
victims.
Agencies’ Perceptions 
of Shelter Needs
T em po rary  s tru ctu re  
Low cost
Rapid co nstruc tion  
A ir-transportab le  
Lightweight, m ovable 
Low m ain tenance  
Small co nstruc tion  crew
Victims’ Perceptions 
o f Shelter Needs
P erm anen t housing  
Low cost
L abor-in tensive o r self-help 
T rad itiona l ap pearan ce  
Place to store anim als 
R eplicable by local craftsm en 
C onform ity  to trad itional living patterns 
(that is, segregation by sex w ith in the 
structure)
Technological solutions may also ignore contributing factors, especially 
the social or political needs of the disaster victims. Again turning to the 
housing sector, technological solutions may ignore or fail to address 
adequately such issues as land tenure or economic problems related to 
housing construction.
Other examples where technological capability has influenced response 
are the provision of mass innoculations for suspected diseases following 
natural disasters; the extensive use of aircraft in all phases of logistics and 
search-and-rescue; the supply of high-protein “synthetic” foods such as 
CSM, WSB, and K-Mix II; and the practice of importing relief materiel 
instead of purchasing it locally. Such actions have become commonplace, 
facilitated by technology available to the intervenors. But the question 
remains: Does the technological capacity to do these things obscure other 
needs in the affected community?
INFORMATION SOURCES
Another factor that can limit the effectiveness of the relief system is the 
sources from which intervenors obtain information about the society in
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which they propose to operate. Organizations operating in the field need 
information sources within the community. Cultural and language dif­
ferences, however, often distort the picture received by the organization. 
The more removed the information is from the field, the greater the 
distortion. Outside the country, most agencies must rely on translated 
reports. Furthermore, events significant in the culture of the affected society 
may have no significance to someone living several thousand miles away.
PERCEPTIONS OF DISASTER
Agencies' Perceptions
There is a long-standing debate as to how to define a disaster. What 
concerns us here is a working definition and how it is defined by the 
intervenors and other participants, for the definitions used can provide 
clues to the perceptions governing their actions.
First, let us look at some of the common definitions provided by 
voluntary aid organizations:
“Disasters are unforeseen events that cause widespread loss of life and 
require immediate large-scale relief from outside resources.”
“Disasters are unusual, widespread events that disrupt the social order 
and that require help from outside the affected community in order to 
restore normalcy.”
“Disasters are disruptive events that destroy property, threaten lives and 
health, and that are of such a scale as to require outside assistance.”
In each of these definitions lies a key to understanding the relief agencies’ 
basic perception of disasters, and thus the basis on which they formulate 
their disaster programs. The idea common to each—that outside assistance 
is required—indicates what is perhaps the most prevalent perception. 
Within this phrase lies an imperative to act—for disasters by definition 
require intervention in the form of either materials or organizational 
assistance. It is implied that intervention can resolve or ameliorate unusual 
problems, and that material aid is one of the primary tools for problem 
solving.
How do these definitions shape the response of an organization? To 
begin with, the assumed need for outside aid colors the agency’s disaster 
assessment. Scores of assessments are conducted each year to estimate the 
material losses caused by a disaster; then orders are placed immediately 
with suppliers or donors, and arrangements are made to ship the materials 
into the disaster area. Rarely, however, are thorough surveys conducted to 
determine whether the materials requested are available or can be
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resupplied through the normal market system within a reasonable period of 
time (or whether the survivors can obtain them without outside assistance), 
because the fundamental assumption is that they cannot.
If an agency believes that disasters are relief problems to be resolved by 
material aid, then disasters become logistics exercises. The structure of its 
relief system will be designed to move the aid as expeditiously as possible 
from point A to point B and thence to points C through Z with as little loss 
from pilferage, spoilage, and breakage as is feasible. Its programs will be 
measured by how quickly the people receive the goods. But questions 
linger. Should speed be the prime criterion? And more importantly, are 
disasters simply “relief” problems?
Another telling perception is identified by the term “unforeseen events.” 
The fact is that most agencies regard disasters as caused primarily by 
natural phenomena and fail to establish the real root of the problem: 
vulnerability derived from poverty. Disasters are in fact neither unforeseen 
nor unpredictable; but as long as agencies continue to place emphasis on 
immediate relief rather than on mitigation, and fail to include disaster 
preparedness and disaster prevention as part of ongoing development 
schemes, the “unexpected” event will continue to capture their attention.
The final perception expressed in these definitions and articulated by 
many agencies is the assumption that, because of the magnitude or severity 
of the disaster, the affected community cannot cope. This belief (often 
fueled by media reports of looting, the breakdown of civil order, or of 
people traumatized by the event) leads to the belief that intervention from 
outside will serve the re-establishment of order and will “hold things 
together” until the people can get back on their feet. As we will see later, 
there is little evidence to support this belief. In fact, the people hit hardest 
by disasters are, in the words of Ian Davis, “coping experts”—people who 
are extremely self-reliant and, although poor, are quite capable of rapid 
recovery if adequate resources are made available. The questions to 
consider then are:
1. What type of assistance is most necessary: assistance in restarting and 
improving the existing ways in which people cope, or assistance in the 
form of rapidly delivered material aid?
2. Where is an agency likely to place its emphasis if it defines disasters as 
situations where people cannot cope?
Governments' Perceptions
More progressive governments usually define disasters in the same terms as 
do relief agencies, but the definition is expanded to include a much broader
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social and economic range of consequences. This can be noted in the 
following definitions:
“Disasters are sudden events that force the reallocation of already scarce 
resources to meet basic survival needs.”
“Disasters are sudden and unforeseen events that disrupt normal 
activities and slow or retard progress toward economic and social 
development.”
Government is concerned not only with helping the disaster victims 
recover; it is also concerned that the disaster not retard the social and 
economic progress being sought. There is concern that disasters will 
require a disproportionate amount of attention, diverting personnel and 
money away from more important, longer-term projects and into welfare 
and reconstruction activities. There are also fears that disasters will affect 
the gross national product, especially the production of those materials or 
crops that are needed for export in order to bring in valuable foreign 
exchange.
For governments that see disasters in this light, a primary objective is to 
obtain as much foreign assistance and aid as is possible, so that existing 
resources within the country will not have to be diverted. For governments 
choosing this course of action, foreign relief appears to be a godsend.
The perception of disasters as primarily a relief problem to be met with 
material aid is almost identical with the definitions of the relief agencies. 
There is no awareness that actions taken during a disaster and the 
reconstruction period have a bearing on the development process; rather, 
the disaster is seen as an event apart from development and one that serves 
only as a break, or retardant, in the development process.
An alternate set of views is often held by governments that are controlled 
by an oligarchy, where maintenance of the social and economic status quo 
is a prime objective. The origins of disaster are defined in the same terms, 
but the consequences are seen in a different light. While there are no public 
advocates of the following points of view, if actions were authors, the 
following would be quotes:
“Disasters are large-scale events that create a breakdown of law and 
order.”
“Disasters are events that point to the social and economic inequities 
within the society and threaten the established order.”
“Disasters are large-scale events that underscore a government’s im­
potence and inability to act.”
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Governments who act upon such beliefs are trapped. If they appeal for 
and accept massive outside aid, might not the population realize just how 
weak the government is, thereby sowing the seeds of change? On the other 
hand, how can the government fail to accept outside assistance if it really is 
not capable itself of handling the disaster? This too could lead to large-scale 
popular unrest. Ironically, the more repressive and ineffective governments 
often see most clearly the developmental aspects and consequences of relief 
actions, although they themselves probably view foreign relief organiza­
tions more in terms of their logistics capabilities than as instigators of social 
change. To these governments, disasters are situations that must be 
controlled. Intervenors that provide aid must be alert to the possibility of 
becoming pawns in a game where the rules are never spelled out.
There is a third governmental definition that we will explore briefly here 
before returning to it in a later chapter. Here the possibilities presented by a 
disaster are recognized.
“Disasters provide an opportunity to rebuild a better society.”
It does not question that aid is necessary. But now disaster is viewed as an 
opportunity, not as a set-back only. Among the perceived opportunities are 
a chance to rebuild a safer, healthier environment and to use a variety of 
resources that would not otherwise be available to assist the affected 
community in making a substantial leap forward on the road to “progress.” 
To the government with this perception, there are never enough aid 
resources, and plans and programs are thrown together rapidly in order to 
take advantage of the new resources while they are available. In this view, 
three things are required: sufficient cash for the government to operate 
effectively; coordination of incoming aid; and reordering of priorities that 
will give the disaster area a larger share of the government’s attention. A 
government with these objectives sees the immediate material aid provided 
by relief agencies as either an intermediate or stopgap measure, or as 
woefully inadequate to meet the greater needs. What a government wants 
most of all are the financial and material resources to carry out the greater 
plan.
Victims' Perceptions
It is difficult for the poor in developing countries to conceptualize a 
disaster. Life is always a struggle and the potential for the survival of the 
members of any family is only marginal. Early death is not an unusual 
event; in countries with low nutritional status and a high infant mortality
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rate, deaths within a family occur at rather regular intervals. Furthermore, 
the perceptions as to what the disaster means change as time from the 
actual disaster event increases. At first, disasters are perceived in terms of 
human loss and injuries, then material loss, and finally economic 
consequences. While a relief agency may see destruction of crops or homes 
as either an agricultural loss or a materials requirement, the victims see the 
loss in economic terms, namely, in income, lost or income that must be 
diverted from income-generating activities to meet basic survival or comfort 
needs.
The sense of economic loss, or of economic opportunities lost, is the one 
perception that is common to all victims. It is also the common concern of 
each economic stratum among all the victims.
INFLUENCES WITHIN THE RELIEF SYSTEM
The operations of the relief system are often influenced by pressures unique 
either to disasters or to the disaster relief system. This is due, in part, to a 
misunderstanding of what actually happens in disasters, as well as to a real 
attempt to react quickly to human suffering and trauma. These pressures 
may have negative results.
The first of these pressures are time constraints in the form of deadlines 
to be met for most disaster programs. These time constraints are usually 
artificial and quite often arbitrary dates the agency sets as a means of 
hurrying along emergency and reconstruction programs. They are often 
related to what the donor perceives as a particular phase of a disaster or tied 
to some seasonal event, such as the onset of a rainy season or the winter. In 
very few cases do these deadlines have any meaning except to the agency 
that sets them and, for the people in the field who find their programs 
constrained and forced into unnecessary haste, they can be downright 
maddening.
A second constraint is the disaster-funding process. Because disasters are 
traumatic events, they can generate a tremendous amount of funds in a 
short period of time. In the early stages of a disaster, the availability of 
funds is phenomenal, but within a few months donations stop. Agencies 
know this and concentrate tremendous efforts on fund-raising immediately 
after the disaster has occurred. But early availability of large amounts of 
funds (which must be attracted by gaining the public’s attention) brings 
with it a pressure to spend the funds as quickly as possible. Thus many 
agencies attempt to carry out their programs in a very short period of time 
while the funds are available and the disaster is in the public consciousness. 
The funding process contributes to the problem of time constraints. Often 
donors with the best of intentions set deadlines for expenditures of funds,
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the objective being to insure that disaster victims receive aid promptly. 
Unfortunately, haste and deadlines often result in programs that are poorly 
conceived, do not sufficiently involve disaster victims, and operate on 
information obtained at the height of confusion.
The next constraint is that of linkages between different levels of the 
system. Most organizations have clearly defined relationships during 
normal times. Following a disaster, organizations correctly feel that they 
must support those groups with which they have a prior relationship. The 
relationship must be re-examined, however, when an organization is forced 
to step out of its normal spheres of activity. A donor wishing to contribute 
funds for housing should look for an organization with housing experience. 
If the group with which the organization has a standing relationship is not 
in the housing field, it should either find a group that is in the field or 
change its priority.
Another problem unique to the system is the multiplicity of top-down 
pressures. In a system where donors donate to other donors who pass the 
money to other institutions that, in turn, fund other institutions doing the 
work in the field, the pressures for action and response multiply at each 
level. Following a disaster, urgency is heightened and the pressures added 
at each level of the system often result in excessive time being devoted to 
trying to meet each donor’s perceived needs or requirements.
One aspect of this problem is the practice of earmarking; that is, the 
placing of constraints on how donated funds may be used. In the best of 
cases, funds are earmarked for certain types of programs. The donor may 
wish to contribute to housing reconstruction, medical aid, or social 
programs and, for the most part, this type of earmarking causes only mild 
inconvenience as long as the agency has the capability of carrying out the 
program designated by the donor.
Other constraints are also controversial and problematic in formulating a 
balanced relief or reconstruction program. Among the most common prior 
constraints are: 1
1. the requirement that all or a majority of the materials purchased be used 
within the donor’s own country;
2. the requirement that donated goods be shipped on the carriers of the 
donor’s own country;
3. the requirement that all materials shipped be granted duty-free status.
Immediately following the 1979 hurricane that struck the Dominican 
Republic, a large intergovernmental organization in Europe created a fund 
for housing reconstruction. It notified several private agencies working in 
the Dominican Republic that it would accept proposals. The New York 
headquarters of one agency, which had economic and agricultural
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development programs in the country, submitted a brief proposal, which 
was accepted on the day it was received.
Nine days after the disaster, the agency’s field director in the Dominican 
Republic received a cable from his headquarters informing him that several 
hundred thousand dollars had been appropriated for a housing recon­
struction program. It also informed the director that the program must be 
executed within sixty days. The director, who had no prior experience in 
housing, cabled his headquarters for authority to extend the deadline in 
order to determine how best to use the funds and to determine whether the 
organization should become involved. The headquarters, fearing loss of the 
money, instead began looking around for a housing consultant to assist the 
field director in setting up a program. When the consultant arrived, he 
determined that housing was a low priority in relation to other immediate 
post-disaster needs and that housing reconstruction should not take 
precedence over other matters. Headquarters, not pleased with this 
assessment, demanded that the field office decide quickly on a program 
and get it underway. After examining various options, the field staff decided 
that the only way that so large an amount of money could be spent at one 
time was to order vast quantities of building materials. A hasty survey of 
homeowners’ preferences determined what building materials were the 
most desired and a large order was placed for them.
In the attempt to get the housing program moving, the agency met with 
several local housing groups. One in particular suggested an approach that 
the agency chose to work with (which had not had prior experience in 
headquarters with this proposal, which was to train housing construction 
workers and neighborhood people in how to use the materials being 
imported in a self-help housing program. Headquarters cabled back that it 
would prefer to support a group with which it was already working and 
instructed the director to operate through that group.
The result? A local group involved in housing was denied resources and 
funds that would have enabled it to increase its effectiveness, and the group 
the agency chose to work with (which had not had prior experience in 
housing) ended up conducting a slipshod materials distribution program 
that had little lasting impact on improving the housing stock.
INFLUENCES AND PRESSURES OF THE PRESS
The role and influence of the press in disasters is a hotly debated topic and 
a definitive work has not yet been written. The press has been praised for 
bringing the true stories of disasters to the public and for its humanitarian
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efforts in stimulating public response to the human needs and suffering 
caused by disasters. On the other hand, it has been condemned for 
presenting sensationalist views of that suffering and for distorting the 
public’s perception of disaster recovery efforts. Whatever the position 
taken, it cannot be denied that the press has enormous influence on the 
workings of the relief system at all levels. Extensive press coverage of a 
disaster can create tremendous pressure on agencies and governments to 
become involved. It can also create tremendous pressure to react quickly 
and massively to alleviate the suffering portrayed by the media.
Not surprisingly, the media end up distorting the picture of what 
happens in disasters. They do this by concentrating on the suffering of the 
victims and by showing the unusual events that occur in a disaster situation. 
Confusion is often depicted as ineptitude, and cautious, deliberate 
planning is often viewed as foot-dragging incompetence or failure to react 
rapidly. Stories filed by news media are those that will be of interest to the 
unaffected (outside viewers) and will be colored by the perceptions of the 
correspondents, who are often constrained by many of the same cross- 
cultural influences as the relief agencies. Stories can create an impression of 
vast destruction by focusing on the damage of a few buildings when, in fact, 
damage may be relatively moderate. Especially harmful is the fact that most 
news stories reinforce the stereotypes that people have about disaster 
victims and the processes at play.
Although the media can motivate the public and generate a tremendous 
response that will swell the coffers of humanitarian agencies, they can “turn 
off’ the public the next day with a series of negative stories on how the 
disaster is being handled or a portrayal of the inequities that inevitably 
occur in these situations. Many agencies reported that donations were 
extremely high in the first few days following the earthquake in Nicaragua 
in 1972, but that donations fell off rapidly when news media reported on 
the corruption of the Somoza government in distributing relief supplies. In 
reality, the Somoza government was responsible for only a portion of the 
relief supplies, and private agencies were relatively free from these 
problems. Yet their donations were severely curtailed as a result of these 
stories.
Agencies must play to the press for public support, and this creates 
problems. The types of assistance that can be easily portrayed on film or 
television are very attractive because they “show” the agency in action. 
Scenes of food, clothes, and blankets being distributed, medical staff at 
work, and houses under construction all serve the public relations needs of 
the agencies. Pre-disaster planning, vulnerability analysis, preparedness
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activities, community organization, psychological counseling, and other 
important activities that cannot be photographed are neglected. The result 
is that photographic images reinforce misconceptions and perpetuate 
myths, which inhibit change in emergency response.
Post-Disaster Programs
Programs are the vehicles by which agencies fulfill their reason for 
existing—relief for the victim and reconstruction of a functioning society. 
Programs are the link between concept and action; they embody everything 
discussed so far.
Yet program structure and management is neither taught nor studied. Of 
all the elements making up the relief system, programs are the most 
important and receive the least attention. It is not surprising that there is a 
tremendous breakdown between idealistic expectations of what the agency 
should be accomplishing and what actually results. This chapter explores 
the influences and problems of program structure and management and 
ends with some typical program models.
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROGRAM
Even before a field program is established, there are many factors that will 
shape it. Many of these are extensions of the forces within the relief system 
itself, and others have to do with the nature of intervention. Let us briefly 
review five of the most important sets of constraints on a program.
Motives
Motives for intervention are:
1. Humanitarian Concern. The prime motive for intervention.
2. A Presence on the Scene. Many agencies become involved in disasters 
simply because they are already working in the affected country when 
the disaster strikes. It would be practically impossible for an agency
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already involved in economic or humanitarian work to avoid becoming 
involved in a nearby disaster.
3. Opportunity. Many agencies see a disaster as a chance to establish a 
presence in a community for a longer-term involvement.
4. Furtherance of Primary Goals. Many agencies see relief work as a chance to 
further their primary goals. This is especially true of church organiza­
tions, which sometimes feel that by responding to a disaster they can 
introduce and establish themselves in order to further their missionary 
and charitable work.
5. Demonstration of Concern or Friendship. Many intervenors provide relief to 
demonstrate a concern for the society or to promote kinship. In most 
cases, this is an extension of humanitarian concern, but for govern­
mental agencies, it can be an attempt to gain influence or to support a 
friendly government.
These motives subtly shape a relief program. For example, an organi­
zation wanting to establish a presence for long-term involvement is more 
likely to develop programs with strong community-based participation and 
be much more responsive to meeting initiatives developed by the 
community. An agency with programs in-country prior to the disaster will 
usually operate through its existing organization and simply expand the 
staff or scope of work to meet the perceived relief needs. Relief experts can 
normally look at an agency’s motive for intervention and make an accurate 
prediction of the structure, staffing patterns, and, in many cases, the 
spheres of activity that an agency will adopt in a post-disaster situation.
Resources Available
The available resources, especially funds and materiel, determine both the 
nature and the scope of a relief program. It has been said that many relief 
programs are a reflection of what the agencies’ donors will provide. For 
example, agencies that work closely with AID can usually be expected to 
become heavily involved in food programs. Agencies supported by small 
organizations, such as churches, or that rely on individual donations are 
likely to provide varied material assistance, such as blankets, clothing, tents, 
and canned goods.
Resources also affect the period of involvement. Agencies with limited 
resources normally work only in the immediate post-disaster period. 
Agencies with access to more funds will become involved in recon­struction.
Another resource that can affect the nature of a program is the type of 
expertise available to the agency. An agency with links to a medical
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institution can be expected to provide medical assistance. If engineers are 
available, water purification or sanitation programs may be added to the 
program portfolio. The availability of expertise should not be overlooked. 
A survey by INTERTECT in 1977 of the relief and reconstruction programs 
in Guatemala showed that most agencies fit expertise into their program, 
rather than seek expertise to meet certain program objectives (Ressler 
1977).
Time-Frame
Time constraints are usually dictated by funding pressures, by donors, and 
by perceived seasonal obstacles. Short time-frames are the bane of good 
project planning, especially when pre-disaster planning has been neglected. 
A program operating under artificial time constraints can rarely be 
effective. Short time-frames affect staffing patterns, limit community 
involvement, and inhibit project planning.
Forte of the Agency
The normal activities of a relief organization will often determine the type 
of activities it undertakes in the post-disaster situation. An agency working 
in housing is likely to continue working in that sector following a disaster. 
An organization with medical experience can be expected to offer these 
services or to expand them. (It should be noted, however, that the lack of 
experience in a particular field has never been a perceived obstacle to 
intervention, and many organizations have plunged into various relief 
activities without the slightest expertise or experience.) This is especially a 
problem in housing reconstruction programs and in feeding and nutrition 
programs in drought relief.
Earmarked Funds
The types of activities chosen are often determined by donors. If an agency 
receives funds earmarked for housing reconstruction following an earth­
quake, the agency must carry out such a program whether or not it has any 
expertise in the field. Earmarking is a growing problem for agencies. Once 
the money has been received, it is too late to bargain about the conditions. 
Donor education and the development of guidelines for donors must be a 
part of an agency’s disaster preparedness.
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An Agency's Mandate
Many relief agencies have been established to meet specific disaster relief 
objectives. But unless the agency’s founders thoroughly understand the link 
between disasters and development, the terms on which the agency is 
based often prevent it from being completely effective.
UNDRO’s problems are fundamental to the way it was originally 
organized. They are a manifestation of how a failure to link disasters and 
development can affect the performance of a relief agency. At the time 
UNDRO was established, disasters were treated in isolation from develop­
ment. The founders felt that disaster aid required a separate office. Thus 
UNDRO was given autonomous status within the UN system (much like 
that of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and was not placed under 
the auspices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). When the office 
began to undertake disaster mitigation activities, the staff found that most of 
the measures they advocated were surrounded by development issues and 
could be addressed only in those terms. By not being a part of the UNDP, 
the UNDRO representatives were not always “in tune” with local develop­
ment needs and problems and thus missed many opportunities to link 
mitigation and vulnerability reduction to development programs. Further­
more, several of the measures they suggested were simply unrealistic in the 
local political and economic context.
The establishment of UNDRO also demonstrates how failure to 
understand the disaster processes and how the system works when an 
organization’s mandate is written can affect the agency’s performance. 
UNDRO’s primary mandate is to serve as coordinator for international 
disaster assistance. Because the agency sees disasters primarily as emer­
gencies, it focuses on trying to coordinate emergency response. Typically, 
UNDRO dispatches a coordinator to the affected country for the emer­
gency period and asks that foreign donors coordinate their assistance 
through Geneva.
In practical terms, this is not very effective. Outsiders unfamiliar with the 
latest developments or the local politics should not try to coordinate—a 
local group should. While preparedness activities and establishment of 
links to the government prior to the disaster can help, an outside 
coordinator, especially one who stays only for the emergency period, can 
never be truly effective and in many cases has only added to the confusion 
and delays.
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE SUCCESS OF A PROGRAM
Once a program has been established, there are three factors that affect the 
outcome and determine, to a great extent, whether or not the program will
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make an effective contribution to the relief or reconstruction effort. Because 
these factors influence program implementation, they must be thoroughly 
understood by anyone contemplating a post-disaster project.
Attitude of the Agency
The attitude that an agency takes in a community toward the victims and 
the behavior of its staff are a major influence on implementation. This has 
to do with factors mentioned earlier, namely, the agencies’ perceptions of 
victims and victims’ behavior after a disaster. If an agency and the program 
it formulates reflect a paternalistic attitude, success will be limited. 
Alternatively, if an organization takes the attitude that its role is to help 
victims help themselves, rather than to step into the breach, to take over, 
and make decisions until the people can get back on their feet, the first 
obstacle has been overcome.
Relationship to the Community
An extension of an agency’s attitude toward the disaster victims is its view 
of its role generally. Does it see itself as an agent of the relief process, or as a 
participant in community processes striving to meet community goals? The 
more an agency can become an integral part of the community, the more 
effective its relief programs will become.
Decision Making
The way in which an organization makes decisions is the most important 
factor influencing the relative success or failure of a program. Even if an 
organization is close to the community and is prepared to respond to 
initiatives from the victims, rather than initiate “solutions” itself, overall 
effectiveness will be limited and in many cases nonexistent, unless the 
organization places decision making at the community level. Many 
programs are steeped in democratic traditions and intentions, yet the final 
authority in all decision making resides with program staff, not with 
community leaders. Even with the most progressive intentions, a program 
cannot be effective unless decision making is shared. A post-disaster 
program can be nothing more than charity unless authority is shared with 
the community.
Assumptions about where ultimate power should rest are often reflected 
in the management model chosen by a program. An organization striving 
for effective community participation often finds that the management 
model selected inhibits, and in some cases prohibits, the very participation
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it is seeking. The tables of organization most often used are a reflection of 
industrial practice. These are designed to facilitate decision making from 
the top down, not from the bottom up. (So restrictive are these models that 
in many cases, the title of “field marshall” would be more appropriate than 
that of “field director.”) If a program is to include community participation, 
staff must develop an organization that stresses participatory management 
and decision making at all levels.
COMMON PROBLEMS IN POST-DISASTER PROGRAMS
Program planning in many agencies can best be characterized as planning 
by default. Take, for example, the usual way a housing program is 
established. First, an agency requests an area or is assigned one by the 
government. The agency then estimates how many houses are required, 
determines the amount of money available, and divides the funds by the 
number of houses required. It then seeks a building system that enables it 
to build the required number of houses at that cost. Usually a standard 
design is adopted and mass construction begins. When the required 
number of houses has been built or when funds run out, the program 
ends.
The agency then measures its success by determining the number of 
units produced, whether they were produced within a certain time limit, 
and whether the project was completed within the budget. The houses are 
seen as the end product. Success is measured in terms of the donor and not
the victim. Nothing has been left in the community other than an artifact_
no contributions to the building process and no new skills. Often the newly 
constructed building cannot be repaired or maintained.
The following is a list of problems that are common to relief and 
reconstiuction programs. They are divided into two parts, planning and 
execution.
Common Problems in Project Planning
An analysis of program planning carried out by intervenors in a number of 
recent relief operations reveals twelve common errors. This group, 
sometimes referred to as “the dirty dozen,” consists of the following:
1. Poor conceptualization of the project. Not enough can be said about this 
topic. The vast majority of relief and reconstruction programs are 
conducted without the establishment of formal goals or objectives. Often 
there are vague pronouncements or statements such as “To help the 
victim” or “To reconstruct houses.” Until a staff has established where it is 
going, it will be difficult to determine how to get there.
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2. Failure to establish policies to shape program planning. Policies provide the 
framework by which staff makes choices throughout the program planning 
process. The failure to establish policies at an early date leaves a program 
without any guiding principles and with no firm basis upon which to make 
decisions.
3. Failure to involve fully the local people in the planning process. Enough 
said.
4. Failure to examine the complete range of options. Too often, an agency 
selects the first approach to solving a particular problem that it thinks of. 
Usually this is a matter of not taking enough time to explore the choices, or 
unfamiliarity with the alternatives.
5. Selection of only one strategy or approach to problem solving. Often an 
organization will “fixate” on a particular methodology and will develop a 
whole program around one standard approach. In essence, the agency is 
putting all of its eggs into one basket and if anything goes wrong, or if the 
approach meets with only limited success, the entire program may have to 
be restructured. Furthermore, the selection of only one approach does not 
easily accommodate variances in the affected community.
6. Failure to balance the program. A balanced program is one that meets a 
variety of related needs. For example: a housing reconstruction program 
that provides training in improved construction techniques, job oppor­
tunities for local builders and craftsmen, employment opportunities so that 
local people can gain the funds necessary to participate in the program, and 
supplementary projects designed to improve the sites and services (such as 
sanitation) would be considered a balanced program. One that simply 
provides a replacement for a damaged house would not.
7. Overextension. Programs become overextended by (1) trying to meet 
too many needs, (2) trying to meet the needs of too many people, or 
(3) trying to meet the needs in too broad an area. A good example of 
overextension occurred in Guatemala when a small relief agency with a staff 
of seven offered to provide housing reconstruction services to a geographic 
area of over 1500 square kilometers that had not only a rural population, 
but also a number of large towns. The total number of people in the area 
approached 75,000. When the program made a commitment to the 
government to provide services in this area, it had already received a total of 
$25,000 for reconstruction. During the course of the agency’s efforts, it 
received an additional $25,000 and some roofing material as an in-kind 
contribution from a foreign government. The total monetary resources of 
the agency were approximately $80,000. From this was subtracted the cost 
of the staff, transportation and vehicles, and other overhead items. Had the 
agency been able to use the entire amount, the total contribution to the area 
would have been only slightly more than $ 1 per person. Even if the funds
156 Disasters and Development
A monument to waste: temporary housing unused and abandoned.
could have been used creatively, the number of people effectively served 
could not have been more than approximately 10 percent of those in the 
project area.
8. Failure to examine cause-and-effect relationships. Failure to look ahead is 
often a result of inexperience. Yet by thinking through many of the 
program options and trying to gauge the outcome, agencies could avoid 
many mistakes. In his paper on accountability (1978), Everett Ressler 
argues that as a part of the formal planning process, agencies should 
prepare a program-impact assessment similar to the environmental impact 
statements that are required of many construction projects.
9. Failure to select a management model that fits the objectives of the project. As 
mentioned earlier, the choice of management model and table of 
organization are crucial to successful project implementation.
10. Failure to develop a management plan. An examination of most relief or 
reconstruction programs will reveal a failure in this area. Good program 
management requires proper sequencing of activities, assignment of 
resources and personnel, establishment of milestones by which a program 
can gauge its performance, and the pairing of resources and personnel. 
Rarely do relief or reconstruction plans contain even the most rudimentary 
flow charts of activities. Without management plans, resources cannot be 
used efficiently. Agencies should emphasize the basics of program planning
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in their training of program administrators, and model plans should be 
developed for disaster projects.
11. Failure to budget a project properly. Budget estimates are one of the most 
difficult exercises in project planning. Not only must a budget be prepared 
in an inflationary environment, but the amount of funds and their date of 
transfer to the program are often unknown. Thus incremental budget 
planning is required, and a certain amount of flexibility must be built in.
12. Failure to obtain proper technical inputs. This is largely a result of failure 
by the agencies to expand their horizons, and an attempt to oversimplify 
their humanitarian work. In most cases, agencies are simply not aware of all 
the related issues nor the technical expertise that is available.
Another aspect of the problem is the use of inappropriate technical 
inputs. For example, following many disasters, agencies send medical 
teams with the latest technical equipment and medicines. In most cases, 
however, what is needed is not high-tech curative medicine, but low- 
technology, community-based preventive health measures, such as sanita­
tion and hygiene.
The use of technology and selection of the appropriate technology is 
always a problem for agencies with no prior experience in a community and 
little knowledge of the society in which the disaster has occurred. The time 
to determine the appropriate technology, therefore, is before a disaster has 
occurred.
Common Problems in Program Execution
The following problems are commonly found in the execution of relief 
programs. 1
1. Overloading the location organization with too much work or money.
2. Concentration on the product, not the process. Many agencies concentrate on 
the attainment of measurable goals, such as the number of people fed, 
sheltered, and clothed, and ways to measure their performance in these 
terms. Using these criteria, the agencies often neglect the process by which 
the goals are attained. In most cases, however, the process is at least as 
important as the product.
3. Failure to support local coping mechanisms. This was discussed earlier, but 
it cannot be overemphasized. Agencies must be extremely careful to 
support the local coping mechanisms as much as possible, or at the very 
least not to undermine their effectiveness.
4. Failure to concentrate resources where the agency is most effective.
5. Staying in relief too long. Many agencies fail to note the rapidly changing 
circumstances in the post-disaster environment. The time for emergency
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relief and charitable programs passes quickly and other approaches are 
required in the transition to longer-term reconstruction activities. An 
agency that continues to provide relief during the reconstruction period will 
not only be providing aid inappropriate for the period, but will hamper the 
reconstruction efforts of other agencies and even delay the recovery.
6. Failure to use local resources. Many agencies find that it is easier to import 
the materials, supplies, and expertise than to acquire them in the affected 
community. Often imported supplies are cheaper, even with the added 
transport costs; because of the disrupted market structure following a 
disaster, they can often be obtained more quickly. Importing of resources, 
however, reduces participation by the local community, and bypasses an 
opportunity to provide a stimulus to recovery.
7. Failure to prevent the recurrence of a disaster. This is one of the hidden, yet 
most prevalent, faults of reconstruction programs. There are two aspects to 
mitigation: physical vulnerability and the socioeconomic. For example, 
houses can be made safer and communities can be relocated to less 
vulnerable sites. If disasters are a result of long-term socioeconomic 
problems in a society, agencies cannot address the vulnerability problem 
without undertaking a wider look at overall development aspects of the 
problem. The challenge is to formulate plans that are more development- 
oriented than disaster-oriented, but that include disaster mitigation as an 
integral part.
8. Failure to develop local capabilities. Opportunities to develop local 
capabilities are often missed. A relief program offers many opportunities 
for training or enhancing the skills of local people. Program management, 
accounting, construction techniques, materials handling, and vehicle 
maintenance are but a few of the skills that can be developed. Most 
important are the skills for planning and carrying out projects, which can be 
imparted to local leaders so that they in turn can formulate and carry out 
programs of their own. Helping others to develop skills can be time- 
consuming and more expensive, but is an added contribution to the 
community.
CR ITER IA  FO R A SSESSIN G  A  PROGRAM
There are various ways to assess a program, and each type of program has 
its own criteria. There are, however, several general criteria that can be 
applied to ascertain overall benefit. These are based on the contributions the 
program makes to the community. Contributions are divided into two sets: 
short-term, or immediate, contribution, and long-term, or developmental.
The immediate contribution is measured in three ways. First, the 
alleviation of suffering or the burdens caused by the disaster. This is the
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humanitarian contribution. Second, the contribution to or support of local 
coping mechanisms. This is determined by whether the program works 
through or enhances the capabilities of the mechanisms within the society 
that normally deal with disaster. The third measurement is whether a 
program shortens the length of time between emergency and full 
recovery.
The developmental contributions that a program makes are more 
difficult to judge, as well as extremely important, especially for assessing 
recovery and reconstruction programs. Actions are measured first by their 
contribution toward long-term development of the society, which is 
determined by the extent to which the program helped to develop local 
leadership and contributed to institution building and to the improvement 
of skills within the society.
The second developmental measurements are the spin-off benefits. For 
example, did the post-disaster program contribute to developmental goals 
or set in motion activities that would help attain these broader 
objectives?
Finally, the developmental contribution should be measured by the 
degree of increased safety of the community. A post-disaster program that 
simply returns a society to the same state of vulnerability that it had prior to 
the disaster would obviously fail this test.
SOME COMMON PROGRAM MODELS
Now that we have examined some of the common problems, as well as the 
assessment criteria, let’s take a look at some of the more common program 
models and the styles of aid giving employed in disasters.
Program Styles
The manner in which an agency dispenses aid is referred to as the style. The 
four characteristic styles usually reflect the attitudes and objectives of the 
agencies (and are described here in the informal terms often used by field 
staff). 1
1. Quick and Dirty. This style can be identified by a quick response with 
massive material aid. The usual objective is to saturate an area as quickly as 
possible with relief items and to create as much visibility with as little 
entanglement as possible. The prime criterion is speed, especially speed of 
delivery. Quick and dirty programs are usually carried out in the emergency 
phase. The emphasis on delivery of relief materials is based on the 
assumption that material aid can solve many of the needs. (This is often 
called the “logistics approach” to disaster aid.)
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Many of the agencies that use the quick and dirty style are well organized 
and highly efficient. Victim needs that recur in every disaster are identified 
and materials are sought (or drawn from stockpiles) to meet these needs. By 
standardizing the materials, the agency can substantially reduce the time 
required for acquisition, stockpiling, and shipment. But this can create 
other problems.
Because the basic decisions are made by the donor, with little oppor­
tunity for victim participation, they often result in delivery of inappropriate 
aid. Overall, quick and dirty programs have very little real impact on 
solving problems, and in those programs where the logistic systems have 
not been developed properly, the sorting of arriving materials can delay 
other higher priority deliveries and tie other distribution systems into 
knots.
2. Firefighting. The style is characterized by an ad hoc response to 
problems or needs. There is no prior planning or setting of objectives until 
the requests are received.
Found in all phases of the post-disaster period, this style of program is 
considered a notch above the quick and dirty style because it does relate to 
needs of or demands from the community. Problems arise, however, 
because it may be difficult to determine real priorities in the confusion after 
a disaster, and the requests, or nature of the requests, often depend on who 
is doing the asking. In terms of execution, it is difficult to tie the program 
together and make best use of resources because the program is responding 
to many diverse needs.
3. Development through Disaster. The objective here is to use the process of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction to achieve development goals. These 
programs concentrate on accomplishing all their goals during the transition 
phase. (In more practical terms, they may be trying to do everything before 
the money runs out.)
While a step in the right direction, this style of program is often frustrated 
by the fact that the priorities of the victims are not always the same as those 
of the agency, and that the potential for change during the transition phase 
is not as high as generally believed.
4. Planting the Seed. This style reflects an awareness that development is a 
slow process and that disasters offer certain limited opportunities for change. 
The emphasis is on setting up an environment and the infrastructure 
necessary to continue development activities after the disaster program is 
terminated. Intervention may occur at any point, though it is usually in the 
rehabilitation or reconstruction phase. Agencies stress the development of 
community leaders and organizations and a high degree of participation by 
the victims. These programs emphasize processes, not products, and 
material aid is secondary in the overall program.
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Program Approaches
The way in which an agency provides aid determines both the shape of its 
programs and the degree of input and sophistication required to manage 
and complete them. In general, there are three discernible program 
approaches.
1. The Shotgun Approach. The objective of the shotgun approach is to 
provide aid in as many different sectors (e.g., health, housing) as possible. It 
is different from other approaches in that the activities are not tied together 
and thus do not complement or supplement each other. Critics of the 
approach note that it represents the “action end” of the premise that a little 
aid is better than none.
The shotgun approach is used more by relief than development agencies 
and by the newer, less experienced groups. If an agency has enough 
resources and good staff, the programs can have modest success, though 
management of many diverse, unconnected programs can be difficult. For 
an agency with limited resources, the shotgun approach soon puts it out of 
business, as resources are quickly dispersed. Furthermore, overhead costs 
of running many diverse programs can be relatively high.
A variation of the shotgun approach is sometimes used by large agencies 
without experience in an affected area. Initially, they set up projects in 
different sectors on a trial basis. When circumstances permit, the agencies 
evaluate the projects, phasing out the less promising ones and directing the 
resources to the more successful. Unless the projects are integrated, 
however, or are in the same sector, the diversity of the problems 
encountered by the staff remains little changed, though the actual number 
of problems may be reduced.
2. The Single Sector Approach. In this approach, an agency focuses all of its 
efforts and resources in one sector, for example, housing. It may, however, 
conduct a variety of projects and use a number of different methods to 
attain its goals. A typical housing reconstruction program might include 
provision of building materials, training of home builders, and making 
housing loans and grants available. Usually, the various activities are 
complementary and may be designed so that each contributes to the overall 
goals. Single-sector programs allow an agency to concentrate resources and 
reduce the need to diversify technical inputs. (For example, technicians in 
the housing fields are generally familiar with all the related aspects from 
construction to financing. Similarly, health personnel know the related 
activities peripheral to their work.)
The single sector approach can be used by an agency of any size during 
any phase of a disaster. If an agency undertakes a variety of activities, it 
needs a degree of sophistication to integrate them into a balanced program
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successfully. Single sector programs are considered more effective than 
shotgun programs and can be used in both urban and rural areas.
3. The Integrated Recovery Program. An IRP is a balanced program that 
responds to a variety of needs in a stricken community. The objective is to 
help the whole community to recover by addressing the needs in the key 
sectors. IRPs use, and are similar in concept to, the holistic approach found 
in integrated rural development programs (IRDPs). A variety of projects 
and activities may be conducted in different sectors, but they are planned, 
balanced, and integrated in such a way that each is complementary to and 
builds upon the other activities. If conducted properly, IRPs afford an 
agency the best vehicle to introduce change and to have a long-term impact 
upon a community.
A typical IRP might include the following activities. First, work schemes 
to repair community facilities would be started to enable people to obtain 
cash to buy replacement goods and materials lost in the disaster. The 
injection of cash would stimulate local markets and help speed their 
recovery. To facilitate this activity further, the program would provide aid 
to the small business sector, possibly with loans or grants, or help to 
provide the materials to be sold. By addressing needs in all the major 
sectors, the agency can help the entire community to recover uniformly, 
resulting in a shorter, less turbulent recovery period.
An IRP is characterized by: (1) stimulation of activity in various sectors, 
(2) the sequencing of activities at appropriate times, and (3) the use of a 
combination of direct and indirect methods to achieve objectives. IRPs 
work best in small communities and are rarely successful in urban areas, 
even those with clearly defined or identifiable neighborhoods.
With an IRP, there are four prerequisites for success: a thorough 
understanding of disasters and the processes at work; a high degree of 
sophistication in planning and execution; a good sense of timing; and the 
ability to recognize the transition from one phase to another.
Nonprogram Approaches
Up to this point, we have focused on how agencies formulate programs to 
meet disaster needs. The common practice is to develop a program for 
every major need or set of needs identified. Yet programs have very definite 
limitations. Funding is for a fixed period. An organizational framework 
must be established and various types of administrative machinery must be 
set up. When funds end, the program ends.
The program approach” to problem solving will, of course, continue to 
be the major way agencies respond to disasters, but there are other 
nonprogram options and intervention strategies. As an example, let’s take
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the situation in Guatemala in 1976. All the major organizations set up 
programs to provide metal roofing sheets, locally known as lamina, to the 
disaster victims at low cost. Altogether, the agencies’ investment in lamina 
amounted to over $10 million. But was there another option? What would 
have happened if the relief organizations had made a decision to guarantee 
low-interest loans through existing loan institutions for everyone in the 
disaster-affected area, and to help small businesses or the government to 
develop a surplus of the building material? The distribution of lamina might 
have been handled without having to develop elaborate programs and 
without tying up such a large amount of cash.
An example of a nonprogram approach on a smaller scale was found in 
Jamaica in 1979. Heavy rains in the western part of the country produced 
large lakes, which stood for several months and through the normal 
cropping season. Several hundred farmers were displaced. Instead of 
developing a welfare program for the displaced farmers, a number of 
churches offered temporary use of church lands for farming. Money they 
had collected for the flood victims was placed on deposit at local lending 
institutions to guarantee loans to the farmers for seed and farm tools. Thus 
the farmers were able to continue their normal work with minimal 
disruption, and once the loans were repaid at the end of the harvest, the 
deposits were withdrawn and used as grants to those returning families still 
in need after the sale of their crops.
Most disaster programs, especially those of volags, are designed to help 
the poor. Unfortunately, in the Third World, the poor, affected dis­
proportionately by disasters, usually outnumber the resources available. 
Innovative, nonprogram strategies can be used in concert with traditional 
program approaches to extend those resources.
10
Programa Kuchuba'I: A Case Study 
of a Reconstruction Program
Program planning, management, and execution, as well as the various 
factors that influence a program, are best seen in a case study. A good 
example is Programa Kuchuba’I.
Programa Kuchuba’I was chosen because it had a wide-ranging effect on 
many of the other programs conducted in Guatemala. It was a highly 
sophisticated program, one which pioneered the development of new 
methods and strategies for dealing with disasters, and it presented an 
alternative to the traditional methods used in post-disaster aid.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM 
Background
The earthquakes of February 4, 1976, covered a wide area of Guatemala. 
Destruction was greatest in the upper highlands of central Guatemala. In 
the center of this area lay the municipios (municipal districts) of San Martin 
Jilotepeque, Santa Apolonia, Chimaltenango, Tecpan, and San Jose 
Poaquil. Here approximately 90% of the structures were either destroyed or 
substantially damaged.
The population is predominantly Cakchiquel-speaking Indians, who live 
in the towns {pueblos) or rural villages (aldeas). This region is one of the 
densest in all of Latin America.
The farmers in the area lead a marginal existence, with many families 
forced annually to go to the coast to help harvest coffee, cotton, sugar cane, 
and other major cash crops on the large estates ifincas) of the coastal plains. 
The main crops in the highlands are corn and wheat, and only recently have 
improvements in the agricultural system been introduced that have allowed 
the farmers to realize greater returns and a gradual improvement in the 
standard of living. Even with these changes, however, it is still a marginal 
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existence; and before the earthquake, a delicate balance between gradual 
economic improvement and possible economic disaster was only slowly 
tilting in favor of the former.
Principal Organizations and Their Relationships
Prior to the earthquake, there were several organizations working actively in 
this area, mainly in economic and agricultural development. One of these, 
World Neighbors, had been working for thirteen years, helping to 
strengthen cooperatives and training extensionists to work with farmers and 
their families in agriculture, nutrition, and health. At the time of the 
earthquake, World Neighbors was administering two development pro­
grams in the area. One covered the municipio of San Martin Jilotepeque (with 
thirteen paid staff and about fifty volunteer extensionists), and the other 
centered in Tecpan and covered the municipios of Tecpan, Santa Apolonia, 
and San Jose Poaquil (with six paid staff and twenty-five volunteer extension 
workers). World Neighbors was also assisting the El Quetzal Agricultural 
Co-op and the Kato-Ki Savings and Loan Co-op. The Kato-Ki had offices in 
most of the pueblos and members in almost all of the aldeas in the region. 
Recent improvements in agriculture enabled many of the members to 
begin small savings accounts with the co-op. The World Neighbors 
programs encouraged saving as a means of self-reliance and as “insurance” 
against possible economic disaster (such as crop failure or an illness or 
death in the family).
Some of World Neighbors’ activities at the time of the earthquake were 
supported by OXFAM U.K., a British volag with independent affiliates in 
the United States, Belgium, Canada, and Australia. The field director, 
Reggie Norton, had served as a field representative in Managua following 
the 1972 earthquake.
The interrelationship of the organizations at the time of the earthquake 
was as follows: The Quetzal and the Kato-Ki Cooperatives were principally 
supported by the members of the co-ops themselves, with organizational, 
technical, and funding assistance from World Neighbors. World Neighbors 
was administering two integrated rural development projects, one of which, 
the San Martin Project, received its funding from OXFAM.
Immediate Post-Disaster Activities of OXFAM/World Neighbors
Immediately following the earthquake, the co-ops became the very first of 
the local organizations to respond to the people’s needs. The members 
worked to help rescue other villagers, establish communications, and 
conduct damage surveys; and they met with as many people as possible to
determine what the initial priorities were. These were transmitted to World 
Neighbors and OXFAM. Initially, the major activities of the first few days 
revolved around the need to set up a distribution system for blankets and 
medical aid, which were purchased locally. The initial success of the 
distribution program, which dispersed materials through the World 
Neighbors organization, demonstrated that it was possible to carry on large distribution schemes.
As the leaders of the cooperatives and World Neighbors programs met 
with people in the villages, they developed a list of priorities and presented 
it to the staff of OXFAM. After much discussion, three priority areas were delineated:
1. Financial assistance to buy small silos to protect the grains that had been left 
exposed by the earthquake. In Guatemala, farmers traditionally store their corn 
and wheat in one room of their house. Thus when the house was destroyed, 
they needed a new place to store and protect what could be salvaged.
2. Re-establishment of the markets. The farmers felt that there would not be 
enough aid for everyone, and it was important to have a market so they 
could sell their grams. They were also worried about the importing and 
ree distribution of grams by some relief organizations, which they feared
would flood the market and reduce the prices on their grains.
3. Assistance in rebuilding housing. The number one priority of the people 
here was clearly lamina. Before the earthquake, people with sufficient 
resources were buying lamina, and it had a high level of prestige and 
cultural acceptance. Lamina can be erected very quickly, does not use a great 
deal of wood for support compared with alternative materials, and is 
relatively safe. It can be used in a provisional shelter and then reused in the
permanent house. People placed a high priority on roofing for two reasons:
It was clear that the heavy tiles commonly used had killed many 
people when they fell off the roof during the quake. It was plain that 
the houses that had lamina had withstood the earthquake in greater 
numbers than those with tile;
There were only two and one-half months until the beginning of the 
rainy season, and people wanted some sort of roofing material that 
would provide shelter quickly and could then be incorporated into a permanent structure.
Other roofing materials (such as straw and asbestos cement sheets) were 
explored but rejected for a variety of technical, cultural, and practical
reasons. Thus a major purchasing and distribution plan for lamina was drawn up.
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Several other important issues arose early. First was the determination of 
the people and area to be served. The co-ops wanted to distribute the lamina 
only to their own members. They felt that if they served everyone, there 
would be no incentive for people to join the co-op, and they wanted to use 
the program to help strengthen the co-op.
OXFAM and World Neighbors countered by saying that the co-op 
should serve the entire area, thereby demonstrating a commitment to 
helping everyone and demonstrating the value of the organization. This 
would increase popularity and thus membership. The agencies also pointed 
out that there would be ample resources to serve everyone. Co-op leaders 
were afraid that if they did not agree, the agencies would start an 
independent program that could eventually supersede the co-ops in 
importance, thereby reducing their effectiveness. The leaders therefore 
finally agreed to serve all the people in the area. Later, they further agreed 
to extend services to co-op members who resided outside the area.
Description of Housing before the Earthquake
An understanding of the housing before the earthquake helps us to 
understand the reasons why different elements of the reconstruction 
program came into being. First, housing in the area failed not because of 
the materials used, but because of the manner in which they were used. 
Houses had high walls, heavy roofs, load-bearing walls, and were un­
balanced. An analysis of the damage showed that in only a very few cases 
did the adobe itself fail; rather, the houses came down because they were 
not built to resist earthquakes. If people undertook a self-help housing 
program, they would have to teach better construction methods.
In several of the villages, a type of construction known as bajareque was 
used. Bajareque closely resembles the wattle-and-daub method of con­
struction. Bamboo poles or small sticks are placed in horizontal rows on 
either side of vertical poles and attached by special vines, wire, or nails. The 
bajareque-type structure is indigenous to the area and employs a method 
dating back to the pre-Colombian period. While it is not entirely 
earthquake-resistant, a house of bajareque construction with a lightweight 
roof of grass or lamina stood remarkably well.
In the project area, people traditionally built evolutionary structures; that 
is, the house starts with one or two rooms and gradually, over the years, 
more are added. By the time the structure attains its final form, it has 
undergone a number of changes, evolving from a small square structure 
into a longer, rectangular building and then, especially in the pueblos, into 
an L-shaped structure. With each addition, the balance of the house 
changes, and its ability to resist an earthquake is lessened.
Studies of housing in earthquake reconstruction programs have indicated 
that the houses built after disasters also follow this evolutionary process. 
Following an earthquake, people initially rebuild with lighter materials. As 
time passes, however, the earthquake is forgotten and the traditional 
materials again become prominent. Gradually, the housing is virtually identical to what was destroyed.
This underscored the need for construction of a strong, earthquake- 
resistant frame and for teaching better construction methods from the very 
outset of the reconstruction period.
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Setting up Programa Kuchuba'I
A housing committee was set up consisting of one representative from 
OXFAM, one from World Neighbors, and a consultant from INTERTECT. 
The first step was establishing an overall policy for the program. The policy contained these provisions:
1. The program was to be controlled by the local people.
2. The program must use and be supportive of the local organizations, as 
well as the natural coping mechanisms of the society.
3. The structures to be built must use materials, skills, and techniques normally available.
4. The structures must be affordable for local people.
5. The choice of whether or not to build, or even to use the earthquake- 
resistant principles, must be left up to the individual.
There were many comments about the last policy because the OXFAM/ 
World Neighbors program did not use its resources to build houses for 
people, or attempt to force people to incorporate earthquake-resistant 
building techniques into their houses. Other organizations built houses 
according to pre-set plans, developed without the participation of the 
people in the design process. There was also some resentment from the 
victims themselves because Programa Kuchuba’I would not build them 
houses as the others were doing. OXFAM and World Neighbors remained 
adamant, however, that the decision to build and the choice of materials 
and techniques should remain with the home owner.
Goals and Objectives
The next step was to develop a set of goals for the program and to develop a 
methodology for meeting them. The initial program evolved as follows: 1
1. The first component of the housing program was the lamina dis­
tribution program. Later, additional materials, such as wood preservatives,
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A Guatemalan takes his lamina home. (Photo: Dave Collins/Save the Children)
nails, and other construction materials were provided through the materials 
distribution network.
Most of the items distributed through the network were provided at a 
subsidized price. Wood was sold at cost; everything else was sold at one-half 
of the wholesale price.
2. An extensive program would be undertaken to teach better con­
struction methods. This program would consist of four parts:
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Training the local builders;
Training new extensionists and promotores in the housing skills; 
Training existing staff in the housing skills;
Training, as time permitted, other interested groups and voluntary 
Training, as time permitted, other interested groups 
and voluntary agencies working in the area.
The primary emphasis of the training program was on local albaniles 
(masons) and carpinteros (carpenters). These were the people already 
respected in the community as builders, who in the long run would be 
asked for advice and whose recommendations and actions would be 
followed. The advantage of concentrating on albaniles was that they already 
knew how to build; thus all they would need was training in how to use 
earthquake-resistant techniques. Also, by concentrating on the albaniles the 
project would support the local building process, as it would be improving 
skills and supporting the builders. Albaniles were selected as instructors to 
teach the building techniques to others.
Secondary emphasis was placed on the training of extensionists There 
were two groups of World Neighbors-trained agricultural extensionists, one 
in San Martin and one in Tecpan. They were to receive additional training
A local builder explains techniques for housing construction. (Photo: World Neighbors)
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Local builders participate in building a safe house to learn better building techniques. 
(Photo: Mary McKay/World Neighbors)
so they could teach earthquake-resistant construction in addition to their 
other work. But because they were not builders, it was also necessary that 
they receive instruction in basic construction techniques.
3. A program of building model structures throughout the program area 
was undertaken to provide:
On-the-job training for builders and extensionists;
Model houses showing the earthquake-resistant principles 
and demonstrating that local materials could be used safely;
Limited housing for persons within the program area who were 
unable to reconstruct their own dwellings, for example, widows and 
the elderly;
Housing for the program and co-op staff;
Community buildings to provide meeting halls for villages.
The last two merit special attention. The question of staff housing 
became an issue early on. Some felt that it might appear as if the staff were 
taking advantage of the program to better their own interests. The program 
felt that because the staff were community leaders, their living in houses 
that used the new construction techniques would encourage others to 
follow suit. It was also felt that because they were working with the 
program, they did not have time to devote to their own housing, and
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therefore it would be a nice gesture to provide some help in rebuilding. It 
was stipulated, however, that they provide or pay for the materials, while 
the program would provide the labor.
The community centers were also debated. The consultants felt from 
their experience that all the demonstration structures should be houses. 
The other members of the committee, and the representatives of the 
communities, argued that community centers were needed in each of the 
villages to serve as a focal point for community organization, and that 
building them was an activity in which the whole village would participate. 
Furthermore, since they would be used frequently, a greater number of 
people would be exposed to the construction techniques.
4. A program of technical assistance would be provided to the villagers 
and albaniles. The objectives were:
To work out problems with the new construction techniques arising 
from the use of local materials;
To work out problems arising from the introduction of new building 
materials.
5. A program to advise local groups on proper salvage techniques and to 
demonstrate proper techniques of inspection, recovery, storage, and repair 
of materials salvaged from the ruins was instituted. Where possible, model 
salvage projects were to be carried out to demonstrate these techniques.
There were several factors that would assist the proposed housing 
program. First, local groups were functioning well, especially the co-op 
organizations supported by World Neighbors. Informal organizations, 
such as the extended families and ad hoc groups, were also beginning to get 
together to discuss reconstruction. Especially impressive was the way local 
leaders had responded to the emergency. The lamina distribution program 
just beginning was working smoothly, and it became obvious that many 
people not previously associated with the co-op had turned to it as a place 
where their ideas and needs would get a fair hearing.
Also on the plus side was the fact that local builders were anxious to learn 
how to build earthquake-resistant houses. Many of the builders had already 
discussed how they should confront the problem of rebuilding. They knew 
economics would force most people to rebuild with adobe, and they 
wanted to know how to build safe houses.
There was a wide range of literacy among the builders. Some could read 
or write Spanish fairly well and even interpret technical drawings, but 
others had no formal education and had learned their building skills 
through apprenticeship and on-the-job training. Thus the program had to 
develop new methods of communicating these skills to people at vastly 
different levels of literacy.
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Initial Organization of the Program
While the program was being set up, several events occurred that 
influenced the organizational structure of the Programa Kuchuba’l.
Two weeks after the earthquake, volag representatives met with the new 
National Emergency Committee and outlined their future plans. The NEC 
suggested that each agency be given responsibility for defined areas, and 
two days later, OXFAM submitted a plan outlining the lamina sales program 
and the areas it proposed to cover. The plan was accepted by the NEC, and 
OXFAM was designated as the authority responsible for relief and 
reconstruction in the aldeas and rural areas of San Martin Jilotepeque, 
Tecpan, San Jose Poaquil, and the pueblos, aldeas, and rural areas of Santa 
Apolonia.
It was felt that the organization of the program should reflect each one of 
the areas. However, the Kato-Ki and El Quetzal Co-ops had been working 
in areas other than those covered by the agreement. Therefore, it was 
decided that a special branch of the program would be set up for these 
memhers.
During the emergency, there were essentially two staffs. One had 
headquarters in Guatemala City, where it maintained contact with the 
government and other volags, as well as procured materials. The second 
was the housing committee, which was located in Antigua. Generally, those 
in the city were OXFAM staff, those in Antigua, World Neighbors. Due to 
problems in communication and differences in ideas, each moved in 
different directions, and it became difficult to coordinate their activities and 
operations. By the end of the fourth week, it was necessary to establish a 
coordinating body to provide leadership and direction.
A month after the earthquake, a meeting of the key program people was 
held in Guatemala City. The new program—called Programa Kuchuba’l 
(Cakchiquel for “working together”)— ajoint effort of OXFAM and a union 
of World Neighbors programs and cooperatives, was officially established. 
A formal table of organization was adopted and a board, made up of the 
key project personnel plus representatives from the local people, was 
established. Many of the personnel in the pre-earthquake programs were 
incorporated into Programa Kuchuba’l and were expected to carry out dual 
roles, with the understanding that as reconstruction activities waned, they 
would return to their normal activities. Materials distribution was assigned 
to the cooperatives; the housing education program was to be carried out 
by a new housing office in charge of coordination, production of 
educational materials, and technical innovations; and the training of 
albahiles was under the supervision of World Neighbors.
The initial structure of Programa Kuchuba’l is shown on page 175.
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Evolutionary Changes and Operational Problems
Various parts of Programa Kuchuba’l continued to operate several years 
after the earthquake. As time from the earthquake increased and the 
communities returned to some degree of normalcy, various projects were 
phased out and emphasis shifted to others. For example, as the people 
recovered economically and markets were restored, the materials dis­
tribution program was de-emphasized.
The most important change was an adaptation of the overall program to 
the time frame of reconstruction. Originally, it was estimated that 
reconstruction would take two years, and most of the activities were 
scheduled so they would take place during this period. However, one factor 
was not considered. In every country, there is a traditional building season; 
that is, a time when the climate permits construction and people have the 
combination of time, money, and materials to devote to housing. If any one 
of the three elements is not present, then people will not be able to 
build.
The earthquake struck Guatemala during the building season. In most 
cases, people had some money (from crops) and because of the materials 
distribution program, they had access to materials. However, they did not 
have the time, for they spent that time recovering from the shock of the 
earthquake and tending to their normal economic and agricultural tasks, 
which they viewed as a greater priority. Most of the people built makeshift 
structures that would get them through the remainder of the year and into 
the middle of the following year.
Most relief agencies concentrated their housing activities in the im­
mediate post-disaster period in an attempt to build as many houses as 
possible before the rainy season, which came three months later. By the end 
of the rainy season (nine months after the earthquake), most agencies had 
completed their activities.
A year later, at the end of the harvest, many people were ready to begin 
construction, for they then had the time as well as the materials and the 
money. But most of the housing assistance available immediately after the 
disaster was gone. In order to meet this increased demand, Programa 
Kuchuba’l had to adapt to work within the people’s time frame, not the 
limits of the OXFAM/World Neighbors funding period.
This cycle of heavy (and increased) demand repeated itself a year later, 
and the agencies realized that reconstruction would take many years longer 
than estimated and that the funds for reconstruction would soon wane. 
Thus the agencies sought and emphasized self-supporting activities that 
would continue after funding ceased.
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Most of the functional changes occurred in the housing education 
component. The most important of these concerned the method of 
teaching and the target group. Initially, the new building methods were 
conveyed in a different manner in each area. In Tecpan, Santa Apolonia, 
and Poaquil, classes were given for albaniles in each community, while in 
San Martin emphasis was on teaching the World Neighbors’ extensionists, 
who would then try to teach the individual families. Both approaches had 
their drawbacks, so an alternative, more personal, method was tried. In 
July, a vocational school for albaniles was set up at central points in the 
project area. Emphasis was shifted from general classes on earthquake- 
resistant techniques to a more thorough curriculum covering all aspects of 
housing construction and the skills required. During this time, emphasis 
also changed from teaching the maestros de obra and families to turning out 
new albaniles.
Because the staff intended to place as much of the program as possible in 
the hands of the local people, World Neighbors appointed the chief 
instructor as director of the housing education project, replacing the World 
Neighbors’ staff person (an American). A superb and highly respected 
maestro de obra who had quickly grasped the new concepts, he nevertheless 
was not prepared for the administrative aspects of the position, nor in 
practice could he continue both to teach and administrate. When this 
became obvious, World Neighbors felt obligated to step in and reassume 
control, causing a small crisis of confidence and briefly undermining the 
respect in which World Neighbors was held as a result of its stated goal of 
local management. Looking back, there is no doubt that the chief instructor 
could have taken over the directorate later had he been given a chance to 
acquire the skills, but the experience points out the need to balance 
idealism with common sense.
Another operational problem that continued to hamper the program was 
the lack of available Guatemalan technical expertise. Despite several efforts 
to recruit local engineers and architects to work with Kuchuba’I, none were 
found who were familiar with traditional construction. Thus the consultants 
(INTERTECT) were retained for a series of one-month visits at three-month 
intervals to check on progress. The result was that if a technical problem 
arose, a decision was delayed until the consultants returned. The lesson 
here is that either the agencies must develop their in-house capabilities or if 
local expertise cannot be found, should contract long-term consultancies.
A situation arose in the first year that affected all the agencies and the 
attitudes of the local people toward foreign assistance. The National 
Emergency Committee (NEC) encouraged each voluntary agency to 
undertake reconstruction in a designated area, instead of duplicating efforts
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throughout the affected region. The purpose of this policy was to avoid 
overlapping of resources, to help distribute aid to all regions, and to assist 
the voluntary agencies in raising money, as the policy would allow each 
organization to describe a defined area to its donors where they could see 
the results of their contributions.
Despite its intent, the assignment of areas had negative implications. 
First, not all the relief organizations were made subject to the same type of 
agreement. Some agencies received authorization to work in the entire 
country. This issue caused strain between groups working in the same 
area.
Second, the government made no effort to check out the ability of the 
organizations undertaking the commitment to rebuild various towns. For 
example, Chimaltenango, which is a major town of 35,000 people, was 
assigned to an organization based in California. It was not a volag, but a 
small group of businessmen who were involved in relief primarily for tax 
purposes, and were not capable of carrying out any type of reconstruction 
program, or even of raising a substantial amount of money for assistance. 
In fact, when these businessmen committed themselves to rebuild 
Chimaltenango, they did not even know where the city was located!
The assignment of areas might have had some benefits had NEC thought 
more about the division and assignment of agencies throughout the 
country. However, the policy created competition between agencies, 
generating more negative than positive results. The problem was that the 
policy created inequities in the distribution of relief and reconstruction aid. 
The level of assistance provided in each area was different, and many 
agencies distributed aid under differing requirements and policies. For 
example, some agencies sold lamina at subsidized prices, some gave it away 
free, and some instituted lamina-for-work programs. Thus local people 
resented certain programs. This was especially a problem when one agency 
sold materials while the agency in the adjacent area provided them free.
The letter of commitment between the government and each organiza­
tion left the impression that the volag was given sole responsibility for 
reconstruction in the assigned area, and many agencies took this pledge 
quite literally. One organization, in fact, issued an order to its assigned 
village to stop all reconstruction activity until the agency could figure out 
what to do.
There is one way in which the system could have been improved. Had 
the NEC, and later the National Reconstruction Committee (NRC), 
established uniform reconstruction policies (for example, setting a standard 
policy for sales of lamina), this would have done away with many of the 
inequities of the system.
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From the very beginning, the OXFAM staff in Guatemala City was active 
in trying to get the government to adopt a uniform policy for the 
distribution of lamina. OXFAM had already decided that it would subsidize 
its sales and felt that this policy should be adopted by the government or at 
least by all the foreign relief agencies. The government rejected the idea 
initially, for it felt that the victims should not have to pay for anything. After 
a number of discussions with the OXFAM staff, however, the government 
changed its mind and requested voluntary agencies to follow such a policy. 
Most refused to go along. Some pointed out that, in their advertising, they 
promised not to sell materials. In some cases materials had been donated 
under laws or agreements that expressly prohibited sales. Therefore, they 
were bound to donate the materials. This impasse caused problems for the 
organizations that were selling materials or teaching improved construc­
tion. Even those that had been working in Guatemala for a long time were 
severely criticized because they would not give away the materials or build 
complete houses as areas in neighboring agencies were doing. People even 
stayed away from Programa Kuchaba’l’s educational efforts in the hope that 
it would get OXFAM and World Neighbors to change their policy (Froman 
et al. 1977).
THE UNIQUE ASPECTS OF PROGRAMA KUCHUBA'L
The three things that made Programa Kuchuba’I unique were the high 
degree of citizen participation and involvement at all levels of the program, 
the educational component, and the sophisticated strategies for utilizing 
project funds.
Involvement of the People and Reinforcement of Local Institutions
Programa Kuchuba’I had one of the highest degrees of participation of any 
program in Guatemala. From the very beginning, and at every level, 
OXFAM and World Neighbors stressed that the people were to be involved 
in planning and carrying out the program. Planning and management of 
the program were accomplished through the junta directivo (joint directorate), 
which was made up of representatives from each of the participating 
organizations (OXFAM, World Neighbors, the co-ops, and the World 
Neighbors-supported extension programs). The head of each of the 
projects (housing, block making, and road construction) usually attended, 
but could not vote. Decisions were made collectively, though the OXFAM 
director undoubtedly had a larger influence because OXFAM provided the 
majority of funds.
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At the community level, participation by each aldea was a prerequisite for 
initiating program activities. The program staff visited each village and 
offered to hold a class on safe construction and to discuss the program. 
After the class, the community exchanged ideas on how the techniques 
could be disseminated and how they themselves would participate. The 
staff explained that the program would assist a village only if invited, and if 
the community would provide the site, most of the construction materials, 
and the labor. In turn, the program would provide any construction 
materials that had to be purchased outside the community.
Each village selected one albanil or other suitable candidate to receive 
training in how to build a safe structure. (While in training, each builder 
received a salary from the program, since no villager could afford to donate 
a month’s work.) After training, the builder would return to the community 
and supervise a crew of volunteer builders in the construction of a 
demonstration building (usually a village meeting hall). All decisions 
concerning the meeting hall, plus the organization for supplying labor and 
materials, were the responsibility of the village. Since the community 
provided most of the materials, the villagers had to decide what size and 
shape of building they were willing to build. Also, the villagers had to 
discuss what building materials would be used by the majority of people in 
that community, and decide what type of wall construction they wanted (the 
majority of buildings were made of adobe de canto, a type of construction 
where the adobes are placed on their sides, or bajareque, a form of 
construction using mud and cane).
Thus at the community level, it is clear that the program not only stressed 
local decision making and involvement, but further reinforced the existing 
community structures (coping mechanisms) and supported the local 
builders, while at the same time improving and contributing to their 
skills.
At the grass roots level, the choice was up to each family whether or not 
to use the techniques prescribed, and whether or not to use one of the 
albahiles trained in the program. Thus the ultimate accountability for these 
decisions was in the hands of each family.
From the onset of the program, it was obvious that many of the rural 
families could not afford to hire a trained albanil to build their houses. To 
give those families who wished to use the methods an opportunity to do so, 
a strategy was worked out that would reduce the total cost of construction, 
yet still support the local builders. Grupos Kuchuba’les, or mutual aid groups, 
were set up. Each group consisted of five families who agreed to work 
together, first building one house, then another until all five families had a 
new house. Each agreed to follow as closely as possible the recom-
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A Kuchuba'I Group works together to rebuild a house in a disaster area. (Photo: World 
Neighbors)
mendations for earthquake-resistant housing promoted by the program. A  
program-trained builder was assigned to each Kuchuba’I group to supervise 
the construction and teach each of the men the proper techniques.
By the end of the cycle, all five houses were relatively safe and all five new 
homeowners had become competent at this form of construction. Because 
no two houses were exactly alike, the builders were able to see ways in 
which different design and configuration problems were resolved. They 
also benefited from organizing and working in a mutual aid group at such a 
small scale. Thus at this level, the program was able to strengthen small- 
scale community organization further as well as help build self-reliance.
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Housing Education Component
The housing education program that developed was the first attempt to use 
housing education as an approach to reconstruction following a major 
disaster. It was unique in giving priority to long-term objectives. The use of 
low-cost indigenous materials and support of the normal building 
“profession” and processes were also unique and key elements.
In earthquake reconstruction, there are three basic possibilities for 
housing assistance to victims. First, to provide people with the resources, 
money, or materials to rebuild; second, to provide a replacement house for 
the one destroyed; or third, to work within the usual system for building 
houses and teach better building methods.
Each of these approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages. If 
resources alone are provided, the programs are not complicated and 
overheads are low. As far as safety is concerned, however, people will 
probably rebuild the same types of houses as before and the long-term 
problem of vulnerability will not be resolved. If the second approach is 
chosen, the relief agency will either have to develop a large architectural 
and engineering staff to meet the design needs of different families, or select 
a few standardized buildings and mass-produce them, thereby eliminating 
each family’s participation in the design process. Furthermore, con­
struction of whole houses entails a much larger financial commitment to 
each house and substantially reduces the number of people served by the 
project.OXFAM and World Neighbors chose the third approach. Their choice 
was based on the belief that there was a need to improve technical 
construction skills to enable local people to build effectively and safely in a 
country that is extremely prone to earthquakes. They wanted to ensure that 
the local, rural people could provide themselves with earthquake-resistant 
houses, not only during reconstruction, but long into the future.
In order for the housing education program to work, four steps were 
necessary. First, the technical solutions to the problems of vulnerability had 
to be worked out. At the time, there was not much literature available to the 
voluntary agencies. What was available was either too technical or suggested 
impractical solutions. There was no information available about the 
bajareque structures, approximately one-third of those in the rural areas. 
Within Guatemala, there were no professionals to whom the program could 
turn for advice. Even at the national universities, traditional structures and 
materials were not included in the curriculum of the engineering and 
architectural schools, even though 90 percent of the buildings, and those 
most vulnerable, were of these types. Thus, to obtain the technical
d
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A relief agency worker illustrates safe construction sites. (Photo: World Neighbors)
information necessary and to have expert advice, the program was forced to 
hire housing consultants.
The consultants immediately set out to develop practical guidelines and 
techniques for modification of housing. The technical information available 
was reduced to simple principles, and several test structures were built to 
decide how these methods could be incorporated into practical con­
struction. Based on these ideas, a number of simple, practical manuals were 
developed to illustrate these techniques. The manuals were prepared for 
the general public as well as for those who would do the actual con­
struction.
The next step was to convince the public to accept the techniques. To do 
this, classes were given in each of the communities. The classes attempted 
to explain how earthquakes affect houses and how houses could be 
modified to withstand the forces. If people showed interest, a demon­
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stration structure (described earlier) was erected. Throughout the program, 
efforts were made to convince the public to use these methods. Wall 
posters, leaflets, public meetings, and private talks with individual families 
building new houses were all a part of the promotion effort.
At the same time, it was necessary to teach the local builders the new 
techniques. By participating in the general classes given to the community, 
the builders’ interest was aroused. Some were then selected to participate in 
the construction of the demonstration building and had a chance to learn 
first-hand the various techniques. The construction of only one building, 
however, proved to be inadequate, and soon it was obvious that a more 
detailed program would have to be set up to offer vocational training for 
local builders.
The training of the builders was the part of the program most 
emphasized over the years. At first, training was directed toward the 
experienced and established builders, especially those who had attained the 
status of maestro de obra. In the first few weeks after the earthquake, there was 
intense interest among these men and participation in the program was 
high. As reconstruction progressed, however, the demand for trained 
builders in all types of construction rose, as did the salaries offered, and 
many went to work on more sophisticated programs, or moved to 
Guatemala City where they could obtain a salary much higher than that in 
the rural areas.
Thus the training program began to focus its attention on vocational 
training for less-experienced tradesmen or new builders. By the end of the 
first year, vocational courses were established at centers in San Martin, 
Tecpan, and Poaquil. Over the months, the range of topics expanded from 
adobe and bajareque into some of the more contemporary types of 
construction, including brick and cement block.
The training program was able to combine theoretical classes with 
supervised practical experience. Each of the student builders had an 
opportunity to participate in construction in either the community 
buildings or houses built as part of the Grupos Kuchuba’les.
In the later stages of the program, a new element was added to the 
vocational training. The housing staff formed a construction company that 
would hire the graduates of the program, so that they could continue to 
work under the supervision of the chief instructors and hone their skills 
while continuing to help people rebuild their houses. Furthermore, some 
of the albaniles were able to participate in the management of the company, 
which further added to their capabilities. The construction company now 
operates without any assistance from Programa Kuchuba’l. Thus it has
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become a way of continuing the work without further input from the 
voluntary agencies.
Financial Strategies
The innovative financial strategies used centered on the materials dis­
tribution programs. The basic tenet of the OXFAM and World Neighbors 
staff was that free aid was not to be given out beyond the actual emergency 
period.
Thus the program had to establish a policy for distribution that would be 
both equitable and at the same time serve those who most needed the 
material.
Three alternatives were discussed:
1. Gifts. Some proposed that lamina be distributed as a gift to all families, 
regardless of their economic status.
The weaknesses of this approach were:
a. If materials were provided free of charge, the program would end 
once they were distributed and funds ran out. Because lamina and 
other construction materials were expensive, and because funds were 
limited, the agencies’ ability to cover a wide area would be re­
stricted.
b. A strong feeling existed among groups with experience working 
in Guatemala that giving things away was not harmonious with 
ongoing development programs in the area and that recipients would 
lose their sense of dignity as the result of a “charity” approach.
However, one of the strengths of the charity approach, theoretically, was 
the people who simply could not afford to buy lamina, such as widows, the 
elderly, and others left destitute by the disaster, would still receive roofing 
materials.
2. Long-term loans. Proponents of this approach argued that people did 
not have cash to spend on roofing materials right away, but could pay the 
full costs of the materials plus interest and administrative charges on a long­
term basis.
The problems with this approach were:
a. The staff estimated that the loans would cost about 30 percent to 
administer just in the first year.
b. The repayment of loans under these circumstances was doubtful. 
By making unrealistic loans, the program could undermine the rural 
credit system that had been built up over the years.
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c. It was felt that there were no existing rural credit facilities capable 
of providing this type of service on the large scale required.
d. The people did not like to borrow, because they believed that 
their land would be confiscated if they did not repay.
3. Subsidized sales. Under this approach, it was proposed that lamina be 
sold to people at a significantly reduced rate, about 50 percent of cost.
The advantages of this approach were:
a. Lamina could be supplied to twice the population covered under 
give-away plans, since the money paid could be reinvested in further 
lamina purchases.
b. The choice of whether or not to buy lamina (as opposed to other 
available roofing materials), as well as some choice regarding gauge, 
size, and quantity, was left to the consumer.
c. The method would turn over cash immediately.
d. It would be relatively simple to administer. Costs, complexity of 
administration, and problems of distribution would be minimal.
e. The consumer would be involved in a commercial transaction, 
not a charity scheme.
The most apparent weakness of this system was that there were people 
who could not afford to pay for lamina at any price.
After much discussion, the following plan was laid out:
1. To make lamina available at roughly a 50 percent subsidy price.
2. To undertake surveys at a later date, to ascertain which families were 
not able to acquire lamina through the subsidy system. For those who could 
not afford to purchase lamina, either:
a. A lamina-for work program would be set up for families who 
could work.
b. A gift of the lamina would be made to families who could not 
work.
After March 15, all distribution was taken over by the Kato-Ki Co-op. In 
return for its services, the cooperative received a per-sheet commission, 
which covered its expenses and overhead, and included a small profit. Each 
family was permitted to purchase ten sheets of lamina at the subsidized 
price.
Although the cooperative provided this service, sales were open to all (in 
the assigned area).
The decision to sell materials presented the program with two additional 
problems. The first was how to provide work, and of what type, so that 
people who wanted materials but truly could not afford to purchase them 
could earn the money needed. Second, the total amount of money being 
paid for the materials represented a sizable percentage of the cash available 
to the poor after the disaster. The staff was concerned about the
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consequences of taking such a substantial sum out of the community at this 
critical period, and therefore a method to return the cash had to be 
developed.
Once the initial distribution was completed, and most had purchased 
their first allotment of lamina, a number of people proposed that the money 
returned from the sales be placed back into the communities in a series of 
work programs. It was suggested that the reflow funds be turned over to the 
communities, based on the amount of lamina purchased, so that this money 
could be used to finance local or village projects of their own choosing.
Others felt that the money from the sales should continue to be 
reinvested in materials so that more would be available to each family. They 
noted that the initial allotment was only enough to build very small 
dwellings, and most people needed two to three times the amount currently 
being offered to rebuild a house of normal size. They felt that if other funds 
could be obtained for a work program, the reflow funds should continue to 
be designated for materials. When sales were completed, any money left 
over could be used by the cooperatives to help them develop further their 
services to members and the community.
Because other funds could be obtained in this case, it was decided that 
the reflow funds would continue to be reinvested in materials. OXFAM 
obtained another grant to initiate the work program.
The type of work program to offer also provoked a discussion. Some 
continued to push for letting each community decide how to spend the 
money. Others countered that if the money was made available to the 
communities, it would be used to finance projects normally carried out by 
the people voluntarily, thus destroying a tradition that was felt to be one of 
the most positive aspects of the rural social system.1
Finally, for practical as well as philosophical reasons, people decided to 
upgrade and improve rural roads. Most of the roads in the area are not 
hard-surfaced. If surfaced at all, they are covered with gravel. Few of the 
roads have provisions for adequate drainage, and many are virtually 
impassable during the rainy season. Also, many of the roads to the smaller 
aldeas are not wide enough for trucks or buses, and the people have to carry 
most of their crops into the towns in order to sell them. After consultations 
with the program staff, the co-op, and the alcaldes and their auxiliaries in 
each of the municipios, it was decided that Kuchuba’I would undertake a road 
improvement program to try to make the principal roads in the project
1. In actual practice, this concern was unfounded. Several other programs that sold 
materials, for example, the Save the Children programs in Joyabaj and Quiche, turned 
the money directly over to the communities to let them use as they wished for municipal 
projects. The projects they chose were innovative and not those normally carried out bv 
volunteer labor.
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By improving roads, Programma Kuchuba'I provided jobs and cash for reconstruction 
and made a contribution to the economic development of the rural areas. (Photo: 
World Neighbors)
area into all-weather roads capable of taking intermediate to large-size 
trucks.
The advantages of the plan were that several objectives could be attained 
in addition to returning the cash.
New, simple techniques for improving and maintaining rural roads were 
demonstrated, increased access to the region was provided, which would 
have a long-term beneficial economic impact, and bus service to many 
small communities could be extended. Thus long-term benefits (develop­
ment objectives) could also be accrued.
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMA KUCHUBA'L
A method for analyzing programs can be found by working back through 
the criteria presented in the first part of the chapter. To complete our 
review of Programa Kuchuba’I, we will use these criteria as a “yardstick” for 
measuring the program.
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Approach and Style
To begin with, OXFAM and World Neighbors chose a program approach to 
address the problems in the aftermath of the earthquake. It evolved as a 
single-sector program, concentrating on housing reconstruction. (Even 
though road building was included, its objective was to support activities in 
the housing sector.) Though the program is classified as a single-sector 
program, objectives in other sectors were attained as a result of project 
activities.
The style of the program changed as the program moved along. 
Originally, housing reconstruction was seen as a relatively short-term 
endeavor, and it was felt that all the objectives could be met during the 
initial funding period. When it became obvious that reconstruction would 
continue for a long period of time, more emphasis was placed on self- 
supporting activities that would help meet the objectives after the program 
officially terminated. Thus the style changed from “development through 
disaster” to “planting the seed.”
Contributions
By evaluating the impact of the program, we can see the short- and long­
term contributions. They indicate a program with a high, beneficial impact 
on the community. In the short-term, the program helped alleviate the 
burden of reconstruction by providing materials that reduced the overall 
cost of rebuilding. Throughout the course of the program, the staff and the 
project activities supported the local coping mechanisms. Programa 
Kuchuba’I worked through the cooperatives, the local, traditional 
governing bodies, and the committees established by the government 
following the earthquake. In terms of local processes, Kuchuba’I supported 
the local builders and enhanced their capabilities.
Because Programa Kuchuba’I chose to work at the same pace as the other 
reconstruction activities in the community, it was not able to reduce the 
time between the disaster and full recovery. Its activities, however, did not 
prolong the time.
The long-term contribution is also clear. Throughout the program, 
development objectives were stressed and, especially for those involved 
directly in the various project activities, permanent new opportunities were 
provided. Spin-off activities, such as the road improvement project, 
contributed to other development objectives, especially in the economic 
sector. Contracting the cooperatives as the agent for the materials
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distribution program helped to strengthen these institutions and enhance 
their standing in the community.
Finally, Programa Kuchuba’l has helped to reduce the vulnerability of the 
people to a future earthquake disaster by improving the housing stock and 
developing the capacity of the local builders to construct safer housing.
Program Planning
The staff of Programa Kuchuba’l addressed each problem and aspect of the 
program cautiously, discussing each option thoroughly, and thus avoiding 
many of the common pitfalls in program planning. The process was 
informal, but with guidance from the experienced OXFAM field director 
and advice from the consultant, the staff developed a structured program. 
The only weakness was poor conceptualization. Each staff member had his 
or her own perception of the objectives and despite numerous attempts to 
bring the diverse concepts into harmony and quantify the goals, the overall 
focus was not attained until several months after the program was 
underway. The other aspects of the planning process, however, more than 
made up for this deficiency. Policies to guide the program were set and 
generally adhered to. Involvement of the beneficiaries in all aspects and at 
all levels of the program was extensive. There were multiple strategies for 
achieving the overall objectives, and a fairly well-balanced program 
evolved. The scale of the program proved to be adequate and well suited to 
the size of the population. Technical inputs in both the housing con­
struction and road improvement programs were both adequate and 
appropriate to the technological level of the people.
Concern about the possible impact of each of the activities was a constant 
element of project planning. People were especially concerned to avoid any 
type of project activity that would create a dependency. The first housing 
education program coordinator, Mary McKay, discussed this aspect in a 
paper presented at the Oxford Conference on Disasters and Small 
Dwellings in March of 1978:
We were concerned about an attitude of dependency. It is generally accepted that 
those most affected by disasters are the poorest sectors of society. The typical poor 
victim’s pre-disaster attitude and conditions of dependency are implied with his 
poverty and lack of power. Therefore, especially in a disaster situation, when the 
victims have been humiliated by the natural elements, they need to be helped to 
respond in ways that stress self-confidence, self-reliance and genuine ability and skill 
in dealing with the situation. This must be contrasted with an approach where 
victims are “taken care o f ’ and decisions are made for them. To reinforce 
dependency is to reinforce the chronic problem! (McKay 1978)
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Project Execution
Programa Kuchuba’I encountered one of the most basic problems common 
to reconstruction programs—overloading. In the immediate post-disaster 
situation, the cooperatives were busy with their own priorities and unable to 
undertake adequately all the tasks the agencies requested. Thus the World 
Neighbors staff had to step in to help until the cooperatives were able to 
take on wider responsibilities. The co-ops recovered quickly, however, and 
soon took over the lamina distribution. In later stages of the distribution 
program, it was necessary to provide funds for additional staff in order to 
smooth out some of the difficulties that arose, especially in accounting and 
warehousing.
An early reliance on the World Neighbors extensionists to carry out the 
housing education component in the San Martin area overburdened them, 
and was in many ways expecting too much of men who had not had prior 
experience as albaniles. The result was that the housing education com­
ponent did not have the same impact as did others.2 These problems 
were overcome when the vocational training school for albaniles was 
established.
The project overcame most of the other problems commonly en­
countered in the execution of relief programs. By stressing education and 
involvement, the program concentrated on process, not product. The use 
of local resources, in terms of people and skills, as well as materials, was 
stressed throughout the project. And finally, by immediately providing the 
highly sought-after building materials, the program quickly moved out of 
the emergency phase toward more permanent reconstruction.
Influences
It is interesting to review the influences that helped to shape the direction 
and content of Programa Kuchuba’I. The overriding motive for involve­
ment was, of course, humanitarian concern, but the fact that World 
Neighbors and OXFAM were both on the scene when the disaster struck 
meant that they would become involved for much longer than either agency 
wished at the outset. Both organizations hoped to provide only the 
immediate emergency assistance and then return to their long-term 
development work. However, both the OXFAM and World Neighbors field 
directors reported that requests for reconstruction assistance were much
2. In all fairness to the World Neighbors extensionists, there were also other factors that 
contributed to the slow pace of reconstruction.
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higher than they had anticipated, and they realized that most development 
work would cease until reconstruction needs had been met. Because of their 
prior involvement with the communities, they felt that they could not turn 
their backs and ignore the requests for assistance.
Another factor in the agencies’ decision to become involved in re­
construction was a concern about things that were happening as a result of 
reconstruction activities.
Mary McKay reports:
World Neighbors and OXFAM faced the earthquake . . . from a perspective of 
twelve years development work in [Guatemala], We were convinced that our 
response had to be consistent with our long-term development goals of self-reliance 
and human development which had been built into our programs of soil 
conservation, agriculture, health, nutrition and leadership training, but all around 
us relief activities started taking place that we felt were in direct opposition to our 
goals of self-confidence and self-reliance . . .  in particular, outside agencies started 
building greatly subsidized houses for the survivors. The local people were 
recipients with no say in housing planning, design or the organization of [material] 
distribution. In short, many forces were at work creating a paternalistic dependence 
on material supplies from the outside, and a decision-making process originating 
outside the local community. (McKay 1978)
Thus there were three motives for intervention: humanitarian concern, a 
presence on the scene, and a felt need to defend and protect their concept 
of development in the reconstruction environment.
The resources available to the agency, as well as the resources available 
within the stricken community, shaped aspects of both the construction and 
distribution programs. Because the amount of money available to OXFAM 
was relatively limited (in terms of the number of beneficiaries), the subsidy 
scheme was seen as a practical method of extending the buying power and 
serving more people in the project area. The realization that relief agencies 
did not have the resources to build houses for everyone contributed to the 
decision to undertake a housing education program.
The approach of World Neighbors to rural development centered on the 
training and use of extensionists to introduce new items and methods. 
Experience with an education approach and the techniques of conveying 
information to rural people was their forte, and was undoubtedly a strong 
factor in steering the organization toward, and shaping the concept of, the 
housing education component.
Both organizations approached the affected community with an attitude 
of respect for the people, their institutions, and their traditions. Because of 
their pre-earthquake involvement, the agencies were able to participate as 
partners in reconstruction rather than as benefactors, and the people could 
approach the staff with problems and influence decisions. Because
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decision making was shared, the effectiveness of the program and the 
influence it had over the long term were greatly enhanced.
Epilogue
It would be nice to report that the program was still in progress, and that 
new and exciting contributions were being made. Unfortunately this is not 
so, for Kuchuba’I, like many of the other post-disaster programs, was forced 
to cease operation because of the political violence that increased steadily in 
the years following the earthquake. Many of the promotores and staff tried to 
keep a semblance of the program going amidst the turmoil and continued 
to offer technical assistance to families who were just starting to rebuild. But 
organizing the poor for collective action, even to rebuild their own houses, 
was an activity viewed with concern by many who wanted no change in the 
status quo. Several of the staff received anonymous threats and were warned 
to stop their work. In this environment, the staff met and decided quietly to 
end all formal activities. While Program Kuchuba’I is no longer in 
operation, the people who were trained and the ideas and the skills that 
were taught are still available and continue to be used. Thus the program 
will continue to make a contribution long into the future.
*


Conceptualizing Disaster Recovery
A disaster may be defined as an event that causes a temporary break in the 
normal life of a community. The time between the disaster occurrence and 
the point at which normal activities are re-established is considered the 
recovery time. The goal of both governmental and nongovernmental 
agencies is to reduce this time.
Total recovery from a disaster is measured in four ways: (1) emotional 
recovery of the victims; (2) economic recovery, including replacement of the 
income lost, the restoration of jobs and/or the means of production, and 
restoration of the markets; (3) replacement of physical losses, which 
includes replacement of personal belongings, the home, and in some cases, 
the replacement of land; and (4) replacement of opportunity.
In order to develop appropriate responses to shorten recovery time, it is 
necessary to understand three things: the pre-disaster norm, what factors 
can affect time of recovery, and the different effect of different strategies.
THE PRE-DISASTER NORM
It is necessary to know what the community was like before the disaster 
before attempting to restore that norm. It is impossible, of course, for an 
intervenor to learn everything about a society, especially in the aftermath of 
a disaster. There are key elements, though, which all intervenors should 
strive to identify and understand. The basic family structure, economic 
patterns, governmental structure, religious affiliations, customs and prac­
tices, and power relationships are important.
Each program to be undertaken also requires the interviewer to 
understand the process through which activities are accomplished. A 
housing reconstruction program, for example, requires a broad under­
standing of housing, not simply in terms of the buildings, but as a process,
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consisting of a blend of labor, skills, capital, financing, settlement patterns, 
culture, status, environmental protection, and tradition. Even in the most 
unsophisticated societies, each process has many participants, and all play 
an intricate, balanced role in the society. Parts of each process, and possibly 
later programs as well, may be jeopardized by a disaster. By failing to 
understand the elements of each community activity and their interrela­
tionships, an outsider may respond inappropriately and delay or prevent a 
return to normal.
THE FACTORS AFFECTING RECOVERY TIME
There are many factors that control the amount of time between the disaster 
and a return to normal. The following speed recovery:
1. Risk of secondary disasters. Many hazards are accompanied by second 
to structure the emergency response and to lay the groundwork for 
recovery. By planning each activity before a disaster, an agency can examine 
each thoroughly and make rational decisions without the added pressures 
of a disaster. While preparedness plans usually address immediate actions 
such as search and rescue or evacuation, plans can be expanded to provide 
guidance to structure activities in the transition and reconstruction phases. 
Plans for these phases should include development of broad objectives and 
provide a policy framework under which all agencies can operate.
2. Clarity of policy and direction. Leadership is obviously an important 
factor in the response to a disaster. One of the most important tasks for 
those in positions of authority is to provide a clear picture of goals and 
objectives, the means by which they are to be attained, and the “rules” that 
govern post-disaster actions. On the basis of these policies and standards, 
relief and reconstruction assistance can be provided in an equitable manner 
and delays resulting from indecision can be reduced. Such policies and 
directions are best developed before a disaster.
3. Collective motivation. The greatest resource following a disaster is the 
collective motivation of the people. This motivation can be translated into 
cooperative action and many opportunities for speeding recovery can be 
found.
4. Good communications. There is a need for good communications during 
all phases of a disaster. The emphasis, however, should not be on 
improving the means of communication (that is, radios and other electronic 
communications equipment), but on improving the flow of information 
and the type of information communicated. Good communication is the art 
of knowing what type of information to send; how to prepare it in such a
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way that it is relevant to the needs of those receiving it; and communicating 
with the right people.
5. Technical assistance. In any post-disaster program, there are always 
questions that need to be answered by competent technical personnel. 
This information must be available and presented in such a way that it will 
be comprehensible to those who are working at each level of the 
program.
6. Cash flow. Post-disaster programs are dependent upon an adequate 
flow of cash. Because the costs of purchasing materials on a large scale will 
be fairly high, and financial institutions are themselves likely to be 
disrupted, agencies may experience difficulty arranging credit, and many 
items or services will have to be purchased with cash. Agencies can 
anticipate these problems and develop mechanisms to avoid lengthy 
delays.
7. Reuse of salvaged materials. The salvage and reuse of materials can 
provide the infrastructure for reconstruction. In many cases, the victims can 
completely rebuild with material salvaged from the debris. By encouraging 
salvaging and providing additional complementary materials, intervenors 
can speed recovery.
The following slow recovery.
1. Risk of secondary disasters. Many hazards are accompanied by second 
events. For example, an earthquake can be followed by a series of 
secondary tremors. These may last for only a few days or for as long as 
several months. Some tremors may even be stronger than the original 
earthquake. Survivors may be reluctant to begin reconstruction or even 
salvage materials from the rubble until the threat of a secondary disaster has 
passed.
2. Uncertainty regarding possible relocation. If the victims are uncertain as to 
whether or not they can safely remain at their previous homesite or at the 
place they had moved to after the disaster, they will hesitate to engage in 
long-term activities. Uncertainty about relocation can be caused both by a 
reluctance to occupy a site that was vulnerable in the disaster and by 
uncertainty about government intentions regarding relocation or re­
settlement.
3. Delayed materials. The speed with which recovery begins depends on 
the availability of tools and materials. In almost every disaster, there are 
adequate resources for rebuilding either in the community or in the 
surrounding region. Access to these materials, however, may be reduced by 
official actions, such as evacuation or bulldozing. In those cases where 
materials are not available, reconstruction will be delayed pending arrival of
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supplies. With adequate preparedness, however, intervenors can determine 
most needs before a disaster occurs and can work out contingency 
arrangements to supply the necessary materials.
4. Conflicting expert advice. One of the major problems following a disaster 
is deciding whose advice to follow. At all levels of the disaster-affected 
community—from the government’s relief officials to the field directors of 
voluntary agencies, down to the local inhabitants themselves—people are 
constantly bombarded with information, much of it conflicting. Persons at 
all levels of the disaster relief system, and especially those with no previous 
disaster training or experience, are constantly faced with the dilemma of 
interpreting the information and deciding on its relevance to their 
situation.
This advice may not be suited to the local situation: it could be too highly 
technical; it may not be cost-effective; or it may not be culturally acceptable. 
Often the people offering the advice are not qualified to give it. Motivated 
but inexperienced volunteers provide most of the labor for relief 
operations. While the advice they give is often based on the best of 
intentions, it usually comes from preconceived ideas as to what a relief 
operation should be, not from training or experience. (When relief agencies 
send this personnel, they inadvertently legitimize their advice.) Thus 
conflicts of opinion are bound to arise.
The problem of conflicting expertise and advice can be overcome only 
through adequate pre-disaster planning and training of relief personnel at 
all decision-making levels within the relief structure.
5. Inflation and market instability. In situations where material is available, 
recovery time is influenced by its cost. If prices are not controlled and high 
inflation occurs, recovery time will increase. Similarly, an unstable market 
affected by speculation or hoarding will prolong reconstruction, as will 
excessive customs delays in cases where building materials must be 
imported.
To be effective, prices must be controlled in all parts of the market. In 
Guatemala, for example, the government failed to control the add-on 
transportation costs applied to lamina and cement. When distributing those 
commodities throughout the country, the cost of cement, which was two 
quetzales (U.S. $2.00) per bag at the factory, rose to as much as five quetzales a 
bag less than 100 kilometers from the point where it was produced.
6. Land tenure problems. Politically sensitive and among the most difficult 
factors to address are land ownership, land distribution, and legal land 
reform. After a disaster, these issues are often further complicated by such 
questions as: Should victims be assisted to rebuild on land that is not their 
own? Where should landless people be resetded? Who will provide the land
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Unsorted and often useless aid creates headaches for volunteer relief workers. (Photo: 
Laffont/Sygma)
for resettlement? These issues can all prolong recovery time unless they are 
quickly and properly addressed.
7. Public rejection of plans. Often in the rush to provide assistance, agencies 
will undertake programs without considering their acceptability to the 
victims. There are numerous examples of victims rejecting aid offered by 
intervenors, both governmental and nongovernmental. The reason may be 
that the aid is culturally unacceptable or too costly. Whatever the reasons, 
time and effort, not to mention the expense, will be lost, and the intervenor 
will have to begin again. The time lost is an extension of recovery time.
8. Surveys. While surveys can be invaluable aids to planning emergency 
or reconstruction actions, unless they are properly planned and develop 
relevant information, they can delay reconstruction activities by tying up 
personnel and resources. In some cases, actions have been delayed until 
surveys are completed. The problem is not that surveys are not needed, but 
rather the type of data that is most appropriate and the method that should 
be used to obtain it (a topic to which I will return). The loss of this time can 
mean loss of resources and commitment that would be invaluable in 
reconstruction.
9. Irrelevant aid. The arrival of massive amounts of useless relief goods, 
untrained personnel and volunteers, and untrained officials all add
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confusion to a disaster and delay recovery actions. Furthermore, the time 
and money spent sorting out and eliminating this unnecessary assistance 
cannot be recaptured.
10. Bureaucracy. Disaster response requires a streamlined decision­
making process, flexible standard operating procedures, and good internal 
communications.
HOW RELIEF STRATEGIES RELATE TO TIME OF RECOVERY
In order to understand how different types of programs affect recovery 
time, it is helpful to theorize about assistance strategies. While most relief 
and reconstruction programs have certain objectives in mind, few agencies 
go beyond that point and conceptualize their intervention in terms of 
strategies. If pressed, most intervenors would explain their aid in terms of 
its humanitarian objectives, especially that of easing the burden on the 
victims. For purposes of discussion, we can broaden this to define the two 
most common strategies; that is, to provide aid to help victims until they 
recover, and to provide aid to help them recover. The underlying concept is 
that the assistance provided will free up the victims’ own resources and 
reduce the cost (or burden). If an agency provides replacement goods, for 
example, the people can use their own money for higher priority items. 
Thus, if an agency reduces the burden on the victims, the recovery time 
should be shortened. In practice, these two strategies are usually equated to 
specific disaster phases, the first in the emergency phase, the second in 
transition and reconstruction phases.
Each of these strategies can affect recovery time. Generally speaking, 
simply helping victims until they can get going has little overall impact on 
reducing recovery time and, depending on how the aid is provided, may 
even prolong it. Programs following this strategy are usually classified as 
relief programs and are typified by such actions as distribution of food, 
clothing, household items, and tents. Helping people to recover, on the 
other hand, can demonstrably reduce recovery time. Such programs 
provide the resources needed and generally concentrate on longer-term 
objectives. For example, they may provide materials for reconstruction, 
cash or credit, and opportunities (such as work schemes) for people to 
acquire resources to balance out what assistance they receive. This strategy 
requires a bit more sophistication, but the programs are more beneficial 
and reduce the time to full recovery.
There is a third strategy that facilitates intervention in both the 
emergency as well as the subsequent transition and reconstruction phases. 
That strategy is to identify and provide those resources or actions that can 
accelerate recovery. This does not require any more sophistication than the
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second strategy, but it does require an understanding of disasters. Typical 
actions are provision of building materials for use in temporary shelters that 
can later be incorporated into permanent housing; stimulation of markets 
or the normal economic systems; and setting up work programs for victims 
that not only provide resources but also accomplish reconstruction 
objectives. In short, to accelerate the recovery process, agencies provide or 
restore the infrastructures of a community, provide the materials required, 
and make opportunities for the victims.
12
Mitigation and Preparedness
INTRODUCTION
Up until this point, we have discussed disasters in terms of reaction, both by 
the affected societies and the relief agencies. An underlying theme, 
however, has been that disasters are not unforeseen events and that the 
technology now exists to identify the hazards that threaten a community 
and to estimate the areas and the settlements that will be affected. One can 
then prepare for the disaster and substantially reduce, or mitigate, its 
impact. These two actions are known as pre-disaster planning.
Frederick Krimgold pioneered the early conceptualization of pre-disaster 
planning, which he describes as follows:
Planning may be defined as the process of preparing a set of decisions for action 
in the future directed at achieving goals by optimal means.
The stated goals of disaster relief are the reduction of human suffering, the 
improvement of material well-being, and the increase of personal security. It goes 
without saying that these goals are best served if disaster, in the first place, can be 
avoided or reduced. Thus, the primary goal of pre-disaster planning may be seen as 
the prevention or mitigation of disaster. If we refer to the definition of disaster in 
terms of the need for “outside” help, we may describe the goal of pre-disaster 
planning as the creation of self-sufficiency in dealing with natural phenomena. In 
those cases where prevention is not possible, the goal must be to plan for the 
effective application of aid. . . .  (1974)
Pre-disaster planning is the term used to describe the comprehensive range 
of efforts made to reduce the destruction and disruption of a disaster before 
it occurs. The term is intended to denote action and accurately describes 
the most important part of the actiVity—planning. This is distinctly different 
from post-disaster activities, which involve operations.
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Pre-disaster planning consists of three types of activities: disaster 
prevention, disaster mitigation, and disaster preparedness. Disaster preven­
tion focuses on the hazard that causes the disaster and tries to eliminate or 
drastically reduce its direct effects. The best example of disaster prevention 
is the construction of dams or levies to prevent flooding. As a general rule, 
prevention is expensive and the results are often far less than hoped.
Disaster mitigation focuses on measures that can be taken to minimize the 
destruction and disruptive effects of a hazard and thus lessen the 
magnitude of a disaster. Mitigation efforts offer by far the best and most 
cost-effective method for dealing with disasters. With good planning, most 
mitigation measures can be integrated with normal development activities 
at very little, sometimes no, additional cost. Some examples are: strength­
ening buildings so that they are hurricane- or earthquake-resistant; the 
planting of crops that are less affected by disasters; changing crop cycles so 
that crops mature and are harvested before the peak of a hurricane or 
rainstorm season; adoption of land-use controls to restrict development in 
high-risk areas; and development of diversified economies so that losses in 
one sector can be absorbed by others.
The underlying assumption of disaster preparedness is that disasters are no 
time to be trying to decide what to do. Preparedness focuses on developing 
plans to respond to a disaster once it threatens or has occurred. At its 
simplest, preparedness is an estimation of emergency needs and the 
identification of resources to meet those needs. A more sophisticated 
definition is that preparedness is the development of plans to structure the 
entire post-disaster response, to ensure that emergency aid is managed so 
that each activity lays the foundation for the next, and to plan the response 
so that each sector contributes in some way to the others. The first objective 
of preparedness is to get the absolute maximum benefit out of relief and to 
swiftly complete the transition from emergency assistance to rehabilitation 
and reconstruction. The second is to insure that disaster assistance makes 
the greatest possible contribution to ongoing development. Finally, 
preparedness should guide reconstruction so that it reduces vulnerability 
and mitigates a recurrence of the disaster.
People have much more experience in preparedness than in other 
pre-disaster planning activities. The best known are the development of 
warning and evacuation plans; stockpiling of supplies; developing emer­
gency plans for hospitals; improving infrastructure to support or facilitate 
emergency services; establishing emergency command, control, and com­
munications systems; training in search and rescue and first aid. Other 
measures less known but equally important include developing disaster
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assessment plans; establishing relief and reconstruction standards and 
policies; developing stand-by plans for economic assistance to victims; 
developing crop salvage and marketing plans for economic assistance to 
victims; developing crop salvage and marketing plans for small farmers; 
adopting legislation defining emergency powers; and establishing prior 
inter-governmental and/or multilateral agreements for disaster assistance to 
support the planned response.
In recent years there has been some debate among the experts about 
which activity to emphasize. In the 1950s, most of the emphasis was on 
preparedness, much of which was an unsophisticated spin-off from Cold 
War civil defense activities. In the 1960s, there was intense interest in 
prevention, fueled by the public’s enchantment with the space age and 
everything technological. In the 1970s, there was a shift toward mitigation, 
sparked by Krimgold’s writings. The pendulum seems to be moving back 
toward preparedness, though on a much more sophisticated level.
The reasons for this swing are not difficult to understand. Prevention, 
once seen as the ultimate answer to disasters, has come under growing 
criticism. While such actions as weather modification and earthquake 
control were formerly thought desirable, the more we learn about the 
purpose of these events in nature, the more likely we are to challenge the 
wisdom of preventing their occurrence on environmental and ecological 
grounds. Even such long-touted measures as flood control are now seen to 
have adverse effects, and while research continues, the emphasis has shifted 
more to mitigation and to finding ecologically suitable alternatives.
Mitigation itself is proving to be more difficult to accomplish in the Third 
World than was originally foreseen. Mitigation is a complex process, and 
many of its parts cannot be dealt with in terms of a disaster only, for they 
are also related to development.
As we have seen, disasters can be a primary cause of underdevelopment, 
as well as intertwined with a country’s progress toward development. 
Similarly, many mitigation activities either require a certain level of 
development or are themselves development activities. Third World 
countries are so affected by disaster in part because of their inability or 
failure to address the root causes of poverty and underdevelopment. Thus it 
is difficult to carry out mitigation activities successfully. For example, many 
of the most vulnerable areas are urban squatter settlements that have 
sprung up due to lack of opportunity in rural areas. They are often situated 
on hazardous sites because governments have failed to provide suitable 
alternatives due to incapacity, neglect, or failure to seek land reform. For 
people living there, two of the traditional tools of mitigation, zoning and 
building regulations, simply will not work. Thus prevention and mitigation 
can work only in situations where all these problems are addressed. In
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summary, progress toward development is required in order to mitigate, 
and mitigation is required in order to develop.
Preparedness, on the other hand, offers something that governments and 
agencies can do now, at low cost, and that can have positive results in any 
situation.
Disaster preparedness measures can be undertaken with the skills that are 
available within the country, with the technological resources that are 
available, and usually with little outside assistance. The most vulnerable 
areas can be identified; contingency plans can be developed; where 
necessary, supplies or materials can be stockpiled; and plans can be drawn, 
outlining the actions to be taken by all concerned.
Preparedness is at best an interim measure. Monies spent on prepared­
ness are considered nonrecoverable and they will not contribute to 
development. But while the benefits of preparedness are short-term, this 
investment can save lives, and money spent on preparedness will help to 
reduce the incidence of suffering following the disaster and can shorten 
recovery time.
MITIGATION
The objective of disaster mitigation is, obviously, to lessen the impact of a 
disaster. Traditionally, mitigation has concentrated on human settlements 
and man-made buildings and structures, with the focus on development of 
land use regulations, settlement planning, the development of techniques 
for strengthening buildings and structures, and the development of 
building codes to encourage or enforce use of these building techniques.
A broader and more progressive view of mitigation has evolved in the last 
decade. For example, efforts can be taken to diversify economies and to 
balance and place job- and income-producing resources strategically so as 
to reduce the likelihood that all would be affected in a disaster. Economic 
buffers such as insurance have received new emphasis. In the agricultural 
sector, there have been conscious moves to reduce the vulnerability of one- 
crop societies by diversifying the staples and introducing new cropping 
methods.
Concepts in Mitigation
Mitigation activities can be classified as passive or active. Passive mitigation 
is the development or application of measures such as building codes, land 
use, zoning, and urban or regional planning techniques to reduce 
vulnerability. Active mitigation encompasses those activities that require 
direct contact with the people. When using active approaches, the
208 Disasters and Development
implementing body assumes the role of an activist in helping to guide 
balanced growth and reduce vulnerability. Activities include public 
education, the introduction of modification techniques, the initiation of 
housing improvement programs, the promotion of land swaps or re­
location of people from vulnerable to suitable and safe sites, and economic 
diversification of those sectors most vulnerable to disasters. Passive 
mitigation measures cannot work without active measures to follow them 
up. But active mitigation can be independent of passive activities.
In practice, passive activities have had little impact on reducing 
vulnerability in the Third World. For the most part, zoning and building 
codes are unenforceable. This is in part due to the fact that the codes 
adopted are often based on those developed in the industrialized countries 
for engineered structures. In the few countries where people have 
attempted to develop applicable codes for nonengineered structures, the 
types that most Third World people live in, the methods chosen to reinforce 
the buildings have proved too costly or too complicated for local craftsmen 
to understand and implement. Several innovations, however, have been 
introduced, including the use of building guidelines that describe the 
options for increasing the resistance of a building through simple and low- 
cost methods, and the use of performance standards in lieu of the more 
restrictive zoning and land use regulations.1 Zoning and building regula­
tions are usually considered restrictive. Active mitigation is considered 
more “permissive” and usually allows for more variations based on local 
needs.
Steps in Mitigation
Reducing the harmful effects of natural disasters requires actions on three 
fronts: reducing vulnerability of the physical setdements and houses; 
reducing vulnerability of the economy; and the strengthening of the social 
structure of a community, so that coping mechanisms can help absorb the 
shock of a disaster and promote rapid recovery.
REDUCING PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY
Vulnerability reduction for communities and human setdements has been 
emphasized more than any other activity to date, and the methodology 
employed has been thoroughly tested. The first step is to identify the high- 
risk areas. This is done by relating a hazard, such as an earthquake, to the 
terrain and to the probability that such an event will occur. This activity is
I. For further information on the use of building guidelines, see the Save the Children Fund 
“Report on thejoyabaj Reconstruction Program,” Report #2, August 1976.
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known as risk mapping and the results of the analyses are usually presented 
in the form of risk maps,” which show the type and degree of hazard 
represented by a particular natural phenomenon on a given geographic 
location. Earthquake risk mapping, for example, identifies faults and the 
underlying geological conditions of the locality. Flood plain mapping 
indicates the areas likely to be covered by water during floods of given 
magnitudes (Krimgold 1974).
A further refinement of risk mapping is known as microzonation, which 
is simply risk mapping at a very small scale. For example, within any 
particular area there are numerous geological variations that can dampen 
or reduce the forces of earthquakes. Thus, even within a high risk zone, 
some areas will be safer than others. Microzonation delineates each of these 
areas so that communities can select the safest possible sites for develop­
ment, or the location of critical facilities.
Risk mapping requires technical skills and the application of various 
scientific disciplines; thus it is said to be a function of the technical services. 
Risk mapping is usually assigned to organizations at the government level 
and can be a joint effort of such groups as geological departments, 
meteorological services, and water resource management departments. The 
disciplines involved could include geology, meteorology, hydrology, 
engineering, geophysics, geography, agriculture, forestry, physics, car­
tography, and remote sensing.
This is not to say that high-risk areas cannot be identified by nontechnical 
means. Certainly, historic patterns of disaster and the recurrence of disaster 
hazards can provide a practical guide in determining whether or not a 
community is at risk from certain phenomena. (People have explored many 
resources in an attempt to gather historical information about disasters. In 
Latin America, it is not uncommon to review old church records for 
information about earthquakes. In Jamaica, researchers trying to determine 
the occurrence of storm surges turned to accounts of shipwrecked Spanish 
gold fleets and pirates’ log books for information on the date and location 
of the events. And the attempt to recover stolen Maya artifacts known as 
stelae from Central American archeological sites received new impetus 
when it was learned that many of the stelae recorded significant events such 
as severe storms and earthquakes.)
The second step in vulnerability reduction is to identify those com­
munities that are particularly susceptible to damage or destruction. This is 
done by relating risk to human settlements and their structures. One 
determines whether a community is situated on a site within a high-risk 
area, and if this is the case, the specific areas that are the most vulnerable, 
based on the microzonation data. At the same time, the buildings and 
structures (such as dams and hydroelectric facilities) are evaluated to
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determine if they can withstand the forces in nature to which they may be 
subjected.
Vulnerability analysis is said to be both a technical and planning 
function. Many of the disciplines involved in risk mapping are also involved 
here, but emphasis clearly shifts to engineering, architecture, and 
planning.
The third step is the selection of the vulnerability reduction strategy. This 
requires two sets of actions. First is the determination of the site strategy. 
Options may include construction of protective works, such as embank­
ments, to protect from flooding; zoning to control development of the site; 
restricted development (to ensure that any development meets certain 
standards that take into consideration the threat to the site), and land swaps, 
which would provide alternatives to development of the site.
The second set of actions determines the structural strategies for reducing 
vulnerability. These include the imposition of design criteria or building 
standards to govern construction; the modification of existing structures; 
and the replacement of existing structures with newer buildings more 
resistant to disasters.
The selection of vulnerability reduction strategies is again considered 
both an engineering and a planning function, but a new dimension—the 
political one—is added at this point, for in the end, the strategies selected 
will be the result of political decisions, based as much on a government’s 
capabilities as on its perception of the possibilities, potential, and value of 
mitigation.
Peru provides a good example for examining the physical vulnerability 
reduction process. It is one of the most seismically active countries in the 
world; between 1970 and 1980, several minor and two major earthquakes 
struck the country.
Peru is situated on the South American Plate, close to a major fault, 
where the South American Plate abuts the Nazca Plate (see page 211). At this 
juncture, there is a subduction zone, which means, in effect, that the faster- 
moving South American Plate is attempting to pass over the slower-moving 
Nazca Plate. It is this relative movement that causes the earthquakes that 
periodically affect the country.
While earthquakes can occur anywhere along this subduction zone, as a 
general rule the earthquakes will be stronger the closer they occur to the 
earth’s surface. This means that the coastal region and western-most 
portions of the mountains will experience more ground motion than the 
eastern portions of the country.
Major fault systems exist throughout the mountains, however, and any 
earthquake that occurs in the western-most regions can trigger movement 
along a parallel fault farther inland. One example is the earthquake that
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occurred near Chimbote in 1970. The epicenter was located in the ocean 
west of Chimbote, but its effect was felt in the mountain regions near the 
city of Huaraz, which is located on one of the major parallel fault systems in 
the mountains.
By locating the major fault systems and recording the movement of the 
faults, as well as examining the history of earthquakes throughout the 
country, it is possible to assemble maps showing where the greatest seismic 
activity occurs and to identify the relative potential for recurrence of seismic 
activity in each of the zones. This information is presented in the map on 
page 213.
The casualties and widespread damage in each earthquake have under­
scored the vulnerability of the population and shown that the housing stock 
of the vast majority of the people cannot withstand the forces of the 
earthquakes. Making the houses safe requires one of two approaches: either 
provision of stronger building systems, or re-engineering the building 
materials now used. Both approaches are possible, but they require 
resources not widely available to the majority of the population, namely, 
money, materials, and technical skills. Almost 80 percent of the people in 
Peru live in nonengineered structures. Even within the larger cities (for 
example, Lima, Arequipa, lea, Trujillo), engineering and architectural 
input into housing construction is minimal. In Lima alone, over three 
million people live in nonengineered buildings that do not meet basic 
criteria for earthquake-resistant construction.
The map on page 214 shows the predominant housing type for different 
areas of Peru. To the side of each type is a number representing its potential 
for collapse in an earthquake. This map shows that the most vulnerable 
structures are located along the coast and in the mountainous regions. By 
comparing the map on p. 214 with the maps on pages 213 and 215 
(showing population distribution), we can identify the most vulnerable 
regions of Peru. These are illustrated on page 216.
REDUCING ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY
Reducing economic vulnerability follows much the same pattern as does 
reducing physical vulnerability. Step one, for example, is virtually the same, 
namely, identifying those areas where there is a high probability that a 
disaster event could occur. The second step is to identify the sectors of the 
economy that are vulnerable in disasters. This is done by relating risk to 
economic activities or means of production. First, the key elements of the 
economy and those that are particularly vulnerable to a disaster are 
identified. Often this is not difficult, especially for countries that have one- 
crop economies, or only a few industries, or are earners of foreign currency. 
Every economic activity should be examined, however, to determine
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whether each type of threatening event could affect a significant portion of 
that activity. This type of analysis should be conducted both at the macro 
and micro levels. While a flood may not have a significant economic impact 
on a country as a whole, it may have a major impact on a community or 
region.
In determining economic vulnerability, there are other critical activities 
and installations that should be considered. Energy facilities and systems 
are of prime concern, as are transportation networks and road systems, in 
addition to financial institutions. Vulnerability studies in Jamaica revealed 
that the main power generating station, the fuel-oil storage depot, the 
principal wharves, the largest airport, the central bank, and the govern­
ment’s central data processing center, as well as the major financial 
institutions, were all located in areas subject to damage from earthquakes, 
hurricanes, flash floods, and land subsidence in earthquakes, not to 
mention fire or explosion from a nearby refinery.
The third step is the selection of a vulnerability reduction strategy. 
Economic protection can be provided in three ways: diversification, 
insurance, and the establishment of reserves. Diversification spreads the 
risk, so that if a disaster occurs, the total losses in any one area or sector are 
acceptable. For many countries, diversification can be a difficult choice. 
Small nations that are dependent upon one or two crops for their livelihood 
may find it politically difficult to justify diversification simply on grounds of 
disaster mitigation. Once again, long-term development choices come into 
play, and ultimately the decision may rest more on political or economic 
factors than on disaster-mitigation strategies.
The role of insurance in disaster mitigation will be discussed later, but 
suffice it to say now that insurance is another method for spreading the risk 
and providing adequate capital and resources for reconstruction.
Reserves can be established at all levels. Governments can establish cash 
and food reserves that can be released following a disaster. Families can also 
be encouraged to establish savings upon which they can rely in lieu of 
insurance. Many innovative methods have been tried. Recent efforts to 
protect against famine include development of food banks and an 
international food reserve system. In Peru, where wood is in short supply, 
the government has established forest preserves with fast-growing eucalyp­
tus trees, which can be used by communities in times of disaster for 
rebuilding houses.
Other simple measures can also be effective. In hurricane areas where 
crops are harvested just before the hurricane season, small farmers can be 
encouraged to build ferro cement or other strong grain silos to help protect 
harvests until they are sold. Agencies should help communities to identify 
small-scale community-based measures to reduce vulnerability.
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REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF A COMMUNITY
Reducing the vulnerability of a community social structure is the most 
difficult of the mitigation measures. For the most part, this can best be 
accomplished through extending normal development work in one of three 
ways. The first is institution building. Local organizations that serve as 
coping mechanisms can be identified and strengthened. A conscious effort 
can be made to increase their capacities and skills, thus enhancing their 
ability to deal with a crisis.
The second activity is to increase the number of coping mechanisms 
within a community. By developing formal institutions and linking these 
groups to outside resources, one establishes a vehicle for intervention and 
the provision of assistance.
The third activity is to broaden the contacts of local groups and to 
encourage whatever promotes cooperation among different elements or 
groups within the society. Such cooperation can reduce the social impact of a disaster.
In their development activities, agencies should be careful to avoid those 
that will further increase or institutionalize a society’s vulnerability. It is 
especially important to identify dependency relationships, particularly 
those that are threatened in disaster, and work to eliminate them.
By increasing self-sufficiency and reliance on internal resources, agencies 
improve the ability of local people to cope with disaster. This can be a 
mitigating factor and can help to speed recovery.
Participation in Mitigation
Disaster mitigation is the responsibility of all organizations working in a 
threatened area. There has often been a tendency to leave mitigation 
measures to governments or to intergovernmental organizations. Voluntary 
agencies, however, have an important role to play, especially in reducing 
economic and social structure vulnerability. By recognizing the threat of 
disaster, organizations can include remedial measures in many of their 
normal development activities. It has been said that almost any good 
development program can have a positive effect on mitigating disasters. In 
fact, many of the activities carried out under the normal development 
programs have done so. The introduction of wheat, for example, to I ndia in 
the 1960s and 1970s, not only improved the nutritional balance, but also 
helped diversify the agriculture and reduce the possibility of widespread 
famine due to rice crop failure or insect infestation. In Guatemala, the 
establishment of savings and loan programs by the cooperative movement
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mitigated the economic impact of disasters and gave those suffering losses 
in the earthquake a reserve of money that could be committed for 
reconstruction. Without this cash reserve and its instant availability after the 
disaster, recovery time would have been prolonged.
Thus hazard reduction measures should be taken into account in the 
administration of general development aid (Krimgold 1974). One can take 
leadership in mitigation in housing, agriculture, economic development, 
urban and regional development, village planning, and community 
organization. It should be remembered, however, that mitigation activities 
included in normal programs cost relatively little, but retroactive mitiga­
tion, especially in settlements and buildings, is very costly.
Common Mistakes in Mitigation
The following are some of the more common mistakes agencies make when 
dealing with mitigation.
1. Placing responsibility for certain mitigation activities in the wrong type of 
organization. For example, some countries have assigned physical mitigation 
responsibilities to social service agencies. It is important to determine the 
particular function of the mitigation activity and to assign it to an agency 
with appropriate responsibilities, interests, and capabilities.
2. Overreliance on passive rather than active mitigation. Many countries have 
attempted to follow the model of the industrial societies and pass strict 
legislation in the hope that these measures would encourage mitigation. For 
developing countries, active measures should be emphasized.
3. Failure to determine the complete range of options. Mitigation is a complex 
undertaking, and many options exist. Agencies should be careful to 
examine the complete range and select a mix of strategies for dealing with 
vulnerability reduction, 'not being content with the selection of only one 
approach.
4. Failure to identify all the disaster threats. Most communities are threatened 
by more than just one type of disaster. In areas such as the Caribbean, 
where hurricanes are considered an annual threat, it is easy to forget that 
earthquakes, volcanoes, and regionalized flooding also pose hazards. 
Countries must be sure to determine all the potential threats and design 
their mitigation programs accordingly.
5. Failure to relate vulnerability reduction to normal development plans and 
activities. As stressed earlier, vulnerability reduction will have little impact 
unless it is conducted in concert with normal development activities. Only
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if one stresses the development aspects will mitigation be feasible in many 
developing countries.
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
In disaster management, opportunities arise where you make them, and the 
best way to make opportunities is through disaster preparedness. For many 
years, preparedness was viewed only in terms of emergency response; that 
is, the reaction to a pending emergency and the activities that would take 
place in the immediate aftermath. Thus preparedness concentrated on 
developing warning and evacuation procedures and on limited steps, such 
as stockpiling, that would speed material aid. A more sophisticated 
approach is now being taken, and typical preparedness activities include 
predetermination of effective strategies and appropriate modes of in­
volvement, development of tools needed by the emergency staff, develop­
ment of plans for the actual response, and training for crisis operations. 
Generally, people are beginning to exploit the opportunities for improving 
the whole range of response, in all phases of a disaster and at all levels of the 
relief system.
Concisely stated, the objectives of preparedness are to protect lives and 
property from an immediate threat, to promote rapid reaction in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster, and to structure the response to both the 
emergency and longer-term recovery operations. Modern disaster pre­
paredness is based on the realization that disasters are no time to be trying 
to figure out what to do, and that the most rational course of action can be 
determined ahead of time.
Preparedness is concerned with activities that occur immediately before a 
disaster, such as warning and evacuation; during the disaster, such as 
maintaining communications and protecting critical facilities and lifelines; 
and immediately following the disaster, including search and rescue, 
disaster assessment, evacuation and treatment of injured persons, security 
in the disaster-affected area, restoration of lifelines and critical facilities that 
have been damaged, and further evacuation of areas threatened by 
secondary disasters.
Preparedness is normally seen as an activity of the planning and 
engineering disciplines as well as medical, social, and security services. 
Practical experience has shown that the best organizations to assume 
responsibility for preparedness are operational agencies. For governments, 
this means ministries that have their own communications and transport, as 
well as administrative facilities (for this reason, preparedness is often left to 
the military or paramilitary organizations such as civil defense agencies).
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Appropriate ministries are public works departments, housing ministries, 
or other “operational” agencies.
Concepts in Preparedness
As in mitigation, preparedness activities can be divided into passive and 
active categories. The more traditional activities that are usually associated 
with preparedness, including the preparation of disaster manuals, stock­
piling of relief goods, and the development of computer lists of resources 
and personnel, are usually considered as passive in nature. Active measures 
include development of comprehensive response plans, the monitoring of 
threatening hazards (such as hurricane tracking or stream level moni­
toring), training of emergency personnel, and development of the tools and 
methods of emergency response.
Disaster warning and evacuation measures are usually categorized as 
active preparedness measures, though, in fact, they can also be classified as 
an initial response to a disaster threat.
Elements of Preparedness Planning
Preparedness planning borrows from both mitigation and relief program 
planning procedures. First the risk areas are determined and mapped and 
then the vulnerable settlements are identified. Next the responses that 
would be possible in the event of a disaster are examined. Then the 
resources necessary before one can react are estimated and the deficiencies 
are listed.
Once this information has been gathered, a preparedness plan is 
developed. This includes six steps. First is the prior determination of the 
objectives to be met in each affected sector. Second, the strategies and 
approaches necessary to accomplish these objectives and plug any gaps that 
have been identified are determined.
The third step is the development of an implementing instrument. This is 
usually in the form of a disaster preparedness plan, a formal document that 
sets out the sequence of activities and the responsibilities of each 
participant.
The purpose of the plan is to place all activities in a comprehensive 
framework, so that they can be executed in an orderly and sequential 
manner. Normally, activities are divided into parts, so that resources can be 
marshaled at each critical place and stage, and disaster managers can 
concentrate on the most critical activities at the appropriate time.
Plans for a small agency or community may be no more than a brief 
checklist and description of activities with the assignment of responsibilities
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noted on the margins, while a national preparedness plan may include a 
series of documents, including network diagrams and flow charts of 
activities, subplans (known as emergency action plans) for each sector, 
department, and/or agency, scores of checklists and emergency procedures 
to be followed, along with a statement of policies. Whatever form a plan 
follows, it is important that it be written down, both to serve as a reference 
and to ensure that no activities are forgotten in the haste of the disaster.
To be successful as an implementing instrument, an emergency pre­
paredness plan must meet the following requirements:
1. It must present the sequence of activities in a logical and clear 
manner.
2. It must be comprehensive and balanced.
3. It must assign specific tasks and responsibility for each.
4. It must link appropriate organizations and establish mechanisms to 
bring people and organizations together at the critical points.
5. It must reflect the policies of the implementing agencies or the national 
government in a disaster.
The fourth step in preparedness is the development of the tools necessary 
to respond and implement the plan. Tools include the establishment of 
communications networks; transport capabilities; action plans, procedures, 
and checklists for specific areas; the establishment of evacuation routes; and 
the acquisition and strategic placement of search and rescue equipment.
The fifth step is the strategic placement of resources to be used in the 
response. For most agencies, this means stockpiling or working out 
relationships with suppliers to enable rapid acquisition and delivery of 
needed relief materials. Other activities may include drawing up lists of 
materials, personnel, and other resources, and the establishment of 
contingency funds. For the international relief agencies, stockpiling has 
become a much debated topic, with many critics pointing out that it is of 
only limited benefit unless carried out in-country. (See “Issues in 
Preparedness” later in this chapter.)
Generally, if a resource is of real value, then stockpiling should be 
encouraged in or close to a threatened community.
The final step in preparedness is training and drill. A preparedness plan 
and the tools of preparedness are of little value unless people know how to 
use them effectively. Performance is enhanced first by training, which 
means acquainting personnel with the plan and the sequence of activities, 
as well as with the tools and resources, and instruction on how to use each 
effectively. Drill includes practice designed to make each activity routine 
and thereby help reduce time of response, and to help identify the 
bottlenecks and “debug” the system. Disasters, fortunately, occur in­
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frequently. But between disasters, people and institutions change, and it is 
easy for gaps to develop and for people to forget what has been set out in 
the plan. Periodic review and drill is the only practical way of keeping the 
preparedness activities fresh in everyone’s mind and adapting the plan to 
changing organizational structures and to changing needs. (An innovative 
method of keeping the preparedness plan up-to-date has been formulated 
in Sri Lanka. Each year at the beginning of the cyclone season, the 
government holds a “Cyclone Awareness Day.” On that day, each 
government department and nongovernmental institution with a disaster 
assignment is required to review and update its plan and send a notice of 
any changes to the central disaster coordinating office.) In many countries, 
it is normal practice for critical facilities, such as hospitals and power 
generating facilities, to conduct periodic disaster drills, which are analyzed 
to determine what changes need to be made in the disaster plan.
Without constant drill and training, disaster preparedness efforts will 
come to naught. Recently, a small island nation that had been struck by 
heavy flooding decided to establish a preparedness plan. After several 
months of painstaking activities, the new plan was prepared and submitted 
to the government. Only after it was adopted was it learned that a similar 
plan had been prepared twenty-five years earlier in response to flooding in 
the same location. Because there had been no provision for drill or 
updating, it had been forgotten over the years.
Common Problems in Preparedness
A review of preparedness planning and an assessment of activities carried 
out under a preparedness plan has indicated a number of common 
problems. These are: 1
1. Overcentralization of authority and failure to delegate authority to 
local levels;
2. Failure to sequence post-disaster activities;
3. Failure to structure the emergency response and actions in the 
transition phase;
4. Overreliance on electronic communications, especially telephones;
5. Failure to plan adequate and appropriate disaster assessment 
measures;
6. Failure to build in flexibility and an ability to respond to changing 
situations;
7. Overemphasis on speed of delivery of material aid rather than on the 
process of determining actual needs and priorities;
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8. Failure to determine appropriate mechanisms for delivering aid at the 
appropriate periods;
9. Failure to establish methods for terminating or diverting inappropriate 
aid;
10. Failure to plan adequate protection of critical facilities;
11. Placing responsibility for preparedness planning in the wrong 
ministry;
12. Overemphasis on relief activities (as opposed to search and rescue, 
protection of critical facilities, etc.)
While implementing preparedness plans, agencies often fail to involve 
local people fully and to take coping mechanisms into account in the 
preparedness planning and training.
Issues In Preparedness
1. Stockpiling. Critics point to the fact that distribution of relief supplies 
rests more on human than technological factors, and that the ability to 
move materials rapidly from Europe or North America to the developing 
countries is of little consequence if they cannot be distributed rapidly once 
they arrive. Another issue is the appropriateness of the aid that is 
stockpiled. While there is no doubt that some equipment, tools, and 
resources are helpful in disasters, much of the aid that is traditionally 
stockpiled is of little real value to the disaster victims (despite the fact that 
they may stand in line for hours to receive it).
Other critics point out that for stockpiling to be effective, it must be 
carried out in or very close to the area where it will be used.
Arguments often focus on tents and other emergency shelter items. As an 
alternative to tents, some relief strategists have proposed that stockpiles of 
building materials, especially roofing sheets, be placed near threatened 
communities. Others argue that if the agency has the capability to stockpile 
materials in this manner, it makes little sense to withhold them until a 
disaster strikes, especially when they could be useful in improving the safety 
of the existing buildings. They argue that money is better spent on 
vulnerability reduction than stockpiling.
The answer to the stockpiling question probably lies somewhere in 
between the arguments. Stockpiling can be effective, especially if it is 
carried out in the country, and there are certainly some materials and 
resources required in every disaster that a poor country cannot justify 
buying. Medical supplies, especially, are costly and often have a short shelf 
life. Thus it probably makes sense for these to be stockpiled and provided
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by the international relief system. Donors should be careful, however, to 
ensure that the aid provided is appropriate and that the ability to stockpile 
does not result in the stockpiling of inappropriate aid, or the transfer of 
these materials at inappropriate times, or in such a way as to clog up the 
pipeline needed for more critical items.
2. Community Shelters. A preparedness issue that often arises is the 
question of providing large shelters for persons living in areas threatened 
by cyclonic storms. Much of the traditional preparedness literature advises 
officials to designate churches, schools, or other large buildings as shelters. 
Proponents often point to similar practices in the United States. While this 
practice has been fairly successful here, there are two serious drawbacks to 
using this approach in developing countries. In the United States, the 
buildings designated as shelters were especially designed or reinforced to 
withstand hurricane-force winds. The designation of similar large-scale 
buildings in developing countries is practical only if they meet the same 
design criteria and standards—which few do. In fact, many are less stable in 
high winds than the surrounding houses. The record of these buildings 
when used as shelters is alarming. In Andhra Pradesh, following the cyclone 
in 1977, three buildings (churches and schools) failed, with a total loss of 
over 400 lives. In Dominica, some experts attribute the relatively low loss of 
life in Hurricane David (1979) to the fact that there was no warning and 
people were not able to get to the churches designated as hurricane shelters. 
Of the six main churches, four were totally destroyed.
The second question is that of designating any building in a low-lying or 
flood-prone area as a shelter. Hurricanes can propel storm surges dozens of 
kilometers inland with awesome force that no building is safe against. Even 
if the building does survive the pounding of the wave action, the water may 
rise as high as 10 meters, entirely covering one- and two-story buildings. 
Every building used as a community shelter in the coastal area of 
Andra Pradesh during the 1977 cyclone was submerged by the surge. In 
fourteen of the buildings to which people had fled for protection, there 
were no survivors.
Thus even if buildings are specially designed or reinforced as shelters, 
there would still be a danger.
There are other practical issues involved in the question of coastal storm 
shelters. In rural areas, it would be difficult and cost-prohibitive to build 
and maintain a single structure large enough to house all the people in a 
particular region, and it is unlikely that shelters could be distributed widely 
enough to be close to all threatened families. Furthermore, the success of 
shelters would still be dependent upon adequate warning and evacuation 
systems. Unless an adequate early warning system was developed, people in
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riverine environments or on islands would be unable to get to the shelters 
in the first place.
What then is the alternative? Most experts concur that the best measure is 
adequate warning and evacuation of the threatened area. They argue that in 
areas along the coast, especially those where storm surges could occur, 
people should not be encouraged to remain. Since the technology is now 
available to track cyclonic storms, more emphasis should be placed on 
public information and awareness of the need to evacuate. This should be 
accompanied by construction of evacuation routes and hurricane-resistant 
reception centers for evacuees.
3. Centralization versus Decentralization. One of the management issues in 
disaster preparedness is the question of how much centralization of 
authority is required for the effective administration of preparedness and 
emergency response activities. When emergency preparedness was a new 
topic, little was known about a society’s response to a disaster, and it was 
assumed that people confronted by disaster would panic and behave in 
unusual ways. It was believed that a strong central office with ultimate 
authority and power would be the most effective way of controlling the 
situation and keeping the social fabric together. Krimgold has written, “An 
emergency is often used to justify changes in the ordinary procedure for 
making decisions. It provides an excuse which allows national authorities to 
decide local questions or in turn an excuse for international authorities to 
decide national questions. In the name of emergency, property can be 
confiscated, people can be forced to leave their homes and democratic 
processes can be circumvented” (1974).
The other danger is that in order for a highly centralized bureaucratic 
system to work, it must have a pyramidal and hierarchical administrative 
framework. In such systems, there is a loss of information at each level of 
the organization each time a communication is sent, and the final message 
received may be different from the original transmitted. Furthermore, such 
a system is dependent on the functioning of the central office. If that is 
damaged or communications are severed, the whole system will break 
down.
Our increased understanding of disaster response by societies indicates 
an alternative approach to management and argues the case for de­
centralization. If disaster assistance is to be compatible and “in phase” with 
actions that are occurring within the community (which as we have seen are 
usually quite logical and rational), preparedness activities and decisions 
should also be community-based. It would be difficult for a national or 
even regional disaster plan to take into account all the local variations found
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at the community level. Decentralization is important because it allows for 
local variations in culture, community, and need. Thus “the shortest 
possible distance between the people who make decisions and the people 
who are subject to the result of those decisions should be maintained” 
(Krimgold 1974).
This is not to say that there is no need for a central coordinating body for 
preparedness activities, which should be endowed with a degree of 
authority, for such an organization can assure that there is minimal overlap 
in provision of services and that all assistance is provided on an equitable 
basis (if given the proper working tools, such as uniform assistance policies). 
The role of the central office is to coordinate resources outside the 
community and help meet the needs identified by the local plan.
4. Use of the Military and Civil Defense. In many countries, responsibility for 
civil disaster preparedness is placed in the hands of agencies that are either 
a formal part of the defense ministry or rely heavily on military organiza­
tions. This reflects common practices in the United States and Europe 
during the 1950s and 60s. During the Cold War, many of the industrialized 
nations built extensive civil defense networks to respond to civilian needs in 
the event of a nuclear attack. Responsibility for coordinating activities was 
normally placed in the hands of military or paramilitary organizations.
As tensions lessened in the 1960s, it was decided to expand these 
organizations to include a response to civil disasters and to integrate the 
resources, which include warning devices, shelters, food supplies, and 
search and rescue equipment, into municipal and state preparedness 
activities. (In the United States, the change from a strictly military to an 
expanded civil portfolio is reflected in the progressive name changes from 
Civil Defense to Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, now integrated in the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency.) The reasons were not always 
humanitarian. Some defense planners saw natural disasters as a working 
laboratory for nuclear war preparations.
There are a number of advantages to using the military in a civil disaster. 
Usually, the military has an excellent and highly mobile communications 
system. Units of soldiers can operate self-sufficiently for several days at a 
time, and they have access to vehicles and heavy equipment useful in many 
disaster roles. Furthermore, the military is trained to act in an orderly and 
disciplined manner, which can have major psychological advantages in a 
chaotic situation.
On the other hand, there are a number of problems associated with the * 
military. First, military units are not suited to long-term disaster roles. Very 
few commanders are willing to allow their troops or key personnel to devote
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A tent city goes unoccupied because people were reluctant to leave their homes and 
belongings for tents in a stark, unimaginative camp. (Photo UNDRO)
extensive time to non-defense-related activities. Thus organizations that are 
dependent upon the military in key sectors must by necessity limit their 
involvement to the emergency period.
A second problem is that any organization or activity tends to mold its 
method of operation around the key participants. If the military assumes a 
major role in disaster response, activities will be molded to military 
capabilities. A subtle example of this is the emphasis on the use of tents as 
emergency shelter. Because military organizations already have the units 
and can quickly erect them, few alternatives are sought.
Another example is the way in which tent camps for evacuees are set up. 
Military engineers will naturally use their own base planning procedures 
and lay the camps out along military lines. These plans are designed to be 
orderly, compact, and to achieve a high density. While suitable for military 
needs, the plans neglect the basic requirements of adequate space for 
families, and the needs of special groups among the disaster victims. 
Furthermore, a high density may encourage the spread of disease and the 
development of undesirable social conditions within a camp, all of which 
can have a negative long-term effect on the inhabitants.
The third problem is precisely that which makes the military so efficient 
in the first place, that is, its highly centralized control system. The military 
hierarchy is designed to facilitate control and to centralize authority. But in 
a disaster, people need to get together and develop collective responses. A
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military hierarchy of decision making can discourage and inhibit this 
process.
Another common problem is that many civil defense agencies are 
dominated by senior military officers. This may result in the agency being 
subtly reformed into an operational arm of the military or becoming a 
shadow command designed to “take over” in a disaster.
In many countries the military represents the power of a repressive 
government, and local people, far from welcoming the arrival of the 
military after a disaster, are often fearful of any increased presence of the 
armed forces. Unfortunately, many preparedness experts from the inter­
national relief agencies routinely encourage developing countries to pattern 
their preparedness plans and organizations after Western civil defense 
models and thus inadvertently encourage a higher degree of military 
presence than is really desirable.
The best answer to these dilemmas is to integrate the military’s capacities 
under civilian control. The resources that are needed in a disaster and that 
the military can easily provide should be identified, including com­
munications, medical services, and transport. Plans should be made to 
place small units under the temporary authority of civil officials for specific 
tasks. It will then be easier for nonmilitary authorities to manage these 
resources, and local leaders will not feel overwhelmed or threatened by the 
presence of soldiers in their community.
An effective, and nonthreatening, way of integrating military and civil 
functions is to assign only officers with a technical background to civil 
defense agencies, and at the local level, to place command of military units 
under the authority of senior noncommissioned officers.
5. Technical Assistance. Much of the increased interest in disaster pre­
paredness in the developing countries has been stimulated by the assistance 
agencies of the industrialized countries and some of the international 
consortia of nongovernment agencies. The two most influential organiza­
tions currendy involved are the AID office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) and the League of Red Cross Societies. OFDA has taken strong and 
valuable steps in aiding the development of national disaster plans. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, OFDA (then titled “Foreign Disaster Relief 
Coordinator”) began a series of annual seminars for representatives from 
relief and development organizations in Third World countries. Parti­
cipants heard lectures from noted disaster specialists and visited state and 
national civil defense agencies in the U.S.
In the latter part of the decade, OFDA changed its approach and began 
holding seminars that were more closely attuned to the needs in each 
region. Participants were encouraged to outline and describe their own
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needs, which OFDA and other organizations could later help them try to 
meet. The most successful of these seminars was held in 1979 on St. Lucia 
and resulted in a variety of regional Caribbean disaster preparedness 
activities.
The work of the League has been influential too, not only in establishing 
preparedness activities as a function of local Red Cross societies, but also as 
an example to other nongovernmental agencies as to what can be 
accomplished through preparedness. The League has also promoted 
national pre-disaster planning by asking national societies to encourage 
their governments to develop national disaster plans. “In this activity, 
functioning as a humanitarian pressure group, the Red Cross has been 
responsible for a significant part of the pre-disaster planning which has 
taken place . . .  in the developing countries” (Krimgold 1974).
Other nongovernmental organizations are beginning to take note of 
pre-disaster planning possibilities. This is especially true among inter­
national volag coordinating bodies. For example, the World Council of 
Churches has recently undertaken preparedness activities and is en­
couraging its member churches to do likewise. The World Vision con- 
has also begun to take steps along these lines. Very promising attempts at 
preparedness at the local level are being made by CADEC (Christian Action 
for Development in the Caribbean), under a special Disasters Emergency 
Relief and Welfare Committee supported by technical assistance from 
Church World Service, OXFAM, and Catholic Relief Services.
There are a number of recurring problems associated with providing 
technical assistance in the development of emergency preparedness plans. 
First is the problem of selecting an appropriate model for the plan. Often a 
standard model or models based on systems used in industrialized 
countries are suggested as a base for local derivatives. Relying heavily on 
highly technical or capital-intensive equipment and resources, such plans 
are usually inappropriate for developing countries.
Although in any preparedness plan there will be recurring organiza­
tional, operational, and staffing patterns, it is clear that each country or 
organization requires a unique combination of these elements. Models 
developed by each country should present the best plan for meeting local 
needs and capabilities and reflect the material and human resources 
available. “Constructing models based on the characteristics of the most 
wealthy and technologically advanced nations must be avoided. The danger 
of such models is that they lead less developed societies to overlook their 
own indigenous resources in developing incremental improvements in 
their disaster preparations, thereby becoming more dependent on outside 
assistance” (Fritz 1971).
A second set of problems involves emphasis. More often than not, 
technical aid has concentrated only on relief, especially that provided by the
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international donor community. In fact, in certain cases preparedness 
assistance has seemed to be focused more on facilitating aid by inter­
national donors than on the response capabilities of the disaster-affected 
community. To be effective, technical assistance should concentrate on the 
full range of preparedness needs and activities.
The best means of overcoming many of these problems is by making a 
subtle shift in emphasis. Instead of concentrating on the adoption of 
specific models or plans, technical assistance should be aimed at providing 
a conceptual framework within which an organization can review the 
options and develop its own approach and structure. While it is not possible 
to design a preparedness model or disaster plan that can be adapted to all 
situations and environments, it is possible to develop satisfactory measures 
that will be adequate for most situations. Technical assistance can support 
local efforts by providing access to resources and information that will 
facilitate the preparedness and response activities. By bringing people 
together to discuss common issues, problems, and experiences, measures 
such as the AID Disaster Preparedness Seminars can benefit preparedness 
activities.
6. Planning the Political Elements. One of the most frequently overlooked 
aspects of pre-disaster planning is the political element. When a major 
disaster occurs, the prime minister or president of the nation will naturally 
want to demonstrate concern by taking personal steps to assist. In many 
countries, a personal representative is designated to be in charge of relief or 
reconstruction and reports directly to the chief of state. In some cases, this 
has led to the formation of entirely new disaster response teams and the 
circumvention of the networks established through disaster preparedness.
In nongovernmental agencies, the phenomenon also exists. If a disaster 
is of an immense magnitude, the head of the organization often feels 
compelled to visit the scene and “check on how things are going.” Many 
field directors have seen their carefully developed programs squashed 
before they got off the ground by one of these “state visits,” where the chief 
of the organization demanded quick action or key changes based on his or 
her assumption of what is necessary in a disaster.
It is quite logical, and indeed proper, that chief executives insist on some 
degree of personal involvement. The problem, however, is that such 
intervention by persons who are not a part of the pre-disaster planning 
process can slow, complicate, or even erase painstaking preparedness and 
mitigation efforts.
Yet there are some measures one can take to prevent such intervention 
from being too disruptive. For governments, a supervisory committee can 
be established to oversee preparedness and response actions. The position 
of presiding officer, as well as several other positions on the committee, can 
be left vacant until a disaster strikes, at which point the chief of state can
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select a personal representative to head the organization or can even take 
command personally. The other members of the committee would be pro­
fessionals, or persons who have a continuing interest in disaster planning 
and coordination, and who are familiar with the plans that have already 
been established. These people would constitute a majority of the 
committee, and during nondisaster periods, it would have a temporary 
presiding officer.
For the international nongovernmental agencies, there is no such easy 
remedy. The best solution is to try to instill an awareness of the organi­
zation’s disaster plans and approaches so that a visiting executive will not 
feel inclined to interfere. This is especially important for groups whose 
presiding officers are chosen from outside the organization, not from those 
who have “come up from the ranks.”
The Role of Volags and Small Groups in Pre-disaster Planning
Too often, groups such as volags, churches, or small community organi­
zations are omitted from pre-disaster planning activities. Many small 
groups feel that preparedness or mitigation activities are beyond their 
capabilities, or feel that it is not their place to become involved. As we have 
seen, however, small groups are among the most effective of the coping 
mechanisms and play a key role in disaster recovery. Thus they should be 
encouraged to participate to the fullest extent possible.
There are many roles that small groups can fulfill and activities they can 
undertake, especially in preparedness. At the most basic level, small groups 
can promote public awareness of natural hazards and promote public 
action to mitigate or prepare for a pending disaster. Second, agencies can 
work together with community groups to develop an organizational 
framework for meeting people’s needs in a disaster and assign respon­
sibilities for certain tasks to appropriate groups. This step, the development 
of an organizational framework for coping, is the most important action 
that can be taken at the local level.
Actions to reduce losses at the local level are called “community-based 
disaster preparedness” activities. Volags and small groups can be very 
effective in helping to organize and implement these measures. For 
example, in some cyclone-prone rice-producing areas, two ways of 
reducing crop losses could be introduced. If the weather cycle permits, 
crops could be planted several weeks earlier so that they could be harvested 
before the peak of the hurricane season. The introduction of improved 
storage for harvested rice, such as small-scale ferro-cement silos, would 
reduce losses should a cyclone strike after the harvest.
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Social service agencies, especially churches and their affiliates, should 
learn more about their role in psychological recovery. One of the most 
valuable roles played by these organizations is helping families and 
individuals overcome the emotional stresses of a disaster. It is surprising 
how few groups are adequately trained or prepared to help individuals and 
families deal with widespread traumatic events, such as mass casualties, 
family reunification, and the loss of possessions.
Organizations with access to resources for longer-term recovery should 
develop policies to guide their recovery programs. It should be re­
membered that in a region-wide disaster, the social services available at the 
local level will be minimal, and organizations should determine in advance 
what affected groups to serve and the best means for maximizing the 
resources available. The possible gaps in the delivery of social services can 
be readily identified or estimated, and steps should be taken to plan 
appropriate action to plug these gaps.
A simplified pre-disaster planning process for small groups is as 
follows:
Step 1: Identify the key sectors and areas likely to be affected in each 
community.
Step 2: Determine what types of assistance people will need and estimate 
the types and levels of assistance they could reasonably expect to 
receive from within the community and from outside resources. From 
this list, identify the gaps that will exist.
Step 3: Determine what services the organization can provide, giving 
priority to the gaps identified in step 2.
Step 4: Determine how each one of the gaps can be met and develop a plan 
for providing these services when needed.
Step 5: Review the plan and determine if the organization needs any 
additional services or assistance to implement the plan, and if so, make 
arrangements to obtain these services when appropriate.
It should be remembered that any preparedness activity, no matter how 
small, can have significant results. Recently in Bolivia, a small group of 
farmers established a new settlement in the Amazonian jungle. The farmers 
knew the best land was along the edge of a river, but also knew that it would 
flood periodically. Of immediate concern was the realization that in the 
floods poisonous snakes from the jungle would seek refuge in farm houses. 
Because medical help was hours away, the community decided that certain 
measures would be necessary to safeguard people. A church-sponsored 
organization was asked to help establish a nearby clinic on high ground, 
and to install a battery-operated refrigerator to store antisnakebite serum. 
This precaution paid off several years later when a flood did strike and a
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fourteen-year-old girl was bitten. She was subsequently saved by the serum 
that had been stored.
The Role of Insurance
Insurance is a mitigation measure often overlooked in disaster studies. In 
the industrialized societies, insurance is a major factor in individual, 
corporate, and community recovery. Furthermore, insurance is often used 
as an incentive to mitigation. For example, insurance companies can agree 
to lower the annual cost of the insurance if a family or company in a 
disaster-prone area takes certain measures to strengthen its buildings or to 
protect the property. Insurance companies have been quite creative in 
developing mitigation incentives for businesses and industrial facilities, not 
only in the United States and Europe, but also in the Third World. For 
families, however, insurance companies have not risen to the challenge of 
developing programs for those of moderate and low income.
To understand the importance of insurance, it is necessary to understand 
the role it plays in a disaster. For families, insurance can eliminate or reduce 
the possibility of complete financial ruin. For families and small businesses, 
it can provide access to funding not otherwise available. It is doubtful, for 
example, that poor people would be able to borrow substantial sums after a 
disaster in order to rebuild. Insurance is a cheap way to make sure that they 
have access to these funds.
Other factors such as the impact of insurance following a disaster should 
not be overlooked. First, insurance proceeds are a means of injecting 
unfettered capital into a post-disaster situation. All other funding sources 
after disasters have certain constraints. Loans may be provided to disaster 
victims, but they will normally be given only for a specific purpose, for 
example, reconstruction of housing or rehabilitation of businesses. In 
many cases, the borrower will never actually see the money, or will have 
little say over how it can be spent. Insurance, on the other hand, pays 
money directly to policy holders, who can use the money as they see fit. 
More often than not, the individual will reinvest the money to replace the 
loss, but the choice is left up to the individual.
Second is the effect that a rapid payoff can have on a community. It 
normally takes two to six weeks for insurance companies to assess damages 
and pay out their claims. Some researchers have noted that quick and 
substantial settlements can have a major impact on lessening the emergency 
period and beginning a transition into rehabilitation and reconstruction. In 
Dominica in 1979, the beginning of reconstruction was marked by the 
settlement of insurance claims. This injection of capital, even on a small 
scale, has not only a psychological benefit, but can also stimulate rehiring
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and the restart of markets. As a rule, the larger the payoffs or the greater the 
percentage of people covered by insurance, the more quickly recovery will 
begin and the shorter the recovery period.
Third is the role that insurance plays in reducing the burden on financial 
institutions in the afflicted community. If businesses and industries, 
especially, are not insured, the money for their reconstruction will have to 
be provided by the financial houses within the community, or from nearby 
regions. This reduces the capital available for reconstruction of small 
businesses and for use by families and individuals.
Thus insurance can have a major impact on mitigating the effects of a 
disaster. Unfortunately, there are few creative programs or companies that 
are willing to extend these benefits directly to the poor. There are, however, 
some indirect means of providing these benefits. For example, the 
institutions to which poor people belong may be insurable when the 
individuals and families are not. This is especially true in the case of 
cooperatives. Dominica again provides a good example. The Dominican 
economy is based on two crops. Approximately 60 percent of the farmers 
produce either bananas or coconuts. Most of the farmers work small plots 
of land, averaging less than twenty acres. All the farmers belong to a 
producers’ cooperative and sell their produce through the cooperative to 
one authorized buyer (in the case of bananas, to WINDBAN, the Windward 
Islands Banana Company).
Because most of the farms are marginal, it would be impossible for the 
farmers to obtain insurance on an individual basis. WINDBAN, however, 
as a corporation and major exporter, can buy insurance and did so prior to 
the hurricane. After the disaster, WINDBAN received a settlement of 
several million dollars. WINDBAN, in turn, divided this among the farmers 
based on a fixed amount per acre. Farmers received only slightly less than 
the amount that they would have received from sales of their crops during 
that year. With this influx of capital, farmers were able to clear their land 
and purchase the new plants and seedlings needed to reestablish their 
groves. This had other positive benefits. The people purchased their 
replacement supplies through the normal markets, and thus were able to 
help stimulate recovery in that sector.
Volags and other development groups can play a significant role by 
working with their counterparts, especially cooperatives and other com­
munity-based institutions, to develop innovative insurance schemes to 
extend the benefits of insurance to the poor.
13
Program Planning and Management
The delivery of relief and reconstruction aid can be improved substantially 
by detailed program planning and through sound program management. 
Program planning is the more important, for if all aspects of the program 
are thoroughly considered, if objectives are clearly defined, and tasks are 
properly sequenced, many of the management problems that often develop 
can be avoided. Program planning is not complicated and does not take a 
lot of time. The following is a description of some of the key considerations 
and steps in post-disaster program planning and management.
DETERMINING HOW AND WHERE TO INTERVENE
The first step in intervention is deciding how and where the agency can be 
most helpful. As already mentioned, one of the earliest activities following a 
disaster is disaster assessment. It was also mentioned that there are two 
types of assessments, namely, damage assessment and needs assessment. 
For most relief and reconstruction programs, needs assessment is the more 
important. Needs can best be determined by visiting representative areas 
and talking to selected groups in the affected communities. Emergency 
needs are usually obvious; long-term needs may be more difficult to 
ascertain. Furthermore, needs change from day to day. What is important is 
identifying the needs at the times they must be met.
Once the basic needs have been identified, they should be quantified. 
Agencies should be careful not to become too involved in surveying, but 
should attempt to estimate percentages of families requiring different types 
of assistance. “A count needs to be taken of the reserves of food, medicine, 
clothing and building materials existing within the community, and of the 
capacity of the victims to help themselves and each other. Rarely will
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everyone in the area be stricken, and of those who are, not all will take 
advantage of the relief offered” (Taylor 1979a).
The next step is to determine what gaps exist in the overall delivery of 
assistance. Agencies should remember that other relief organizations will 
also provide aid, and their plans should be taken into account before the 
agency decides which activities it will undertake in any particular area.
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INITIAL STEPS IN PROGRAM PLANNING
Once an agency has decided on a certain course of action, the next step is to 
define precisely what the program hopes to attain and to establish a 
framework for guiding the decisions that will be required in subsequent 
activities. To do this, an agency first sets its policies, establishes goals and 
objectives, and finally selects the strategies and approaches by which to 
attain the objectives. The process sounds simple and, in fact, it is. Yet it is 
surprising how many agencies fail to use these practices and flounder 
because no one is sure precisely what the goals of the program are.
Setting Policies
Policies are used to shape the response. They provide a framework, or 
standard, by which choices are measured. Setting policies is one of the 
easiest of all the program planning steps, but unfortunately is the one that is 
the most often neglected. Ideally, an agency that frequently responds to 
disasters sets its policies as part of its preparedness activities, and thus, 
when a disaster breaks, those involved in the initial program have some 
guidance in structuring their decision making.
The following policies, which were derived by the CRS staff in the 
Dominican Republic to guide its housing reconstruction program following 
Hurricanes Frederick and David in 1979, demonstrate how simple a policy 
framework can be:
To support and expand local actions or groups;
To conduct all activities in such a way as to meet development goals;
To maximize all expenditures through recapture of funds, extension of 
buying power, multiple objective planning;
To give priority to people who are not eligible for any other form of 
assistance (or to those one step up);
To rely on appropriate technology;
To spend majority of funds within the project areas;
To give priority to [a particular] area or sector.
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Every time an organization then needs to make important choices, it can 
first review them against the policies it has set to determine whether or not 
the choices “fit.”
Objectives
Identifying the objectives of the program is the next step in planning. 
Again, the setting of objectives does not need to be overly complicated. 
Each objective can be put in a narrative form and should describe what the 
agency hopes to obtain by each action or set of actions in each program or 
sector of activity. Once again, an example of objectives from the CRS 
program in the Dominican Republic:
To upgrade the standard of housing within the project area;
To provide increased job opportunities;
To improve or diversify local skills;
To provide alternate income to people whose economic livelihood has 
been hurt by the storm;
To restore or develop new equitable marketing systems within the project.
During the discussion of objectives, staff should also discuss how 
programs in different sectors can be tied together to attain broader results. 
An agency should strive for balance and look at more than one way of 
attaining a particular objective.
Goal Setting
Goal setting is the quantification of objectives. The purpose is to determine 
how much assistance is going to be provided and how many beneficiaries 
will be recipients. (It is at this point that the quantification of the disaster 
assessment is helpful.)
Some examples of goals from the CRS program:
To reach 25 percent of the low-income people within the project area;
To provide 1000 loans, 5000 subsidies, 1000 grants in the project area;
To increase the margin of safety in the housing affected by this program by 
50 percent.
Goal setting in itself is not a difficult process, but establishing realistic 
goals requires much forethought and discussion. It is at this point that the 
agency must balance its desire to help against the realistic assessment of its 
own capabilities.
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The Determination of Strategies and Approaches
The determination of strategies and approaches is the final step in 
conceptualizing a relief or reconstruction program.
To differentiate between the two terms, a strategy is the plan for attaining 
the goal, while an approach is the method used. The following example 
should clarify the differences further. In order to provide replacement 
housing after a disaster, the strategies open to an agency are:
1. To provide indirect assistance by stimulating the housing industry;
2. To provide direct assistance by giving loans and grants;
3. To provide direct assistance by establishing a housing program.
Assuming that the strategy chosen by the agency is to establish a housing 
program, some approaches that might be available include:
1. To provide the needed construction materials and tools;
2. To provide materials and technical assistance in an aided self-help 
construction program;
3. To establish a construction team and build frames and roofs of houses, 
but leave the remainder of the construction and finishing details to the 
homeowner;
4. To establish a construction team and rebuild complete replacement 
houses for a designated number of people in the project area.
The selection of one strategy or approach should not preclude the 
adoption of others if the resources of the agency allow. It is especially 
important that approaches be balanced and complementary.
SETTING UP THE PROGRAM
Once an organization has conceptualized its program, the process of 
putting it into operation begins. This entails allocating resources, developing 
program management, and monitoring the projects.
Resource Allocation
The allocation of resources, especially money, is one of the most difficult 
choices that an agency will face. It is important to balance the program and 
to try to develop an appropriate mix of responses. It is impossible to 
describe all the choices that exist for programs in each of the different 
sectors, but there are some concepts that are helpful to know for programs
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in general. The first set describes ways in which funds can be stretched; thus 
they are known as funding concepts.
1. Linking to other programs. This is the simplest and most effective way to 
expand the capabilities of an organization. The methods usually considered 
are cost sharing, pooling of resources, or contributing matching funds.
2. Recoverable funding. In recoverable funding, all or a portion of the 
funds distributed are returned to the program (usually for reinvestment). 
The most common examples are revolving loans and sales or subsidy 
schemes. Recoverable funding increases the number of people who can be 
served and extends the “service” of the cash originally committed.
3. Maximization of buying power. This refers to the practice of selectively 
spending money so that the financial power of either the programs or the 
beneficiaries is extended. For example, if loans are determined to be a 
viable option, an agency can use its money to guarantee loans from normal 
financial institutions to clients who normally would not be eligible, instead 
of using its own resources to make the loans. In this manner an amount of, 
for example, $100,000 could be used to guarantee up to $1,000,000 or 
more in loans, thus increasing ten-fold the buying power of the money the 
agency has on hand. At the individual level, an example of maximizing 
expenditures is the use of coupons or redeemable certificates (such as food 
stamps) to increase the buying power of the people. In this way, the 
resources of the agency can be “piggybacked” with the resources of the 
victims.
4. Multiple objective planning. Here expenditures are targeted so that more 
than one objective is reached with each disbursement. At its most 
sophisticated, it is the placement of money in the community in such a way 
that most will stay in the community or at least pass through several hands 
before leaving. A sample scenario: a work project is established to repair a 
road damaged by the disaster, people are paid in cash and coupons 
redeemable in local markets only, the workers spend the money and help 
stimulate recovery of the market, which in turn buys goods from the 
farmers affected by the disaster. The objectives reached: a road is repaired, 
capital is provided to the victims, the victims’ buying power is extended, the 
market is stimulated, an economic unit (the market) is assisted, and finally, 
the farmers (victims themselves) are assisted. The number of contacts 
handling the money: three.
The second set of concepts describes some guiding principles for 
balancing a program.
1. Concentration of resources. In order to have the maximum effect on a 
community, a program should concentrate its resources in a specific 
geographic area. The size should be such that funding activities are
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complementary and expenditures in one sector can have an effect on other 
sectors in the same community. If an agency is funding a housing program 
in one community and an agricultural recovery program in another, the 
result will be less effective than if they were in the same community and the 
overall cost will be higher.
2. Balance between family and community assistance. Most international relief 
agencies, especially the volags, tend to respond to disasters with programs 
to assist families. Community assistance is left to the government and its 
donors. In certain situations it is impossible for intervenors to coordinate so 
that both families and communities receive assistance concurrently and a 
degree of balance is attained. Yet, because full recovery is not complete 
until all sectors are restored to normalcy, it may be necessary for volags also 
to provide assistance to community projects, especially following large 
disasters where the agency is operating in remote rural areas. As a rule, 
one-fourth to one-third of the project funds should be used for labor- 
intensive community projects in these situations.
3. Loan to grants ratio. When direct assistance is provided to families, the 
financial capabilities of the average family to be served should be 
considered before deciding on the financial approach. The proper balance 
for loans and grants is approximately 80-20. It should be remembered that 
grants or donations are nonrecoverable and an assistance program will 
soon be out of business if this course is pursued. For Integrated Recovery 
Programs (see chapter 9), a suggested balance is 40 percent subsidies, 30 
percent loans, 20 percent community assistance projects, and 10 percent 
grants.
Program Management
The next step in setting up a program is to establish the management 
apparatus. Activities include establishing a table of organization (or 
organigram, as it is often called), developing a budget, and hiring the staff 
and consultants. The more professional agencies have organized project 
management systems that provide a sequenced guide for the staff to follow.
W hatever m ethod an organization chooses for m anaging its program, 
several aspects o f  each activity should be considered.
e s ta b l is h in g  a  t a b l e  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n
As pointed out earlier, tables of organization can have a subtle effect on the 
way in which programs are executed. In theory, a table of organization is 
the instrument for organizing the staff and for establishing lines of
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authority, a hierarchy of responsibility, and lines of communication. Setting 
up an organigram is in itself an art, and care must be taken to ensure that 
decision making is not inadvertently restricted and that the flow of 
information is not inhibited.
1. Form should follow function. The structure of an organization should be 
built around the activities that it is going to conduct. To do this, the planner 
classifies all the activities that are related by either function or by the skills 
or compatibility of skills necessary to carry out a set of tasks. Administrative 
tasks, for example, should be assigned to administrative staff. Operational 
tasks should be assigned to operational units or personnel with operational 
skills, tools, or other capabilities.
2. The organigram should encourage participatory management. While decision 
making and clear lines of authority are required, there must be appropriate 
mechanisms that give people access to decision makers and encourage 
participation at the highest levels. This can often be accomplished by 
establishing citizens’ advisory councils or boards at the upper levels of the 
program and project area committees at the lower levels. By developing 
mechanisms for participation by the victims, an agency facilitates the flow 
of information from the community to the program.
3. Retain a reasonable span of control. A common weakness of many tables 
of organization is that key people are assigned too many responsibilities. In 
management, this is known as “exceeding the span-of-control limits.” 
Span-of-control describes the number of subordinates or activities that any 
one person can control or supervise effectively. Individuals have a limit as 
to how many different activities they can juggle at any one time. The 
maximum is seven. For most people, the span-of-control limit is between 
three and five. Thus, when setting up an organigram, care should be taken 
that the number of subordinates or activities that an individual is required 
to supervise does not exceed this limit.
4. Establish shortcuts. In establishing an organigram, the planner should 
ensure that there are channels that allow those at the lower echelons of a 
program to have access to those at the upper echelons and persons in 
authority. In industry, this is handled by establishing workers’ committees, 
unions, or trade guilds. The larger a program, the more important it is for 
the people who are doing the work to have a voice in the program and a 
representative or advocate at the highest levels. Because of the nature of 
relief programs, the higher turnover of staff, and the mix of expatriates and 
local people, staff problems are greater than in most other organizations. If 
mechanisms are placed into the organigram that can provide an “escape 
valve” to relieve the pressures, a program will run much more smoothly in 
the long run.
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STAFFING
Staffing of a relief program also requires careful consideration. In the initial 
aftermath of a disaster, there is an abundance of volunteers for emergency 
programs. The majority of these are victims and they can be hastily 
organized to carry out the relief activities. (The more sophisticated 
activities, such as epidemiological surveillance, initial damage assessment, 
and restoration of lifelines are normally carried out by pre-designated 
agencies or officials according to a disaster response plan.)
In the later phases of a disaster, a different type of staff is normally 
needed to carry out recover)' and reconstruction programs. Additional skills 
will be required in administration, as well as certain technical fields, and a 
greater degree of sophistication in overall program planning and manage­
ment will be necessary. The bulk of the actual fieldwork, of course, will still 
be carried out by the victims themselves and persons recruited from the 
project area or the surrounding area.
At the end of the emergency, a change in staffing will be necessary. Most 
emergency activities can be carried out by volunteers, whereas in longer- 
term reconsti uction and recovery activities, workers will require payment. 
The failure to prepare for this transition can delay a relief program when 
persons in key positions quit to return to their normal work. Unless this 
transition is anticipated, time and money can be lost while waiting for 
replacements. Many agencies are disappointed that people do not seem to 
want to volunteer for the longer-term activities, but people should not be 
expected to work without pay. Agencies that are committed to using 
volunteers or schemes that pay in kind, such as food-for-work, often find it 
difficult to operate beyond the transition period.
Another staffing question is what to do with expatriate volunteers. Under 
most circumstances, the majority of the relief work should be carried out by 
local personnel. In certain positions, trained professionals may be needed, 
and often they cannot be found within the stricken community. Thus the 
hiring of expatriates may be required; however, organizations should 
attempt to rely as much as possible on local personnel.
Here are several suggestions on staffing for intervenors: 1
1. Do not hire an expatriate when a local person with the same skills is 
available.
2. A proper balance between local and expatriate staff should be achieved. 
Local personnel must be included at all levels, not just the lower ranks.
3. Only expatriates with technical skills should be placed in positions as 
advisors. Expatriates in advisory positions should be assigned local
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counterparts and see their tasks in terms of training, demonstrating, and 
organizing.
4. Equitable and equal salaries should be paid to both expatriates and local 
personnel (Intertect 1974).
A final question that arises in relation to staffing is the use of technical 
personnel and consultants. In recent years there has been an increase in the 
use of consultants at all levels of the relief system. Until ten years ago, most 
consultants advised governments and international organizations. Since the 
1970s, local governments and voluntary agencies have increased their use 
of consultants, especially for specific technical services. The choice of 
whether or not to use a consultant is always difficult, and experience and 
results are varied. For the most part, the performance of consultants has 
depended on their previous experience, and at present, there are very few 
consultants who have had extensive field experience in the actual prepara­
tion and execution of post-disaster programs. Without this base of 
experience, it is difficult for them to be effective. The use of academics and 
technicians from non-disaster-oriented firms, for example, has generally 
met with poor results.
The problem is that there are few consultants who can be chosen at 
random and assigned to a disaster. Thus agencies should assess what type of 
services may be required and develop linkages with consultants before a 
disaster strikes. Consultants should receive orientation and training about 
disasters and the modus operandi of the organization. If this is done, both the 
program and the consultant will be more effective.
BUDGETING AND MONETARY CONTROL
Money is the oil that keeps the relief machine running smoothly; thus 
simple, accurate systems that facilitate budgeting and cost control are 
important considerations. Budgeting for post-disaster programs is usually a 
trial and error process. Because of the nature of the appeals system, relief 
agencies rarely know precisely how much money they have to operate with, 
and this, coupled with the uncertainties until the disaster assessment is 
completed, makes it difficult to allocate financial resources.
The popular image is that budgets are overestimated in the early stages 
when financial resources are plentiful, or that an agency expands its 
activities beyond the resources available. In practice, this is usually not the 
case. Most disasters attract an outpouring of aid, and if the major donor 
nations become involved, substantial resources will be available. Trying to 
allocate resources wisely or to establish programs that match the capabil­
ities of an organization are more often the problem than not having enough 
resources.
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Anticipating later funding difficulties, many agencies tend to develop 
their budgets early in a program. In agencies where rigid financial policies 
exist, a quickly prepared budget may inadvertently become an instrument 
that controls the program, rather than vice versa.
The most realistic way to overcome budgeting problems is for an agency 
to establish a policy on how and when it will commit its funds in each phase 
of the disaster. For example, some agencies place a significant portion (up 
to 75 percent) of all funds received from initial appeals into a contingency 
fund for use in longer-term programs during reconstruction. This allows 
the field staff to develop more realistic budgets in the later stages of 
recovery.
Whatever approach is used, a budget must be flexible and especially 
allow for inflation. If it is formulated during the initial stages of a disaster, a 
large portion of the total budget should be left in uncommitted contingency 
reserve so that the field staff can adapt to the changing situation and 
respond to unmet needs.
Many agencies experience difficulty with monetary control and have 
trouble accounting for funds. Usually this is because they do not use 
accounting systems that are adapted to a disaster situation. Good field 
accounting requires a simple field-accounting system that is easy to use, 
easy to carry, and places the emphasis of trust on the user; and training in 
how to use the system before disaster strikes. Field representatives, 
especially in the emergency, must have an accounting system that 
recognizes the need for flexibility as well as simplicity. Several agencies have 
recently begun to use simplified field-account books that have built-in 
impression pads, so that duplicate or triplicate records can be prepared and 
maintained.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
For agencies that are involved in large-scale or complex projects, a method 
for managing, sequencing, and monitoring activities and progress is 
needed. Most programs consist of a number of separate activities or 
operations that are related to each other in varying degrees. Some activities 
cannot be started until certain other activities are completed, while some 
are not directly dependent upon any others. A management tool that can be 
used to show the sequence of and relationship between various operations 
is the flowchart. Business and industry have long used methods such as bar 
charts, CPM (Critical Path Method), and PERT (Project Evaluation and 
Review Techniques) for planning and managing projects, and these 
techniques can be adapted for disaster programs.
A flowchart is a network diagram that graphically depicts the project 
activities and puts them in a logical order. Flowcharts highlight the critical
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path1 and activities that must be administered to help keep a project on 
schedule. Program managers, using flowcharts, can monitor progress and 
determine when it is necessary to speed up certain activities or operations to 
complete the project on time. Using a flowchart, it is possible to understand 
how the parts of a project should fit together. A program coordinator and 
staff can visualize how the different parts of the project relate to each other 
and test the logic of proposed actions. Furthermore, the network diagram is 
an excellent method for showing workers the plan of the project and their 
role in relation to that of others.
There are many flowcharting techniques that can be adapted to disaster 
usage, and several agencies have developed their own approach or 
technique. Flowcharts are used in two ways: (1) to illustrate a plan for 
responding to a situation that has not yet developed, and (2) to plan a 
program where the resources and events and objectives are known in 
advance.
The greatest benefit of using a flowchart is that a plan must be formulated 
for the entire project. This planning process is itself worthwhile. If properly 
developed, a flowchart can become the instrument for project management 
and control.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Throughout the course of a program, it is important to analyze actions and 
events. Two activities are required: monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring 
is the process of watching the program to ensure that it is operating 
smoothly. Incoming information is used to determine the performance of 
the program by measuring it against objectives. Items monitored are: 
whether or not the program is proceeding according to schedule, cash flow, 
overall performance of staff, and overall performance of the program. 
Monitoring is used to identify bottlenecks and obstacles that cause delays 
or that require a reassessment. It is a continuous process and is the basis for 
making adjustments while the program is in progress.
Evaluation, on the other hand, is a detailed review of the program upon 
completion of an important milestone or at the end of a specified period. 
Evaluations should be carried out both during and after the program. The 
purpose of evaluation is much broader than that of monitoring. It 
determines whether or not the program approach is valid and assesses the
1. The critical path is that sequence of dependent operations from the beginning to the end of 
a project that requires the greatest amount of time.
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impact of the program on the community. It also helps agencies to develop 
a base of information and to derive lessons learned that will help agencies in 
their future activities.
Thorough evaluations of post-disaster programs are rare. Usually 
intervenors prepare detailed post-disaster reports listing the assistance 
provided and prepare a cost analysis or audit of how the money or aid is 
accounted for. True analysis is relatively rare, however. Few reports state 
what the initial objectives of a program were and whether the program met 
these objectives. Performance data about programs are sketchy, and 
virtually none of the reports examine the impact of activities on the victims 
or the community.
There are several reasons why agencies do not conduct evaluations. First, 
most agencies do not plan in advance for evaluation, or they may cancel 
evaluation plans in an attempt to reduce overhead costs. Second, there is 
usually a high turnover of field staff, making it difficult to determine the 
basis of decisions or actions.
Some critics claim that for some agencies, evaluations may be threaten­
ing. No one likes to admit that they have made mistakes, and for agencies 
dependent upon the public’s perception of their efficiency, an evaluation 
may be too threatening. And, some agencies simply fail to see how any 
assistance that is provided for humanitarian reasons can have an adverse 
effect. A more pragmatic reason is that many agencies do not know what to 
evaluate or how to go about it.
Evaluations require three steps. The first is to determine what will be 
evaluated. The second is to choose the criteria against which events or 
decisions will be assessed. The third is to select the method that will be used 
to obtain the information.
An evaluation must be more than an audit. Among the things useful to 
evaluate are:
1. Issues that arose during the course of the program. The term issues refers to 
the broader questions that were encountered throughout the program. An 
example of an issue that always seems to arise is whether or not aid should 
be free, subsidized, or sold at full price. By identifying issues and 
examining how the program responded to each, it is possible for agencies 
to extract policy lessons that will help them to frame future programs.
2. Policy lessons. Specifically, how workable were the policies that were in 
effect and what was their impact on the program? Were they helpful in 
decision making, restrictive to the program, or simply not appropriate to the situation?
3. The structure of the program. How did the structure of the organization 
(the organigram) affect decision making? What organizational models were
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used and how did these facilitate or inhibit information from reaching 
those who should have had it?
4. The allocation of resources. Did the program represent the best possible 
use of the resources available?
5. The sequence of events. Were activities carried out in a coherent manner 
and was this sequence the best that could have taken place? Could shortcuts 
have been developed? If shortcuts were used, how did they work out in the 
end?
6. The impact of the program. Evaluting the impact of a program is the most 
important aspect of program evaluation. Especially important to determine 
are the effects of the program on the coping mechanisms of the community. 
What effect did the program have on local processes and the way in which 
people interact, and what future problems may have been resolved or 
created?
Once an agency has determined what it is going to assess, it must develop 
the criteria for the assessment. Typically, organizations tend to examine 
programs in terms of their own needs and capabilities rather than the needs 
or interests of the victims. Care should be taken to ensure that the criteria 
reflect the viewpoint of the persons who are being assisted.
The next step is to determine how the evaluation will be conducted. 
There are three general methods for carrying out an evaluation. The first is 
to hire someone from outside to conduct the study, the second is to carry 
out a self-evaluation, and the third is a combination of the two known as an 
aided self-evaluation. There are advantages and disadvantages to each, but 
in the opinion of the author, the most effective method is the aided self- 
evaluation, for it brings together the people who have carried out the 
program so that they learn the lessons. By using an outside facilitator to 
assist in the process, people hear a different point of view, and if all the key 
decision makers participate, the evaluation can have positive results.
No matter what methods are chosen, evaluating a program is very 
important. Without evaluations and documentation of experience, agencies 
will repeat mistakes that have been made countless times before, and not 
take advantage of lessons learned in previous disasters. Thus each time a 
disaster strikes, someone will have to begin from scratch and relearn all the 
lessons.
7. Winding down or knowing when to quit. Terminating program activities 
can be more difficult for agencies than would be expected. Most programs 
end when the stated goals, usually in terms of numbers of beneficiaries, 
have been achieved. Ideally, the time frame of a certain activity should be 
coterminous with each phase of a disaster in which it occurs. Thus, when a 
particular phase ends, activities in that period should be phased out. 
Because of the funding procedures for most agencies, however, funds may
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be just arriving when a phase ends, and if they are earmarked or already 
committed for activities in that phase, a program may just be starting when 
events dictate that it should be ending.
As a general rule, relief (charity) programs should end with the 
emergency. Transition programs should end shortly after people have 
returned home or have gone back to their regular work. Reconstruction 
programs should be phased out either when all activities are back to 
normal, or when it is obvious that processes initiated by the program can 
continue without further support from the agency.
By timing relief programs to events, agencies can exert some influence 
over recovery time. If, however, programs continue that are inappropriate 
to the particular phase, the recovery time will be increased.
14
Trends and Future Directions
Disasters and disaster response can be expected to receive growing 
attention from both the international community and the Third World 
countries. Here we will examine some of the current trends in disaster 
response and present some of the challenges that will be faced in the next 
decade.
TRENDS
Many of the trends begun in the 1970s will continue. An increased interest 
in the topic of disasters, coupled with an awareness of the impact of 
disasters on development, should lead more organizations (especially 
development agencies) to become involved in disaster-related problems.
A number of articles in the 1970s proposed that a central World Disaster 
Coordinating Center be established (in Geneva) as a way of achieving 
control over disaster response worldwide. These papers, some of which 
were commissioned by the United Nations Association, pointed out that 
instantaneous international communications are now technically feasible 
and proposed that the means of coordinating disaster response be 
centralized and automated to the greatest extent possible.
Yet the moral and practical reasons why such a center should not be 
established are overwhelming. The tendency would be to perceive the 
center as the place where “the action is” instead of at the level of the affected 
country. Decision making must be locally based, not transferred to Geneva, 
New York, or Nairobi.
In the mid-1970s, a new issue was put forth for discussion by 
humanitarian organizations. Intervention in disasters was redefined as a 
human rights issue (Green 1977). Proponents came to see disaster aid as the 
right of poor people in the Third World, an extension of their right to 
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survive and the basic rights guaranteed under the UN Declaration of the 
Rights of Man. Advocates pointed out that many Third World governments 
either lacked the capabilities for an adequate response or, for political 
reasons, refused to allow international aid to disaster victims. Of special 
concern were famines (many of the proponents had been active in the Sahel 
and Ethiopian famine relief programs). The advocates believed it was the 
obligation of the industrialized countries to provide aid to disaster victims 
regardless of the wishes of the affected country and urged that international 
conventions be established to facilitate intervention.
An alternate view, sometimes called “accountability,” was also proposed. 
Advocates argued that intervention is far from perfect and that since 
international aid can have only limited effect, the responsibility for disaster 
response and mitigation must remain with the host government. Efforts 
should be taken to strengthen disaster preparedness and response capabil­
ities of local government and NGOs. Intervention was not seen as a totally 
positive influence, and it was argued that forced intervention was neither 
politically feasible nor desirable from a development viewpoint. Advocates 
argued that intervention is already overemphasized, and that it obscures 
the fact that most response actions are carried out by local groups and the 
host government. If increased emphasis is to be placed on disasters, the 
focus should not be on intervention but on pre-disaster planning and 
helping local institutions cope with the problems.
With rising nationalism, however, it is questionable whether Third World 
governments would tolerate unilateral intervention by donors. If, however, 
most governments in the Third World continue to be totalitarian, and the 
internal politics continue to be laced with fraternal squabbles resulting in 
“minidisasters,” the humanitarian organizations will likely take a more 
activist posture (as some have done in certain refugee situations), and 
develop modes of operation whereby they can supply relief materials 
without regard to international borders. The consequences of this type of 
relief activity remain to be seen.
The interest and expertise in disasters is still concentrated in the donor 
community. In Europe there has been increased awareness of the influence 
of disasters on development in the Third World. New relief organizations 
are formed each year, and governments and the EEC are increasing both 
their bilateral disaster aid and their assistance to NGOs. The new volags 
have tended to follow the traditional patterns set by the existing NGOs, and 
most are active in social services and the medical and nutritional sectors.
The Europeah governments have been searching for new organizational 
structures and innovative ways to provide disaster assistance. Two organiza­
tions are indicative of this search. In Sweden the government has formed 
the Swedish Standby Force for Disasters. It is included within the defense
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ministry and is a civilian branch of the Swedish defense forces. It is 
composed of military personnel temporarily released from active duty to 
perform duties in disaster relief without loss of rank or pay, and a cadre of 
civilians who sign up on a voluntary basis for a period of twelve months. 
The standby force is organized along military lines and draws the majority 
of its equipment from military material. The role of the team is to provide 
emergency services of a relief nature (Bruzelius 1978).
The Swedish Standby Force reflects a common perception mentioned 
earlier; namely, that disasters are essentially logistics problems, similar in 
nature to military operations. Thus it is considered both reasonable and 
proper that groups organized along military lines be assigned a major role. 
The Standby Force is an attempt to develop an organization with military­
like capabilities, but without direct military involvement and its con­
notations. (The neutral Swedes also see this as a way in which they can give 
their senior military officers some exposure to the Third World).
The Swiss Disaster Relief Team reflects another train of thought. The 
Swiss have formed a specialized civilian unit to conduct research and 
prepare technical teams for service in the Third World. A small core staff is 
responsible for management and research, and a team of technicians 
headed by a permanent member of the staff conducts the fieldwork. Most 
assignments to date have been carried out under the banner of one of the 
international organizations with headquarters in Switzerland, especially the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Swiss team has 
taken a much wider view of disasters and is concentrating its efforts not only 
on the emergency period, but also on the later phases.
Of the two organizations, the Swiss example is considered by most 
observers to be more flexible and responsive to the needs of natural 
disasters. Most of the personnel supplied by the Swiss have been engineers, 
architects, or other technicians, who in most cases have provided skills that 
were not available locally. The makeup of the Swedish Standby Force and 
its military orientation have prevented the group from being effective. 
When it has been “sent into action,” the results have been disappointing. 
With large numbers of untrained, inexperienced personnel groping to find 
an appropriate role, the force has been characterized as an “overresponse.” 
In part, this is due to the lack of adequate orientation (at present, less than 
two weeks) and also to the nature of their organization, which is heavily, 
and unnecessarily, oriented toward total self-sufficiency in communi­
cations, logistics, and transport. But more basic is the role they have defined 
for themselves and their perception of disasters as a tactical problem.
The Swiss team, on the other hand, has maintained a low profile and 
because their senior staff are full-time disaster specialists with field
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experience, the organization is evolving into a much more flexible structure 
with a more meaningful role.
Disasters are also becoming of more interest to the European university 
community. Until only a few years ago, disaster research in Europe was 
mainly found in the British universities. Now active research centers exist in 
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Except in the fields of health and nutrition, where pioneering work has 
been carried out at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 
and at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium), European institutions 
trail their North American counterparts in research and applications. Most 
of the emphasis is on the medical aspects of disaster, and the few 
newcomers who are branching into other areas of disaster research are 
trodding along well-worn roads, seemingly oblivious of the work already 
done and the lessons painstakingly learned.
The appropriate technology (AT) movement has had an impact on some 
European organizations, though most of the work in AT is still carried out 
by small groups that receive only limited support from the major aid 
organizations. The Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) 
of London and its counterparts are making progress, and specific disaster- 
related needs are receiving more emphasis. There have been new efforts to 
link AT and mitigation measures. A promising development is the 
establishment of the Panel on Vulnerability Reduction in the U.K., with 
ITDG one of the core groups.
In the U.S., interest in disasters is more diverse, and the country leads in 
both research and development. The disciplines of sociology, anthro- 
pology, history, economics, engineering, architecture, and meteorology all 
have their specialized interests in disasters.
Research in the U.S. received a major boost after 1976 when, as a result of 
devastating earthquakes in Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, China, and Turkey, 
major funds were appropriated for disaster research. Most is for earthquake 
research and disaster problems within the U.S., though many findings and 
spinoff technologies have been developed that are applicable to Third 
World situations.
In a move opposite to that of their European counterparts, many U.S. 
relief agencies are shifting their emphasis from disaster relief to concern 
with the development aspects. Their approach overall is generally more 
sophisticated and flexible than that of the European agencies.
World hunger was the major concern of the American volags in the 
1970s. Many of the newer organizations were in fact founded to address the 
hunger problem. Thus food aid in both normal and disaster situations was 
of prime interest to the American volag community. This interest should
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broaden and many of these organizations will become more heavily 
involved in disasters.
Because food aid and agricultural development are so closely related, and 
hunger, especially famine, is considered a “disaster topic,” many organiza­
tions that began as food donors quickly moved to provide a broader range 
of services. This has brought about an increased understanding of 
development issues, which in turn has played a part in increasing the 
organizations’ awareness of the interrelationship between development and 
disaster issues. This increased understanding is expected to pay off in more 
meaningful disaster assistance programs.
The U.S. government has continued to be a leader in disaster response 
and research. Its emphasis and directions have not been consistent, 
however, due to the number of administration changes in the 1970s. 
Continuous emphasis has been placed on the application of technology, 
and OFDA has been under constant pressure to modernize disaster 
assistance and apply new technologies. As a result, AID and the National 
Science Foundation have stimulated much of the high-tech research. The 
High Wind Study conducted by the National Bureau of Standards (1974), 
much of the recent earthquake research, and pioneering efforts in the use of 
satellite technology and remote sensing for monitoring disasters (Robinove 
1975) are examples of the work carried out in the last decade. The emphasis 
on technology will continue, though emphasis will also be placed on 
intermediate-level technology.
In the American university community, many disciplines are involved in 
disaster research. In the 1970s, most of this effort was concentrated on 
emergency operations and reconstruction. Today, more emphasis is being 
placed on mitigation and prevention. In the early 1970s, the social sciences 
received the bulk of the research funds; today engineering and “hard” 
science predominates.
Appropriate technology (AT) has also had an impact in the U.S. Most of 
the disaster-related AT work has concentrated on the development of 
simple and low-cost ways of modifying housing to resist high winds and 
earthquakes. In 1978, the U.S. Government made a major commitment to 
support AT and created a special foundation called Appropriate Tech- 
nology International (ATI) to support and encourage such activities in the 
U.S. and the Third World. ATI has already provided funds to support work 
in disaster-resistant housing and to establish a network of researchers 
exploring the problems of earthen buildings in seismic areas. ATI, VITA, 
and other AT groups should have a major impact on small-scale disaster 
technology.
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Despite some promising efforts, the Third World has still not placed 
much emphasis on developing disaster response capabilities or on research. 
In the literature from the less developed countries (LDCs), there has been 
almost no interest in the development-disaster link. At the government 
level, this is partly a result of funding patterns and the assistance available to 
governments without excess resources to devote to disaster research and 
preparedness activities. Few volags in the LDCs have the resources to invest 
in disaster preparedness activities. As one representative said in a recent 
conference on preparedness, “We are too concerned with day-to-day 
survival activities to worry about disaster problems that may not occur 
during our lifetime.” Until more Third World volags are established, most 
of the emphasis in preparedness and mitigation will still be placed on the 
government and the international voluntary agencies. (The Red Cross is an 
exception, as mentioned earlier, having been the leader among Third 
World NGOs in its concern with disasters.)
Until now, Third World universities have neglected disasters, both from 
the point of research and from that of preparing graduates to deal with 
disaster-related problems or even to address the issues of development and 
poverty. There are few architects or engineers who can deal with the 
problems of reinforcing traditional housing to withstand earthquakes or 
high winds, and few social scientists who can advise civil defense or other 
governmental ministries in planning an appropriate disaster response to 
meet local needs.
There are some notable exceptions. In Turkey, where earthquakes are 
recognized as a major threat, the government, universities, volags, and 
some corporations have combined resources to address the problem. 
Emphasis has been placed not only on response, but also on preparedness 
and mitigation activities. To date, most of the approaches taken are along 
traditional lines, but the degree of sophistication and experience developed 
in Turkey makes it a leader in earthquake research and application in the 
Third World.
Mexico has also made great strides in this field. Early work was 
conducted in the universities, and recently the government has created a 
special office at the presidential level to coordinate research and response 
activities. Mexico’s efforts have focused not only on earthquakes, but also 
on floods and hurricanes, and interest spans all phases of a disaster.
Peru has tried to develop a coordinated approach to addressing the 
problem of earthquakes. Most research has concentrated on the improve­
ment of traditional buildings, but efforts have also been made to improve 
disaster preparedness and response capabilities throughout the earthquake
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zone. In recent years, however, runaway inflation has caused severe 
cutbacks in these activities, and preparedness measures have suffered as a 
consequence of austerity moves.
In the Caribbean, Jamaica is a promising newcomer to disaster 
preparedness. Activities were initiated by a consortium of volags under the 
leadership of Christian Action for Development in the Caribbean 
(CADEC), which encouraged the government to increase its preparedness 
measures. Following heavy flooding there in 1979, and a close brush with 
Hurricanes David and Frederick, the government established an interim 
emergency preparedness plan and shortly thereafter, set up a formal 
emergency coordination office. The staff there has begun to develop many 
innovative approaches for disaster preparedness and mitigation, such as a 
simplified storm surge warning and evacuation plan, and it is integrating 
comprehensive housing vulnerability reduction activities into the national 
housing program.
Other countries whose preparedness or disaster response activities bear 
mention are Sri Lanka (cyclones), India (housing research), the Philippines 
(typhoons, floods, earthquakes, and tsunamis), and Guatemala (preserva­
tion of historic structures in earthquakes).
THE ROLE OF VOLAGS
Throughout the relief system, in both the donor countries and the Third 
World, the voluntary agencies have played a key role in disasters. In the last 
decade, the volags have developed most of the practical approaches and 
technologies for disaster response. In the near future, their disaster role will 
expand. Because of their flexibility and diverse capabilities, volags will 
continue to be the working laboratories for different approaches and 
techniques for dealing with disasters. Because volags have exceptional 
capabilities at the village level (as well as flexibility), governmental and 
intergovernmental agencies have relied on the volags to implement their 
programs, and it can be expected that this trend will continue.
The increasing emphasis on use of volags by their governments has 
meant that expanded sources of funds are available, and many agencies not 
previously involved in disasters have expanded their services to include 
relief and rehabilitation work. But the increased availability of govern­
mental support has also created a dilemma for some agencies: how to 
increase services while maintaining independence as a nongovernmental 
agency. As the 1970s drew to a close, many agencies were seeking new 
formulas for receiving government support and developing new relation-
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The growing awareness by volags of the connection between disaster 
response and development is the single most important trend in disaster 
programs today. More agencies are taking a hard look at their performance 
and the relationship between their post-disaster programs and longer-term 
development activities.
With this increased awareness of the disaster-development link, agencies 
have begun to expand their disaster preparedness capabilities. Many 
agencies originally viewed preparedness in terms of limited steps (such as 
stockpiling) that would speed material aid. A more sophisticated approach 
is now being taken. Overall, the opportunities for improving the whole 
range of response in all phases of a disaster and at all levels of the relief 
system are beginning to be exploited. As preparedness pays off in better- 
executed and more effective programs, agencies will place increased 
emphasis on this activity.
While the number of agencies becoming involved in disasters has grown, 
so has the scope of the problem. The increasing number of major disasters 
and the growing number of people who are adversely affected by disasters 
each year have severely taxed the capabilities of all relief agencies. To meet 
expanded needs, many agencies are pooling their resources and working 
together. This cooperation has taken many forms. Sometimes it is simply 
designation of a “lead-agency” with experience in an affected region to 
serve as a conduit for funds and materials. In other cases, a more expanded 
multiagency effort has been undertaken. The pooling of money, expertise, 
and staff, and concentration of these resources at field level, has proven 
beneficial in most cases, and the continued establishment of consortia and 
task forces as an approach to disaster relief is a growing trend that can be 
expected to continue.
CHALLENGES
In the future, not only will the scope of the disaster problem increase, but 
so will the diversity of the challenge. As both our technological capabilities 
and our understanding of the social and economic aspects expand, we will 
be called upon to participate in a wider range of activities than ever before. 
The technological aspects will bring, perhaps, the most visible changes. 
Earthquake prediction, for example, is only a matter of years away, and 
agencies can expect to be called on to provide support in a variety of new 
roles resulting from this capability. Many activities, such as aid and comfort 
to evacuees, will be an extension of present roles. Others will require new 
approaches and skills. For example, if an earthquake is predicted not days, 
but months ahead, tasks that might be required could include assistance in
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temporary relocation, rapid modification of houses, warning dissemina­
tion, family preparedness counseling, and provision of temporary work for 
evacuees, just to name a few. Thus a major challenge for agencies is not 
only to keep abreast of the technical developments, but to begin now to 
explore new opportunities for service and modes of involvement.
As disaster technologies and capabilities are improved, volags will be 
faced with a parallel challenge—how to keep technology at an appropriate 
level. There is already a tendency, especially for governments, to seek high- 
tech solutions to many disaster-related problems. Simply because a 
technological capacity exists does not mean that it is appropriate, and 
volags, by virtue of their work at the community level, will be asked to 
determine the technological parameters of disaster relief.
Our growing understanding of the social and economic aspects of 
disasters will present other new challenges to volags. The current trend 
toward increased preparedness activities will naturally lead to more interest 
in opportunities for disaster mitigation. Many agencies, especially those 
involved in both relief and development, will complete the circle, realizing 
that the connections between disasters and development also run in the 
other direction (that is, development to disasters). The challenge will be to 
formulate development programs that include disaster mitigation as an 
integral part. As more and more poor communities are built in vulnerable 
environments, development agencies will be called upon to initiate 
programs to reduce this vulnerability or to stimulate alternatives. Thus the 
most important challenge will be to develop a broader understanding of the 
development-disaster-development continuum and the opportunities for 
mitigation. If this is done, we will surely begin to take the “natural” out of 
disasters.
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Glossary
Access survey: The identification of disaster-caused bottlenecks that will prevent 
or hamper search and rescue operations or delay other response activities. 
The survey would include the identification of landslides closing roads and 
the inspection of bridges to ensure that they can be crossed following an 
earthquake or a flood. See Disaster assessment.
Accountability: The structuring of programs to increase control and participation 
by persons in the affected community.
Aftershock: Continued shaking after a sizable earthquake, which may be as 
powerful as ordinary shocks. A large aftershock may originate closer to a 
center of population and cause more damage than the main earthquake. 
AID: Agency for International Development, an agency of the U.S. State 
Department.
Aid (and assistance): Can be one or all of the following:
a. A provision made by individuals, agencies, or governments with the 
objective of alleviating suffering and injustice in the developing world;
b. A mechanism for maintaining trade balances;
c. A tool of foreign policy by donor countries in their dealings with 
developing countries;
d. A method of maintaining the status quo of poor countries, thus ensuring 
preferential trading positions for donor countries.
"Circle of Fire": The circum-Pacific belt of active volcano activity. Small-scale 
maps showing active volcanoes and epicenters of large earthquakes illustrate 
a similar distribution.
Coping mechanisms: Those means by which societies, unassisted from the 
outside, meet relief and recovery needs, and adjust to future disaster risk. 
Critical facilities: Those structures critical to the operation of a community and the 
key installations of the economic sector. Examples are hospitals, fuel storage 
depots, government administrative buildings, central data processing 
centers, central banks, and police stations.
Damage assessment: The determination of the extent of physical damage to 
buildings and manmade structures. Two types of damage assessment are 
normally carried out. The first is to determine the gross damage to a
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community so that reconstruction planning can determine the aid level 
required. The second is a detailed structural analysis of typical buildings to 
determine the causes of failure and methods for modifying the structures so 
that during reconstruction, suitable steps can be taken to make the building 
safer. See Disaster assessment.
DAST: An acronym for Disaster Assessment Teams. DAST units are provided by 
the United States Army to assist in the initial disaster assessment.
DEC: An acronym for Disasters Emergency Committee. DEC is the main 
coordinating body for the largest British charities. Members include the 
British Red Cross, CAFOD (Catholic Fund for Overseas Development), 
Christian Aid, OXFAM, Save the Children Fund, and War on Want.
Development: The modernization of a society.
Disaster assessment: Surveys carried out to determine the effects of a disaster on a 
community and a society. Disaster assessment has three subactivities: needs 
assessment, damage assessment, and access survey.
Disaster “Continuum": A conceptual framework for depicting disasters and 
showing how one phase leads into the next.
Disaster-resistant construction: Used to denote the degree to which a structure 
can be made more resistant (or safe) to certain natural phenomena. The term 
recognizes that no building can be made totally safe, but that certain steps 
can be taken to improve performance or survivability.
Disaster response: Refers to those activities that occur in the aftermath of a 
disaster to assist disaster victims and to rehabilitate or reconstruct the 
physical structures of the society.
Disaster Spectrum: A means of visualizing disasters, showing how pre-disaster 
and post-disaster activities relate to each other.
Donor: Individuals and organizations that collect or give aid for disasters or 
development. Donors are distinguished from intervenors in that the former 
do not participate in the actual field operations.
Earthquake focus: The point of first release of the energy that causes an 
earthquake.
Epicenter: The point on the earth’s surface that lies directly above the focus of an 
earthquake.
Fault: A fracture along which the opposite sides have been displaced relative to 
each other.
Fault zones: A zone thousands of meters wide, consisting of numerous interlacing 
small faults. Earthquakes tend to occur near fault zones.
Hazard: A threatening event in nature such as an earthquake. Hazards are of two 
types, primary and secondary. A primary hazard disrupts human settle­
ments. A secondary hazard occurs in the aftermath of a primary hazard and 
contributes to further suffering or loss.
Hazard mapping: The process of establishing geographically where certain 
phenomena are likely to pose a threat to human settlements. Hazard maps 
identify areas that are subject to natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and tornadoes, and areas that could be threatened by manmade 
disasters, for example, areas surrounding nuclear power plants, chemical 
disposal sites, or areas (such as refineries) subject to threat from explosion or 
fire.
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Housing education programs: A program offering vocational training to home- 
owners or builders in how to build a house that is safer or more disaster- 
resistant.
Housing modification: The process of altering the design of a structure before it is 
built to make it more disaster-resistant.
Intensity: A subjective measure of the force of an earthquake at a particular place 
as determined by its effects on persons, structures, and earth materials. 
Intensity is a measure of effects as contrasted with magnitude, which is a 
measure of energy. The principal scale used in the U.S. today is the Modified 
Mercalli, 1956 version.
Intergovernmental agency: Organizations that are made up of two or more 
governments, for example, the United Nations or Organization of American 
States, and their divisions (for the UN, for example, UNDRO and 
UNICEF).
Intervenor: Atiy organization from outside the disaster-stricken community that 
provides disaster relief or reconstruction assistance.
Isoseismals: Map contours drawn to define limits of estimated intensity of shaking 
for a given earthquake.
Landslides: Mass movement or sliding of hillsides caused by the ground shaking of 
earthquakes.
Lifelines: Those facilities that are crucial to life support and that should receive 
high priority for protection or restoration following disasters. Lifelines 
include water systems, electrical systems, gas systems, and transportation 
networks.
Liquefaction: Transformation of a granular material (soil) from a solid state into a 
liquefied state as a consequence of increased pore-water pressure induced by 
earthquakes.
Magnitude: A measure of earthquake size that describes the amount of energy 
released.
Mercalli Scale: A rating scale for classifying the degree of ground shaking at a 
specific location. The scale is graded by roman numerals from I to XII.
Microzonation: Risk mapping at a very small scale. Within any particular area, 
there are numerous geological variations that make certain areas safer or 
more hazardous than others. Microzonation delineates each of these areas so 
that communities can select the safest possible sites for development or the 
location of critical facilities.
Mitigation: The taking of actions that reduce the harmful effects of a disaster. 
Mitigation accepts the occurrence of extreme natural phenomena, but 
attempts to limit both human and property loss.
Monitoring: Surveys of on-going activities to determine their progress and 
effectiveness.
Needs assessment: The determination of the needs of the victims. These are 
usually divided into immediate and long-term needs.
NGOs: N ongovernm enta l o rgan izations in the private sector, b o th  n on p ro fit and  
profit-m aking, that p rov ide services in develop m ent and  disasters.
Pre-disaster normal: The conditions, life-style, and standard of living that exist 
prior to disaster impact. An understanding o f the pre-disaster normal is 
essential in the formulation of emergency programs.
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Pre-disaster planning; The process of planning actions that will prevent, mitigate, 
or prepare for a disaster. Pre-disaster planning includes the tasks of disaster 
prevention, disaster mitigation, and disaster preparedness.
Preparedness: The attempt to limit the impact of a disaster by structuring the 
response and affecting a quick and orderly reaction to the disaster. 
Preparedness is unique among all pre-disaster planning activities in that it 
addresses actions in both the pre-disaster phase, for example, warning and 
evacuation, as well as the post-disaster phas.es.
Prevention: Activities to prevent a natural phenomenon or a potential hazard from 
having harmful effects on either persons or property. Disaster prevention 
includes such activities as cloud seeding to control meteorological patterns, 
the construction of dams or dikes to prevent flooding, and attempts to 
reduce tectonic tension by such measures as pumping water into earthquake 
faults.
PVOs: Private voluntary organizations, nonprofit organizations in the private 
sector that receive a portion of their funds through voluntary contributions 
from the public in order to provide services in development and disasters.
Quick and dirty programs: Programs designed to provide a quick response with 
massive material aid. The objective of this approach is to saturate an area 
with relief items in order to create a high impact with as little “entanglement” 
as possible. The prime criterion of this type of program is speed of delivery. 
Quick and dirty programs usually have very little long-term effect on 
recovery.
Remote sensing: The acquisition of information or measurement of some 
property of an object by a recording device that is not in physical or intimate 
contact with the objects under study.
Return period: The time period (years) in which there is a good statistical 
probability that an earthquake of a certain magnitude or a hurricane will 
recur.
Richter Magnitude Scale: A measure of earthquake size that describes the amount 
of energy released. The measure is determined by taking the common 
logarithm (base 10) of the largest ground motion observed during the arrival 
of a P-wave or seismic surface wave and applying a standard correction for 
distance to the epicenter,-
Risk: The relative degree of probability that a hazardous event will occur. An active 
fault zone, for example, would be an area of high risk.
Risk mapping: The process of identifying high-risk areas. This is done by 
correlating a hazard, such as an earthquake, to the terrain and to the 
probability that such an event will occur. The results of these analyses are 
usually presented in the form of risk m aps, which show the type and degree of 
hazard represented by a particular natural phenomenon at a given geo­
graphic location. Risk mapping is usually the first step in vulnerability 
reduction.
Search and rescue (SAR): The first activities normally conducted following a 
disaster, the intent being to locate disaster victims and to ensure their 
physical safety. SAR activities can include locating victims trapped in 
collapsed structures, removing victims from perilous locations surrounded 
or threatened by flood waters, or evacuating families or even whole 
communities from areas subjected to secondary effects of disasters.
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Seismic: Pertaining to earthquake activities.
Seismicity: The worldwide or local distribution of earthquakes in space and time; 
a general term for the number of earthquakes in a unit of time, or for relative 
earthquake activity.
Surveillance: An epidemiological survey or the health monitoring of the affected 
community.
Tectonics: The study of earth’s broad structural features.
Tsunami: A seawave produced by large-area displacements of the ocean bottom, 
the result of earthquake or volcanic activity.
Voiag: See PVOs.
Vulnerability: A condition wherein human settlements or buildings are threatened 
by virtue of their proximity to a hazard, the quality of their construction, or 
both.
METRIC SYSTEM
1 mile= 1.609 kilometers 
1 kilometer = 0.6214 mile 
1 foot =0.3048 meter 
1 meter = 39.37 inches = 3.281 feet
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